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Resumo
MMOGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Games, como por exemplo, World of Warcraft),
mundos virtuais (VW, como por exemplo, o Second Life) e redes sociais (como por ex-
emplo, Facebook) necessitam de mecanismos de confiança mais autónomos, capazes de
assegurar a segurança e a confiança de uma forma semelhante à que os seres humanos
utilizam na vida real. Como se sabe, esta não é uma questão fácil. Porque confiar em
seres humanos e ou organizações depende da percepção e da experiência de cada indi-
víduo, o que é difícil de quantificar ou medir à partida. Na verdade, esses ambientes
sociais carecem dos mecanismos de confiança presentes em interacções humanas pres-
enciais. Além disso, as interacções mediadas por dispositivos computacionais estão em
constante evolução, necessitando de mecanismos de confiança adequados ao ritmo da
evolução para avaliar situações de risco.
Em VW/MMOGs, é amplamente reconhecido que os utilizadores desenvolvem relações
de confiança a partir das suas interacções no mundo com outros. No entanto, essas re-
lações de confiança acabam por não ser representadas nas estruturas de dados (ou bases
de dados) do VW/MMOG específico, embora às vezes apareçam associados à reputação
e a sistemas de reputação. Além disso, tanto quanto sabemos, ao utilizador não lhe
é facultado nenhum mecanismo que suporte uma ferramenta de confiança individual
para sustentar o seu processo de tomada de decisão, enquanto ele interage com outros
utilizadores no mundo virtual ou jogo. A fim de resolver este problema, bem como
os mencionados acima, propomos nesta tese uma representação formal para essas re-
lações de confiança pessoal, baseada em interacções avatar-avatar. A ideia principal
é fornecer a cada jogador representado por um avatar uma ferramenta de confiança
pessoal que segue um modelo de confiança distribuída, ou seja, os dados de confiança
são distribuídos através da rede social de um determinado VW/MMOG.
Representar, manipular e inferir a confiança do ponto de utilizador/jogador, é cer-
tamente um grande desafio. Quando alguém encontra um indivíduo desconhecido, a
pergunta é “Posso confiar ou não nele?”. É claro que isto requer que o utilizador tenha
acesso a uma representação de confiança sobre os outros, mas, a menos que possamos
usar uma plataforma VW/MMOG de código aberto, é difícil — para não dizer impossível
— obter acesso aos dados gerados pelos utilizadores. Mesmo em sistemas de código
aberto, um número de utilizadores pode recusar partilhar informações sobre seus ami-
gos, conhecidos, ou sobre outros. Ao juntar seus próprios dados com os dados obtidos de
outros, o utilizador/jogador representado por um avatar deve ser capaz de produzir uma
avaliação de confiança sobre o utilizador/jogador com o qual se encontra a interagir.
Relativamente ao método de avaliação de confiança empregue nesta tese, utilizamos
lógica subjectiva para a representação da confiança, e também operadores lógicos da
lógica subjectiva juntamente com algoritmos de procura em grafos para empreender
o processo de inferência da confiança relativamente a outro utilizador. O sistema de
inferência de confiança proposto foi validado através de um número de cenários Open-
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Simulator (opensimulator.org), que mostrou um aumento na precisão na avaliação da
confiança de avatares.
Resumindo, a nossa proposta visa, assim, introduzir uma teoria de confiança para mun-
dos virtuais, conjuntamente com métricas de avaliação de confiança (por exemplo, a
lógica subjectiva) e em métodos de procura de caminhos de confiança (com por exem-
plo, através de métodos de pesquisa em grafos), partindo de uma base individual, em
vez de se basear em sistemas habituais de reputação centralizados. Em particular, e ao
contrário de outros métodos de determinação do grau de confiança, os nossos métodos
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Abstract
Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs; e.g., World of Warcraft), virtual worlds
(VW; e.g., Second Life), social networks (e.g., Facebook) strongly demand for more
autonomic, security, and trust mechanisms in a way similar to humans do in the real
life world. As known, this is a difficult matter because trusting in humans and organiza-
tions depends on the perception and experience of each individual, which is difficult to
quantify or measure. In fact, these societal environments lack trust mechanisms simi-
lar to those involved in humans-to-human interactions. Besides, interactions mediated
by compute devices are constantly evolving, requiring trust mechanisms that keep the
pace with the developments and assess risk situations.
In VW/MMOGs, it is widely recognized that users develop trust relationships from their
in-world interactions with others. However, these trust relationships end up not being
represented in the data structures (or databases) of such virtual worlds, though they
sometimes appear associated to reputation and recommendation systems. In addition,
as far as we know, the user is not provided with a personal trust tool to sustain his/her
decision making while he/she interacts with other users in the virtual or game world.
In order to solve this problem, as well as those mentioned above, we propose herein a
formal representation of these personal trust relationships, which are based on avatar-
avatar interactions. The leading idea is to provide each avatar-impersonated player
with a personal trust tool that follows a distributed trust model, i.e., the trust data is
distributed over the societal network of a given VW/MMOG.
Representing, manipulating, and inferring trust from the user/player point of view cer-
tainly is a grand challenge. When someone meets an unknown individual, the question
is “Can I trust him/her or not?”. It is clear that this requires the user to have access to
a representation of trust about others, but, unless we are using an open source VW/M-
MOG, it is difficult —not to say unfeasible— to get access to such data. Even, in an open
source system, a number of users may refuse to pass information about its friends, ac-
quaintances, or others. Putting together its own data and gathered data obtained from
others, the avatar-impersonated player should be able to come across a trust result
about its current trustee. For the trust assessment method used in this thesis, we use
subjective logic operators and graph search algorithms to undertake such trust infer-
ence about the trustee. The proposed trust inference system has been validated using
a number of OpenSimulator (opensimulator.org) scenarios, which showed an accuracy
increase in evaluating trustability of avatars.
Summing up, our proposal aims thus to introduce a trust theory for virtual worlds, its
trust assessment metrics (e.g., subjective logic) and trust discovery methods (e.g.,
graph search methods), on an individual basis, rather than based on usual centralized
reputation systems. In particular, and unlike other trust discovery methods, our meth-
ods run at interactive rates.
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Terminology
Avatar A 3D graphical representation of a character used in MMO/VWs, It is a user “alter
ego” representation in-world that characterize how users are represented and
perceived within the virtual world, usually as a 3D rendering customizable avatar
representation of an human or humanoid being
Captchas Are challenge-response tests whose purpose is to ascertain whether a particular
user is human. The test is frequently used to identify human users and block
computerized applications when signing up, for some forms of internet accounts.
An example of this use is to block “bot” players. Usually the test involves the
recognition of a distorted image of letters and numbers.
Ganking Attacking another player without warning, when he is distracted, with low health,
engaged with other activity. Usually meaning that the attack occur when the
targeted player is at high level disadvantage.
Griefing Playing a game simply to aggravate and harass other players.
Guild Represents an association of players in a MMOG/VW with similar interests or pur-
suits. Guilds are formal alliances that foment the sense of belonging. After join-
ing, usually the guild name is showed above the player’s avatar for easy identifi-
cation. It also common for MMOG to provide guild specific chat channels to ease
guild member communication.
Inventory Represents a set of assets associated with the user (e.g., clothes, items, scripts).
Lag Represent a perceptible delay between the action of players and the reaction of
the server resulting in having players with slower reactions allowing the others to
obtain advantage within game environment as their actions are processed faster
by the game server. Although lag may be caused by high latency, it may also occur
due to insufficient processing power in the client. Lag can also happen in single
player games as well.
NPCs Are game controlled artificial intelligences, designed to mimic the actions of hu-
man players. Their purpose is to provide some challenge to players and to popu-
late the MMOG virtual world.
Region or Shard A subdivision of the MMO/VW virtual world, usually served by a single server.
These sharded worlds are independent instances of the game-world running on
its own. Sharding also reduces the complexity of distributed game state coordi-
nation. Constitute a game developer solution to MMOG scalability problem. As a
hundred of thousands of simultaneous players, could not be at the same time in
the same precise location. A solution to maintain a pleasant game experience to
all was to split players by their geographic location, creating copies of the game
world known as shards. Boosting network performance and reducing packet de-
lay. The disadvantage is that players cannot physically interact or usually even
communicate across “shards”.
Virtual World Is a 3D immersive scenario representation including the landscape, avatars, ani-
mations and existing objects.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The present thesis fits in the field of trust and reputation systems. In the literature,
we find trust and reputation models for multi-agent systems (MAS), wireless sensor
networks (WSNs), vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs), but, as far as we know, this
thesis addresses the first trust and reputation model designed for virtual worlds and
massively multiplayer online games (VW/MMOGs).
1.1 Motivation
Trust is a challenging concept. Intuitively, most people understand what is trust, but
its representation and modeling in computational systems is not an easy task, largely
because of its context-dependence and subjectivity. In computing, trust has been used
broadly across a number of topics, disciplines, and applications [AG07], namely net-
working security, reliability in distributed systems, intelligent systems, game theory,
and so forth. Moreover, as [JIB07] noted sometime ago, there is not yet a consoli-
dated basis to build up a general trust theory from which we can derive a computable
trust model. Instead, we have assisted to the appearance of specific trust models that
depend on a particular domain of application.
Some examples of domain-specific trust models are as follows. In online services,
[CKW03] noted that the perception of credibility, ease of use, and risk implications have
a direct impact on how trust is perceived. These three trust factors play also an impor-
tant role in player’s perception when he/she interacts with the game services. In the
context of e-markets, it is common to have a reputation-based trust model that multi-
agent systems can use to protect agents from malicious traders [You07]. This model can
be easily transposed to trading activities inside MMOGs or other virtual worlds. Another
trust dimension has to do with user profiling. In [LDRL09], Liu describes a computational
stereotypes-based trust model to determine trust even when player’s interactions do
not match the available user profiles. It is clear that user profiling provides a valuable
insight for trust in MMOGs.
Summing up, in trust computing research, we find two ways of approaching trust. The
first is a domain-specific trust approach [AG07], while the second tries to come to a
general and abstract model for trust [MDH02]. The latter is due to Marsh [Mar94],
and is an attempt of formalizing trust as a computational concept. Obviously, further
attempts have been made in order to understand limitations in existing trust models,
having been even addressed the problem of mimicking the real life social trust in digital
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or virtual worlds [Yan08b].
In this thesis, we put forward a domain-specific trust model in the sense it was designed
for VW/MMOGs, not for e-commerce, social networks, wireless sensor networks, or else.
However, we intend to introduce a general model from the psicological and sociological
point views that applies to both humans and virtual characters (or avatars impersonating
humans). Thus, this model has to do with events and interactions between avatars
within a virtual/game world.
1.2 Problem Outline
What is interesting about MMOGs is that they seem to reunite most trust flavors we can
experience in real life, so that we believe that MMOGs provide the ideal testbed to come
out with a general trust theory and computable trust model. In general terms, and fol-
lowing [RK05], we find three major approaches of modeling trust in computer-mediated
systems: infrastructure trust, services trust, and community trust. As expected, these
trust dimensions are also present in MMOGs, which reinforce the idea that MMOGs can
work as a testbed to modeling trust in interactive virtual worlds in the future [Noo10].
According to [RK05], those three trust dimensions can be hierarchically stratified into
three layers. The bottom layer concerns infrastructure trust, which corresponds to the
initial research on trust endeavored by [Nib79]. Currently, this layer corresponds to key
enablers for the development of a trustworthy Information Society (IS) like secure and
trusted Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructures [VCS07], as
well as the evolution and challenges regarding trust and security in ICT infrastructures
[Var09]. The middle layer service trust relates to trust in online services [MS04], and
currently focuses on web services [WBOM15, ZWZL15] and the effective role of trust
in software services [DCK16], as well as trust developments on cloud services [BS16].
The top layer has to do with community trust, and is where reputation systems aggre-
gate information about the past behaviors of a group of entities as community’s shared
perception [ARH00]. In our view, this can be extrapolated to consider other situations
in which trust can be drawn from different communities like social networks [SNP13]
[GOG13], or even in immersive environments like VW/MMOGs, addressing avatar be-
haviors in virtual communities [ORMCB12], or to enhance community participation and
increase the gaming experience [BHRS09]. Of particular interest is to realize how soci-
ological factors affect trust development in virtual communities [DH08].
In this thesis, we are not interested in infrastructure and service trust, but only on com-
munity trust concerning the aforementioned top layer. This is so because infrastruc-
tures and services are more connoted with contexts like networks and online services.
On the contrary, we are interested in studying trust inside immersive virtual worlds from
psicological and sociological points of view, i.e., how avatars relate with one another
as the humans do in real life. Therefore, this thesis focuses on trustability in MMOGs,
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in particular on trust between avatars living in the virtual environment.
1.3 Thesis Statement
Currently, trust is not represented and handled in a computable form within the virtual
world. This immersive perception of trust in virtual worlds is a distinctive factor in rela-
tion to other trust modeling solutions, namely those used in multi-agent systems (MAS)
and networks. In fact, as in the real world, avatars see and hear other avatars within a
virtual world, so that their visual appearance, their posses and speech may provoke a
number of emotions that influence the way an avatar evaluates the trustworthiness of
another.
Following the leading idea of mimicking real-world trust in virtual worlds, we promptly
realize that relations established between virtual users (or avatars) result from the
interactions between them. These interactions generate data that can be employed
by the virtual engine to update each user’s status and rendering their avatar actions.
Therefore, the thesis statement that corroborates our claims is:
Assuming that in-world data generated from avatar-avatar interactions
can be employed to derive a trust representation for each individual user,
will it be feasible to have an in-world trust assessment mechanism suitable
to support and enhance users’ trust decisions?
Indeed, this thesis proposes a new trust approach in VW/MMOGs, which is based on an
individual trust representation (i.e., a decentralized trust representation) which is built
upon direct interactions between avatars impersonating users or players. In addition,
we will show that no centralized reputation system is necessary to users in their trust
decisions about others, and this holds even when an avatar meets an unknown avatar.
This is accomplished using an inference mechanism that combines graph searching (or
pathfinding) together with subjective logic [Jøs13].
1.4 Research Objectives
As mentioned above, trust is not a new research topic in computer science, pervading
areas as diverse as networking security, reliability in distributed systems, game theory,
etc. But, trust building in computer-mediated social environments such as MMOGs,
where multiple players coexist and interact using multiple communication channels like
sight, hearing, as well as some channels outside the game, is not so common, and thus
this constitutes the grand challenge of the research work underlying this thesis.
Recall that MMOGs commonly use centralized and proprietary reputation systems to
keep privacy and anonymity of players, so that trust is only considered in a limited
manner, simply because proprietary systems basically release data concerning player’s
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game scoring, not classified trust data. But, as known, reputation systems have several
drawbacks, mainly because reputation feedback can be used to maliciously degrade
other player reputation and, consequently, the reputation system, and the game itself.
With all this in mind, the main objective (or general objective) we pursue in this doctoral
thesis is to show that trust can be deployed in immersive worlds, where each individual
avatar/user makes trust decisions about those with whom he/she interacts, in a similar
way as humans do in real life. In terms of research goals (or specific objectives), they
are the following:
• To introduce the state-of-the-art concerning trust models developed within differ-
ent fields, aiming with that process to identify suitable trust modeling solutions
for VW/MMOGs.
• To devise a general security framework for MMOGs in order to identify their specific
malware and cheating problems, as well as possible solutions.
• To develop an innovative individual-based trust model in contrast to the com-
mon global reputation systems. We believe that this trust model deployed within
MMOGs is less prone to defamation and ganking than current reputation systems.
• To develop a trust inference procedure capable of providing a mean of measuring
trust in MMOGs, using for that purpose solutions that consider the subjectivity of
human behaviors. In particular, we believe that subjective logic due to [Jøs13]
can work as a suited trust metric in MMOGs.
The objectives mentioned above are the milestones of the doctoral work that lead to
the design and development of a trust model for VW/MMOGs. Let us now address the
specific objectives in more detail:
State of the Art. The value of modeling and reasoning about trust computationally has
been increasingly recognized in computing communities. Trust conceptualizations are
employed in many areas for addressing different types of issues. But, in VW/MMOGs,
trust mechanisms that provide or induce trustability are scarce. Therefore, we survey
multiple trust models from different fields to assess their viability in VW/MMOGs.
Security framework. Online games and MMOGs rises a number of security-related issues,
namely: player authentication, game availability and resilience, trust and anonymity
concerns, means of ensuring security of player and his/her virtual assets, cheating,
ganking, gold farming, game law enforcing solutions, game client problems, and also
game development issues like scalability and persistence. Therefore, MMOGs have the
same security risks as other online applications, but also present new and interesting
challenges as a consequence of the risks mentioned above. Despite the increasing user’s
awareness in respect to risks of his/her online behavior and, consequently, the inher-
ent security threats, the MMOG player usually has a negligent perception about security.
For him/her, it is just an online game, where players play anonymously for fun. The
usual understanding is that what happens inside the game world does not have conse-
quences in real life. But, many industry developers are aware that this naive judgment
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by many players does not help that much the game business, in particular when the
player credentials are stolen away, trust is also thrown away. Thus, our intent was first
to study the relationships between security, privacy and trust within a general security
framework, before proceeding to a trust modeling solution for MMOGs.
Individual-based trust model framework. We believe that this individual trust model
within MMOGs is less prone to defamation and cheating than current reputation systems.
Within a MMOG, trust builds on the interactions between avatars (i.e., their behaviors),
and thus modeling trust describes perceptual values or factors from the player point of
view, that is, trust leans a lot on psychology and sociology-related principles and con-
cepts (e.g., competence, beliefs, risk, importance, utility, etc.). Regardless of whether
trust is different from the sum of its parts or not, its parts help our understanding of
the more subtle and complex aspects of composing, capturing, and using trust in a
computational setting.
Trust inference. Developing a trust metric as a means of measuring trust in MMOGs is
a real challenge. In conjunction with the trust model designed for VW/MMOGs, such a
metric represents the grand contribution of this doctoral work. Such trust metric takes
advantage of subjective logic due to [Jøs13].
In our way to achieve a trust model for VW/MMOGs, we used a WoW (World of Warcraft)
dataset taken from Academia Sinica in Taiwan [LCCL11] in the beginning of our research
work. Soon after we realized that this dataset was of limited relevance to trust, as
data only provided location and rank-related input over a given period of time. Due to
limitations in accessing to game state and events in WoW, we started using OpenSim-
ulator [Lop07], an open-source multi-user virtual environment (MUVE). OpenSimulator
incorporates a MySQL database module to store relevant data about avatars and their
interaction experiences with others (e.g., trading, socializing, chatting, and so forth).
1.5 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis research work are the following:
C1 – Themajor contribution comes from the deployment of a trust model into VW/MMOGs.
This trust model works at the top layer of the trust hierarchical architecture struc-
tured into three layers: infrastructure, services, and community. As noted above,
our trust model lends itself to social trust, also called community trust, in partic-
ular for immersive worlds where avatars impersonating users or players interact
with one another via sight, hearing, chat, messaging, and so forth. Therefore,
our trust model applies to what is going on inside the virtual world, not outside it.
That is, our trust model is not designed towards infrastructure and services issues.
C2 – The second contribution is more specific, which results from a proposal of a trust
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framework for MMOGs based on the individual perception of trust. Essentially, the
proposed framework reconciles different trust perspectives from psychology and
sociology, because one intends to mimic how humans count on each other. This
framework is described in Chapter 4.
C3 – The third contribution concerns a new trust representation for MMOGs, which
builds upon a new methodology for collecting and aggregating data generated
by avatar-avatar interactions. This data representation is described in Chapter 5.
C4 – The fourth contribution stems from the inference operators to compute trust in
immersive environments. They are rely on the trust representation addressed in
Chapter 5. These inference operators are described in Chapter 6, and are useful
when the trustee avatar is unknown for trustor avatar.
In short, the contributions have to do with the context (i.e., VW/MMOGs), trust frame-
work, trust representation, and trust operators.
1.6 Publications
The research work that has led to the writing of this thesis has originated the following
scientific articles:
P1 – Cardoso, R. C., Gomes, A. Security Issues in Massively Multiplayer Online Games.
In M. Cruz-Cunha (Ed.), Handbook of Research on Serious Games as Educational,
Business and Research Tools: Development and Design, IGI Global, pp. 290-314,
February, 2012.
doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-0149-9.ch016
Abstract. Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) have been steadily grow-
ing in interest over the past decade. Their economic value turns them into one
of the main targets of malware and cheating in Internet. This paper presents and
discusses security issues in MMOG environments. The study starts with a prelimi-
nary characterization of MMOGs, highlighting their main features. Afterwards, the
authors present the security approaches that are applicable to MMOGs, exposing
the implications of security breaches and the need for better protection mecha-
nisms. Next, the paper presents current safety measures and solutions to tackle
specific security issues. Finally, security trends that can be relevant in the future
are described.
P2 – Cardoso, Rui Costa, and Gomes, Abel, and Freire, Mário.Trust Trends and Devel-
opments in Virtual Worlds: A Survey (to be submitted for publication).
Abstract. Virtual worlds, in particular massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs)
and online virtual environments, have not been approached by the existing trust
models and frameworks. The paper intends to fill this gap in the computer science
and engineering literature. In fact, trust research encompasses contributions orig-
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inated in different knowledge fields, other than computer science and engineer-
ing, therefrom resulting a plethora of distinct concepts, definitions, models, and
frameworks. Therefore, this survey will make usage of these multivariate trust
elements in order to describe and compare trust solutions found in the literature,
as well to show how they can be embedded in virtual worlds.
P3 – Rui Costa Cardoso and Abel Gomes. Towards a trust framework for multi-user vir-
tual environments. In Beniamino Murgante, Sanjay Misra, Ana Maria A. C. Rocha,
Carmelo Torre, Jorge Gustavo Rocha, Maria Irene Falcão, David Taniar, Bernady
O. Apduhan, and Osvaldo Gervasi (Eds.), Computational Science and Its Applica-
tions (ICCSA’2014), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 8579, pp. 754-768,
Springer-Verlag, 2014.
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-09144-0-52
Abstract. Trust conceptualizations in multi-user virtual environments (MUVEs) are
not covered as a whole by existing trust models and frameworks. Apparently, the
representation and modeling of trust in a computational environment is an elusive
task, largely because that seems to depend on the context within which entities
(e.g., users) interact with each other. Hence, the existence of multiple trust solu-
tions that address domain-specific problems. These solutions are scarce, or even
inexistent, in MUVEs. In this paper, we thus elaborate on a trust framework for
MUVEs. For this purpose, we carry out a study in order to identify and charac-
terize the MUVE specific features or data sources, as well as to assess how extant
trust models (say, TNA-SL, Regret, EigenTrust, Stereotrust and TACS) satisfy MUVEs
requirements. As a result, we get a valuable insight on how to build up a trust
framework for immersive environments.
P4 – R. C. Cardoso, A. Gomes, and M. Freire, A User Trust System for Online Games —
Part I: An Activity Theory Approach for Trust Representation, IEEE Transactions
on Computational Intelligence and AI in Games, 2016 (published online first on
July 19, 2016).
doi:10.1109/TCIAIG.2016.2592965
Abstract. In virtual worlds (including computer games), users develop trust re-
lationships from their in-world interactions with others. However, these trust
relationships end up not being represented in the data structures (or databases)
of such virtual worlds, though they sometimes appear associated to reputation
and recommendation systems. In addition, as far as we know, the user is not pro-
vided with a personal trust tool to sustain his/her decision making while he/she
interacts with other users in the virtual or game world. In order to come up
with a computational formal representation of these personal trust relationships,
we need to succeed in converting in-world interactions into reliable sources of
trust-related data. In this paper, we develop the required formalisms to gather
and represent in-world interactions —which are based on the activity theory—,
as well as a method to convert in-world interactions into trust networks. In the
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companion paper, we use these trust networks to produce a computational trust
decision based on subjective logic. This solution aims at supporting in-world user
(or avatar) decisions about others in the game world.
P5 – R. C. Cardoso, A. Gomes, and M. Freire, A User Trust System for Online Games
— Part II: A Subjective Logic Approach for Trust Inference, IEEE Transactions on
Computational Intelligence and AI in Games, 2016 (published online first on July
19, 2016).
doi:10.1109/TCIAIG.2016.2593000
Abstract. Representing, manipulating, and inferring trust from the user point
of view certainly is a grand challenge in virtual worlds, including online games.
When someone meets an unknown individual, the question is “Can I trust him/her
or not?”. This requires the user to have access to a representation of trust about
others, as well as a set of operators to undertake inference about the trustability
of other users/players. In this paper, we employ a trust representation generated
from in-world data in order to feed individual trust decisions. To achieve that
purpose, we assume that such a representation of trust already exists; in fact, it
was proposed in another paper of ours. Thus, the focus here is on the trust mech-
anisms required to infer trustability of other users/players. More specifically, we
use an individual trust representation deployed as a trust network as base to the
inference mechanism that employs two subjective logic operators (consensus and
discount) to automatically derive trust decisions. The proposed trust inference
system has been validated through OpenSimulator scenarios, which has led to a
5% increase on trustability of avatars in relation to the reference scenario (without
trust).
1.7 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. The fourth to sixth chapters constitute the
core of the thesis because they detail the trust model here proposed. More specifically,
this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 1 This is the present chapter, in which we introduce the thesis statement,
research objectives, research contributions, and publications that have resulted
from our research work.
Chapter 2 This chapter addresses the security issues in immersive virtual environments,
including MMOGs. We identify and evaluate different types of problems: the safety
of property and intangible goods purchased by users, privacy, anonymity, identity
theft. Interestingly, we noted that most players are not aware of the implica-
tions of lack of effective security solutions. Indeed, this chapter proposes a new
approach on how to address MMOG security through an information security anal-
ysis, as well as presented a comparison with previous approaches. In true, we
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end up proposing a security framework for MMOGs as a contribution for further
research on security in MMOGs. This chapter corresponds to publication P1 listed
in Section 1.6.
Chapter 3 This chapter reviews several trust models, mainly those designed for multi-
agent systems (MAS) and networks. Our study was limited to trust models deployed
in known benchmarking testbeds. The idea was to evaluate how such trust models
can be reformulated in order to satisfy requirements of VW/MMOGs. This is partic-
ularly relevant because this chapter represents the first literature review focused
on trust in virtual worlds. This chapter corresponds to publication P2 listed in
Section 1.6.
Chapter 4 This chapter elaborates on a trust framework suitable for VW/MMOGs. Trust
concepts in VW/MMOGs or MUVEs have not been addressed in the past from a in-
tegrated perspective. In this chapter we present an introductory view on existing
problems related to trust in VW/MMOGs. A special effort was made in order to
identify trust models susceptible to be integrated in a VW/MMOG trust framework.
An effort was also made in order to analyze the adaptability of well established so-
lutions or models to this specific scenario. This chapter corresponds to publication
P3 listed in Section 1.6.
Chapter 5 This chapter addresses the problem of a trust representation for VW/MMOGs.
It is clear that such trust representation requires a methodology for collecting and
aggregating data generated by avatar-avatar interactions, i.e., the in-world data
generated by avatar-avatar interactions have to be worked out and transformed
into a trust representation. This was achieved by a formalization of trust as a
usable concept for VW/MMOGs, which is sustained on the activity theory. Let us
mention that this chapter corresponds to publication P4 listed in Section 1.6.
Chapter 6 This chapter addresses the problem of trust computing, i.e., trust operators.
These operators act on the trust representation described in the previous chapter,
in order to allow a trustor come up with trust result about a given unknown trustee
in an automated manner. These operators combine BFS/DFS graph searching and
subjective logic operators to compute the trust value to be ascribed by trustor to
trustee. This chapter corresponds to publication P5 listed in Section 1.6.
Chapter 7 This chapter presents the main conclusions of the research work underlying
this thesis, as well as puts forward with some open issues and directions for future
work.
As a concluding remark, let us mention that this thesis fits in the scope of trust comput-
ing, making a bridge between computational intelligence and virtual worlds (and digital
games).
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Chapter 2
Security Issues
Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) have been steadily growing in interest
over the past decade. Their economic value turns them into one of the main targets
of malware and cheating in Internet. This chapter presents and discusses security is-
sues in MMOG environments. The study starts with a preliminary characterization of
MMOGs, highlighting their main features. Afterwards, the authors present the secu-
rity approaches that are applicable to MMOGs, exposing the implications of security
breaches and the need for better protection mechanisms. Next, the chapter presents
current safety measures and solutions to tackle specific security issues. Finally, security
trends that can be relevant in the future are described.
2.1 Introduction
The security paradigm that supported game industry for many years was on protecting
game software. This was achieved by making difficult the reproduction of copies of
game, so trying to protect game development and investment revenues. Later, with
the advent of the Internet, new opportunities arose in the game industry [JED+03],
but this also implied changes in game security. Therefore, while the main security
issues of the pre-Internet games were developing copy protection mechanisms, now se-
curity is seen in a wider perspective. Currently, online game industry companies obtain
most of their profits from pay-to-play solutions, and not from selling games [Yan03].
Basically, MMOGs business model changed with the progressive disappearance of game
copies [CHL06], but new problems arose with those pay-to-play solutions [DP08]. In par-
ticular, online games and MMOGs put security challenges, namely: security problems
related with player authentication, issues related with game availability and resilience,
trust and anonymity concerns, means of ensuring security of player and his/her virtual
assets, game law enforcing solutions, game client problems [MGM06], and also game
development issues like scalability and persistence. In short, MMOGs share the same
security risks as those of other online applications, but also present new and interest-
ing challenges as a consequence of the risks mentioned above. Despite user’s increased
awareness in respect to risks of his/her online behavior and, consequently, the inher-
ent security threats, the MMOG player usually has a negligent perception in terms of
security. For him/her, it is just another type of online game, where players play anony-
mously and therefore don’t constitute a real threat to him/her and other users. The
understanding is that what happens inside game’s virtual environment does not have
consequences in real life. It is clear that this is a wrong understanding in terms of game
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security and privacy. There are threats that must be considered when developing and
managing MMOG [DP08]. But, many industry developers do not fol low this perspective.
Due to MMOG business model, whose success results from the amount of players that a
game attracts and maintains, a MMOG needs to keep players immersed in the game and
luring new ones to allow growth on the number of subscriptions and publicity revenues
in order to support the cost of having a computer infrastructure to deploying the game.
Therefore, game’s success is a result of what players feel on the game. If the game is
not interesting, it does not have an interesting history, it is not graphically appealing, it
has communication lags issues, and there is a sense that the game is unfair and players
feel that it is almost impossible to evolve in the game, that there are few players to
interacting with, that they are being scammed, and that they likely lose assets in game
due to cheating, that the game does not provide a fair dispute resolution to solving
game disputes, then players end up leaving the game. Although some of the previous
considerations are not directly security-dependent, many others are. Therefore game
developers must incorporate a well-defined security policy in their business model. In
general terms, the success of a MMOG is a corollary on game trust and reliability by
players. In fact, the player’s perception about security is not in accordance with the
amount of information that he/she shares in a MMOG environment with unknown players
[BBC+08]. This fact can be used for player profiling and social engineering attacks. Se-
curity in MMOGs goes beyond the security problems of current online applications. The
lack of security in MMOGs has implications to user in- game and off-the-game activities.
There is a need to promote awareness to security issues within player community, and
also to lead game industry to develop better and new security procedures. By identify-
ing the current situation within security in MMOGs, this chapter aims to serve as base
for further security research in MMOGs.
This chapter is organized as follows. It starts by briefly describing the game security
procedures and their evolution toward online games and MMOGs. Then, we present an
overview of MMOGs, with a detailed description of their main characteristics, with a fo-
cus on security related features. Relevant security threats, incidents and consequences
are then presented, investigated, and analyzed. Afterwards, we present an insight of
future measures in the design of new MMOGs that may lead to build up more secure
games. The chapter ends with the conclusions, where the main contributions of our
research are listed.
2.2 Related Work
In online games, in particular in MMOGs, security is mainly approached in taxonomies of
cheating techniques. A former tentative approach to classify security requirements in
online games was made in [Yan03]. Park proposed taxonomy for online game security,
having classified online game attacks in four categories: server, networking, client, and
user attacks [PLC08]. In this study, the most relevant security characteristics are avail-
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ability, integrity, and confidentiality. Yan and Randell proposed an interesting approach
to the evolution of the computer games industry and a detailed analysis on security
[YR05]. They argued that cheating is the most relevant security issue in online games,
having then proposed a taxonomy that identifies fifteen types of cheating aggregated in
two categories, a generic category and an online games-specific category. The generic
category includes the following cheating types: cheating by exploiting lack of authenti-
cation, cheating by exploiting a bug or design loophole, cheating by compromising game
servers, cheating related to internal misuse and cheating by social engineering. In the
online games-specific category, we find the fol- lowing forms of cheating: cheating by
exploiting misplaced trust, cheating by collusion, cheating by abusing the game proce-
dure, cheating related to virtual assets, cheating by exploiting machine intelligence,
cheating by modifying client infra-structure, timing cheating, cheating by denying ser-
vice to peer players, cheating by compromising passwords, and cheating by exploiting
lack of secrecy. Webb’s approach in networked computer games considers cheating at
four levels, namely: game, application, protocol, and infrastructure [WS07].Yee intro-
duced a threats model for massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs)
that identified five potential threats [YKSC06], namely: illegal access to play the game,
gameplay cheating, gameplay disruption, cheat at paying for game play, and steal pro-
prietary parts of the software. Yee also proposed some mitigation solutions for these
threats. Bardzell refers to MMOGs as domains for fraud, having then proposed an ap-
proach to fraud mapping by identifying vulnerabilities and potential attack vectors, to
finally delineate possible countermeasures. Hu and Zambetta enhanced Yan and Randell
taxonomy and presented a framework for cheating and mitigation techniques in MMOG
[HZ08]. Interestingly, Yong elaborated a survey of security issues in collaborative virtual
environments [YMSF08], which can be also applied to games. Barosso et. al. made a
detailed analysis on security and privacy in MMOGs and VR [BBC+08], having identified
relevant security characteristics, and existing risks, as well as a set of recommendations
to make MMOGs more secure.
2.3 Massively Multiplayer Online Games
MMOGs are specific games that had their origins in the early Multi-User Dungeon (MUD).
They have evolved significantly in the past years, being now a driving force in the online
games industry [CHL06]. Features Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) can be
described by a set of features that are shared by many of current game deployments
[APS08]. Depending on its design and development, a MMOG can have different specific
characteristics. Let us list a number of relevant features that can be used to identify
and describe a MMOG:
• They are played through an Internet connection.
• The interaction is set up between a client and a game server, i.e., the clien-
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t/server model. Although there are other approaches, like P2P, they are residual
in comparison with the client/server model.
• The game environment is represented as a 3D immersive virtual environment,
which usually represents a world containing cities and huge spaces in between.
• The game is populated with avatars representing human players, items, and Non-
Player Characters (NPCs).
• The interface rendering is based on the client.
• There are different types of avatars to choose, each with its range of features,
profession, and skills.
• Each player must set the skills for his/her avatar, including those to be developed
during the play.
• The players interact in a cooperative and competitive way with others within the
game environment in pursuit of their goals. This characteristic helps to create
strong social bounds among players in the form of permanent or temporary group-
ings known as guilds.
• The game is a persistent universe, where the world continues to evolve even when
players quit their sessions.
• Player’s achievements are kept in a permanent manner.
• The game hasn’t specific winning conditions, but the motivation of most players
is to achieve a higher rank status in game, as well as to possess the best game
items and skills.
• The game has a well-established economy.
• Trading is allowed among users, some-times with real currency.
• Most game players pay an allowance fee monthly to play.
• There are thousands of simultaneous players that interact in real time using their
avatars, chat and voice channels.
• Game state changes, as well as interaction data, are processed on server side and
usually are kept in a database.
• Game state is kept permanently update providing reliability through data integrity
and consistency checking.
• There are several additional communication channels like email and chat.
• The game requires a number of servers with high availability and consistence, but
this is only possible with good server scalability.
• Game induces mechanisms to engage players in time-consuming activities. When
players dedicate more time to the game, they build a greater sense of community,
and an increasing desire to keep playing the game, as their notoriety increases.
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This feature is marketed by game industry via the introduction of new contents
and features in the game [Rob05].
• MMOGs may induce an addicted behavior in some players [WR05].
2.4 Architecture
Usually, MMOGs follow the client-server architecture, so they have at least the following
components:
Game Server: This component can be implemented in different ways, namely: the
server runs on a computer farm or cluster, the server is either centralized or distributed,
the server is replicated into geographically dispersed servers known as shards. The
server is also responsible for dealing with authentication procedures and client valida-
tion. It also provides the establishment of a reliable connection with the game virtual
environment, as well as with databases that maintain the game state. The game state,
transactions and player’s data are stored persistently in a reliable way.
Game Client: This component is the interface with which players interact with the
game. It is an application that runs in a remote device, i.e., a personal computer,
a laptop, a PDA, a console, etc. It establishes a network connection with the game
server, so that after being client authentication granted, the player is prompted to
playing, unless the client needs to be updated or patched. The client is responsible
for displaying the game to players. But, the client has limited access to game data
manipulation because game developers consider that there are not reliable validation
procedures on the client side to guarantee data security and privacy.
Communications: The game interactions with players involve data communication be-
tween clients and servers. The TCP and UDP networking protocols are the most used
to exchange data between clients and servers, though there is also some multicast de-
ployment at a lower level to enable the interaction with multiple players. This puts
a problem in the data retransmission over active network nodes and local firewalls.
There is some research on this subject due to the relevance of the latency problem
to MMOGs [CHL06]. Current procedures involve the aggregation of multiple data to be
sent over the network, as well as data compression, mainly due to TCP overhead size.
In contrast to UDP, TCP has the advantage of data acknowledgment and ordered data
packets, but TCP usually is slower than UDP. Note that there are other data communi-
cation approaches that pursue the development of new protocols [WCC+09].
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2.5 Threats and Vulnerabilities
The security is a relevant issue in online applications, in particular in MMOGs. The fol-
lowing characteristics represent vulnerable aspects of the game that are always subject
to impending threats:
• Game economy
• Strong social interaction
• Real time interaction
• Poor law regulations
• Game design and development
2.5.1 Game Economy
Reaching the game goals requires time, cooperation, and dedication. The valuable
game items are scarce and difficult to obtain. When players progress in the game,
their synthetic characters evolve to higher levels of richness and skills. In the game
economy, there is the possibility of trade and exchange of valuable items with other
players. This means that game goods and assets may acquire value in real life [Rob05].
This represents one of the main reasons why MMOGs are targeted for attacks [MH07].
2.5.2 Strong Social Interaction
MMOGs are immersive and time-consuming games. They promote the socialization and
development of trust from previous game interactions and goal-driven actions, because
such interactions are similar to interactions that occur in real world scenarios. This
knowledge can be used for social engineering and game scams by malicious players.
Eventually, this malicious behavior may lead to goods stealing of other players, and
even threaten their real life assets, provided that the malicious player is able to induce
other players to install malware in their clients or pass their game credentials.
2.5.3 Real Time Interaction
The design and implementation of a MMOG can be a challenging task when the real-
time interaction is a requirement. Besides, state and time in games can become a
major issue in terms of game security [MH07]. In fact, updating the game state must be
done as soon as possible to prevent not only eventual problems related to consistency
and reliability of the game data, but also to prevent eventual exploitation by malicious
gamer’s.
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2.5.4 Poor Law Enforcement Schemes
The game developers oblige every single player to sign up an end-user license agreement
(EULA) and terms of use (TOU) specific to each game, in order to resolve eventual
disputes and controversy in the future. Usually, the resolution of disputes follows one
of two main approaches. The first is that the player account is simply closed if any
issue arises in the game. The second is that game rules are observed and surveyed
within game boundaries, so that eventual disputes outside the games rules like the
ones due to cheating are dealt by the players themselves [dZ09]. It is clear that these
two perspectives do not provide to players an effective and reliable governance, as
there are in-game dispute situations that have implications on real life as was seen in
China and Korea [Per09]. All this, together with the real living value of economy of the
game, makes MMOGs more appealing and prone to fraud and virtual theft [HM07].
2.5.5 Game Design and Development
In respect to game development, security represents an increasing problem mainly due
to the outsourcing of developers, who are motivated to finish up the game development
quickly, and as cheap as possible. Obviously, this has consequences in game design,
and may lead to appearance of flaws and bugs, because third-party developers tend
to neglect security issues in early developing stages. This bring to the game industry
extra costs and problems. Whether it is from bugs and flaws in game or costs associated
with software patches that are supported by the costumer, these problems may be
maliciously exploited, and end up leading to other threats. In addition to developers,
also game management services and game providers split responsibilities in the life
cycle of a given game, and this has consequences to the overall security [DP08].
2.6 Risk Assessment
Here we present relevant risks to core game assets. Game information is data of the
game environment. Game developers have to have a good governance policy in man-
aging the game environment, and this means to keep game playability, maintain the
game state, and protect the player data. This has risks concerning how to ensure: pro-
tection of sensitive game state’s data; unauthorized access to data; manipulation of
data, and also mitigate intrusions and active attacks (such as denial of service attacks)
against game server [CPK08]. Risk assessment measures the probability of an attack
to a game server, and its perturbing consequences. A threat represents the source of
the risk and can eventually trigger the risk. Additional risks are those that apply to
the networks used to exchange data with the game server. In fact, such a data flow
over a network may be tapped to sniff or even redirect data to get unauthorized access
to client. Consequently, if a security breach occurs, a malicious player may take an
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unfair advantage over other users. This likely will degrade game credibility, as well
its reputation, and consequently some players stop playing it, so reducing game rev-
enues. Protection against misuse or attacks in MMOGs is therefore a vital objective
to establish, maintain and strengthen the trust of players in the game [D’H00]. But,
it is important to bear in mind that there are not miraculous security solutions, i.e.,
without flaws. Security should follow a multi-faceted approach in order to adjust it
to specific situations or even specific games. In short, the game security depends on
several exogenous and endogenous factors, namely: player, client hardware/software,
client application, client networking, networking service provider, game server, gaming
governance policies, game databases (game state), game developers, and technicians.
In a game, security is the “weakest link” amongst all game components. However, and
above all, security threats largely depend on the motivation, capability and persistence
of the attacker.
2.7 Security
Security can be perceived as a mean of ensuring protection of information confidential-
ity and integrity and also its availability [CM02]. There are two well-known standards
on security, ISO 27001 standard (previously known as ISO 17799) and NIST 800-30.
Information security expressed in ISO 27001 standard is defined as the preservation of
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information; in addition, other properties
such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation, and reliability can be also in-
volved (ISO/IEC 17799:2005).
NIST 800-30 provides a foundation for the effective risk management necessary for as-
sessing and mitigating risks identified within information technology (IT) systems to help
organizations to better manage IT-related mission risks. The three foundational secu-
rity goals/properties are integrity, availability, and confidentiality, although other addi-
tional attributes such as, for example, authenticity, accountability and non-repudiation
may be also considered.
In a MMOG, security can be perceived as the game capability to protect confidentiality
and integrity of the game state, providing also a high level of availability, accountabil-
ity in the data transactions, as well as the assurance that the game will continue to
perform its mission and within the initial design goals.
Although the previously referred concepts are helpful to identify and classify well-known
security problems, MMOG security has to be guaranteed and addressed in a more eclec-
tic fashion, because it involves other concepts like protection of chat and email within
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the game. Trust is another relevant factor in MMOG security.
There are also different types of threats and risks to take into account in MMOGs. Here
we understand security risk as the potential to lose one or several of the proprieties
previous described. In fact, MMOG security has several security dimensions to be con-
sidered. Previous works on this subject addressed particular issues, mainly cheating but
not the overall security problem. As a multidimensional problem that crosses several
areas, it requires that all issues be addressed together in an understandable and reliable
way. Game economy, technological issues, social interactions, trust, dispute resolution
and governance, privacy and anonymity, intellectual propriety, and marketing are all
security relevant issues in MMOGs. They all need to be considered in an effective and
global security framework in MMOGs. Although some relevant works have already ad-
dressed several of the previous described issues, there isn’t a whole solution for an
integrated security framework.
2.8 Security Dimensions
In respect to MMOGs, let us present the following list of problems relevant to security
and privacy. Identifying and addressing these problems is done with reference to the
game dimensions, namely: game client, game communication channels, game server,
game environment, and player.
2.8.1 Game Client
Security of game clients is an important issue in MMOGs. It has implications on the game
and also on user privacy. Problems are due to: validation of client application with the
game server, data integrity, security and privacy for user/player data as a consequence
of the installation of monitoring tools. This is achieved on client side by deploying game
entities to ensure integrity of game client [MGM06]. This has implications on software
installed on the client side, and on what would happen if it were compromised (e.g.,
the Warden software monitoring tool used by WoW).
Game application adulteration This occurs when the game client is compromised, giv-
ing an edge advantage to the player. The game industry tackles this serious vulnerability
using validation mechanisms of the client application, namely: MD5, surveillance/mon-
itoring tool installed in the client, online service (e.g., Steam) to validate and update
the game client.
paragraphClient memory and process handling This procedure does not aim at manip-
ulating and altering the game client, but just the client data (e.g., making is avatar
invisible, altering data sent in game state updates). This procedure was solved in some
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MMOGs implementations with the use of client side monitoring devices like WoW War-
den.
Keylogger installation When an ordinary player neglects the security issues in games,
he/she can be induced by a malicious player to install a malware device in his/her
client (e.g., a player installs a keylogger that pretends to be a client update, losing
consequently his/her game credentials).
Augmented reality The player may use this technology to give him/her a better per-
ception of the game environment in comparison to other players. For example, in a
battle scenario, if a user has two game accounts, i.e., two players/avatars, and one of
them joins to the opponent guild, the user accesses other players’ information before
time.
2.8.2 Game Communications
In this context we present security issues that may occur in communications, like sniffing
and manipulation of game data in transit over the network.
Client network tap and eavesdropping This happens when a player has enough skills
to gather transaction packets in the communication of other clients with the server,
being then able to identifying data relevant about other players in order to take advan-
tage over his/her opponents. This situation is much more difficult to detect when the
tap is outside the client network.
Man-in-the-middle This type of attack in client network allows the attacker to ma-
nipulate and change information, producing in this way an advantage over others. The
procedure can be detected by monitoring ARP tables searching for ARP Poisoning attack
evidences. Induction of lag delay: This type of attack introduces an induced lag in game
communication as a way of achieving a goal within the game environment more quickly
than his/her game opponents. In this manner, a malicious player takes advantage over
his/her careless opponents.
Denial of service (DoS) This attack targets not on game servers, but gateways and
accessible points. The goal is to disrupt the game service, by flooding service with
communication requests, which artificially induce lag in data communications, taking
players to quitting their game sessions. This issue could be solved if attacker’s IP is
correctly identified, discarding then its data packets automatically.
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Distributed denial of service (DDoS) The distributed denial of service is similar to DoS
attack with the difference that it has multiple and dispersed origins that in simultaneous
makes a Denial of Service (DoS) attack to the game service. This type of attack is more
difficult to identify due to the massive number of accesses.
Botnet attack In the case of botnet attack, a malicious user gets control of other user
computers to perform a DDoS. This constitutes a real threat to game by causing not only
a DDoS to the game server, but also damages on users that go far beyond the loss of
game credentials.
2.8.3 Game Virtual Environment
In the following we present several types of security issues that originate in game’s
virtual environment.
Harassment Barosso described this issue as a serious threat to users and resources
[BBC+08]. Harassment causes emotional distress to users, disrupting or interrupting
their game experience. It is clear that this problem also is a real threat for game
providers because leads many users to unsubscribe the game, reducing this way its
revenues and reputation. According to Barosso, there are several harassment types:
• Avatar griefing This happens when a player is denied repeatedly access to a game
location or resources due to attacker’s actions [Adr10].
• Avatar ganking This is a kind of situation such that a higher-rank character kills a
player repeatedly, making it impossible to player continue with playing[ND05].
• Avatar kill stealing A player starts a fight with a NPC and when it is almost done,
another player attacks and receives the correspondent gold.
• Avatar ninja looting This issue represents an act of a player during which he/she
obtains something that he/she is not entitled.
• Channel harassment In this case, the attacker uses inappropriate language to ha-
rass other players through communication channels associated to the game like
chat and VoIP (Voice over IP).
• Reputation harassment The goal is to deliberately damage user reputation within
and out of the game.
• Reputation damage through identity theft This issue represents a situation where
a malicious player is granted access illicitly to another player’s account, and poses
himself/herself as the legitimate player, passing to have a scamming and cheating
behavior that degrades the reputation of the legitimate player.
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• Reputation damage by offensive posting This issue represents an attack to a player’s
reputation by offensive posts and false information about him/her within game fo-
rums or even in the game itself, causing rejection of the player by guilds or even
disruption of trade (i.e., exchange of assets) due to his/her deteriorated reputa-
tion.
• Reputation damage by abuse of online dispute resolution The fraudulent procedure
of a player in reporting false harassment complaints to online dispute resolution
systems, in an attempt to revoke a player account or degrade his/her reputa-
tion, represents a serious threat to ordinary players, as well as a waste on game
resources.
• Eavesdropping This issue represents a way to obtain advantages against a player
by sneakily listening his/her private conversations and actions within the game
environment.
• Social engineering This issue uses a deception-oriented approach that is used by
malicious players to deliberately deceiving and luring other players in a way to give
to those malicious players insightful information about the others. For example,
luring players to login in a server in order to get and download a special item, and
in this way lure them to a rogue server to get their game credentials.
• Avatar Escaping This issue represents an exploit of game design once that the
player quits the game when near of being killed, and before the game state be
updated. The security procedure to be followed in this case involves a better man-
agement of time and state of the game with the objective of ensuring atomic trans-
actions for game data, in a way similar to atomic transactions found in database
management systems.
• Gold farming This is that sort of situation in which a player/avatar only plays
for profits. His/her actions almost reduce down to collecting items and gold to
achieve the objective of enhancing and increasing his/her character level. After-
wards, the player exchanges his/her virtual assets for real currency. Gold farmers
can be considered a threat to game playability.
• Content rating system Pan European Game Information (PEGI) is a European video
game content rating system. The system is based on a set of rules followed by
publishers. PEGI self-regulation is composed by five age categories and eight con-
tent descriptors that advise the suitability and content of a game for a certain age
range based on the games content. In respect to MMOGs, rating systems like the
PEGI one try to classify MMOGs with reference to the available contents. Because
MMOG players generate more contents than the content available by the game
provider, we end up having a problem. It is true that game providers can deter-
mine which player’s content that is acceptable within the game, by enforcing the
use of guild norms, chat filters, TOS, and prescripted chats to minors. Besides, the
content rating system is important, but not all MMOGs use it. On the other hand,
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the game industry effort in imposing better control on player game content is in
fact insufficient to control the available content found inappropriate to specific
age groups.
• Age verification The means used by MMOGs to access and check player age usually
reduce to a simple agreement that states that the player is eighteen. It doesn’t
constitute an enough deterrence system and hasn’t efficacy enough to succeed.
• Collusion Represents a way of cheating that is difficult to detect and mitigate
because players cooperate to gain unfair advantages over their opponents. One
common way of collusion is to exchange information between avatars that in an-
other way a single avatar hardly could find directly. As noted by Hu [HZ08], in
a typical ’win-trading’ collusion in the StarCraft game, a player loses once every
two times for his/her opponent in a ladder competition. The loss of one point by
a player results in a gain of one point by another player, raising his/her ladder
rank, and vice versa. Thus, both players could climb to top position in the ladder
without playing a legitimate game.
• Bots Playing MMOG requires time and dedication because the game puts certain
goals that players have to achieve, like obtaining a specific skill or even the char-
acteristics of a game item. These time-consuming activities, together with some
repetitive and dull interaction within the game environment, instigate players to
use bots to perform those tasks on their behalf. Although most games don’t allow
it, regular players and gold farmers use bots to perform tasks autonomously as a
way to quickly progress within the game. It is difficult to detect and to eradicate;
Glider is an example of a bot used in WoW. We may use stored players’ data in or-
der to infer and to detect bot activity but it happens that human gold farmers are
often mistaken as bots. Other approaches use CAPTCHAS to detect a bot, but its
repeated interruptions could be annoying to regular players, because they disrupt
game play, and possibly introduce an unfair advantage over regular users.
• False trade When players trade and exchange goods with unknown players, even-
tually with virtual currency, they can be targeted to in-game fraud by paying for
an item and not receiving it. This is a consequence of poor reputability-enforcing
schemes. Game culture: Determines which is the allowed behavior for players
and what constitutes a threat to the dominant culture of the game. For example,
the game culture determines the cheating limits, i.e., what is tolerated and what
is not allowed in respect to cheating.
• Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) ODR can be used to effectively resolve game dis-
putes, but it may be also used as a defamation attack against ordinary players.
• Governance problems due to jurisdiction on dispute resolution Currently, the key
tool for governance of MMOGs is the End User License Agreement (EULA) or Terms
of Service (TOS). This mode of governance derives from the fact that online en-
vironments are essentially creations of intellectual property and thus, are copy-
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righted by the game designers [dZ09]. It also must be considered national law
jurisdiction in dispute resolution schemes like in-game guild rules and policies en-
forced resolution. The lack on accountability and dispute resolution settlement
authority could lead to real live threatening situations [Zet05]. In 2005, a Chinese
player was killed because of a in-game dispute [Per09].
• Rogue server / bogus server It is a fake game server, used by game hackers and
malicious players to mimic a real site. The server aims to attract players by leading
them to give away their account credentials.
• Social engineering: a pishing attack Is initiated within the game using email or
chat to lure players to go to a fake location in a rogue server almost identical to
the legitimate one and give away their game credentials.
• Trading It is a relevant activity in MMOGs that can lead to player’s losses. Players
interact with virtual world business companies to buy items, virtual currency, tips,
tricks, accounts, information guides on to achieve specific goals, and also power
leveling players to improve their game rank or achieve a required goal granting
access to their accounts. [BBC+08]. This uses RMT (real money transactions)
outside the game and is based in reputation and feedback scores. Also there is
trading among players, although the game explicitly forbids without a reputation
system for players they are targeted to fraud.
2.8.4 Game Server
In respect to game server there are several problems and risks.
• Access point issue The adoption of a client-server architecture gives more control
to game managers but also presents vulnerabilities due to the small number of
access points, that facilitate DoS and DDoS attacks.
• Game Time Time synchronization among users can present several challenges due
to induced latency that could enhance or degrade player performance.
• Game State Keeping the game state consistent raises state synchronization issues
due to concurrent transactions among players.
• Game Bugs Bugs constitute a common problem in software in general, and MMOGs
are not an exception. Occurrences of a bug in a MMOG can lead to unexpected
behavior of the game, which if exploited could bring disruption to normal running
of the game.
• Inside attack It represents a problematic situation in which there is a privileged
access to game data and game state that can be used for illicit profits in some
circumstances such as, for example, colluding between players. This issue can be
minimized by adoption of effective security policies within the game.
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• Behavior analysis Taking into consideration that game entities have a need to de-
velop means of detecting problems in games, they end up gathering and storing a
significant amount of data that can have implications on player privacy. This issue
is controversial because, according to EULA, the user has not any right or propriety
in regarding to game environment. Note that data on each player/avatar provides
a way to infer behavior of the player, so that it is possible to develop specific
advertising not just for the avatar but also for the player/user in the real world.
• Game Economy Game’s developers and managers control the game economy. They
can manipulate the availability of special and valuable items, the NPCs’ powers,
and develop quests and goals that have implications on virtual economy values, as
well as direct implications on real money transactions (RMT). A company insider in
colluding with a player may manipulate this aspect of the game in order to obtain
special features in exchange of real money.
2.8.5 Player
Cheating Represents any action of a player to gain an unfair advantage over opponent
players. Even following to the game rules, an action can be considered cheating if it
represents an advantage that the player is not entitled [YR05].
Exploit An exploit happens when a player uses a bug or game flaw to take advantage
for himself/herself in a manner not intended by the game’s designers. Exploits have
been classified as a form of cheating. However, the precise determination of what is or
is not considered an exploit can be controversial. This debate stems from a number of
factors, but typically involves the argument that these issues are part of the game and
require no changes or external programs to take advantage of them.
Social Engineering A definition of social engineering in MMOGs can be referred as a
way of clever manipulation of the natural human tendency for trusting. Social engi-
neering has to do with targeting players to obtaining personal information that allows a
malicious player to gain unauthorized access to valuable assets (game credentials, game
items or even assets from player real life). A malicious player interacts with other play-
ers to gather knowledge about such players and to gain their trust. The goal of social
engineering is the same as hacking in general: to gain unauthorized access to systems or
information in order to commit fraud, network intrusion, industrial espionage, identity
theft, or simply to disrupt the system or network [Adr].
Revoke Payments This problem appears in online payments. For example, a player
buys a special skill at a trade company in order to allow him/her to achieve a higher
rank. After using the skill, and selling it to another player for gaining virtual money,
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the malicious player revokes the initial transaction at the payment system of the trade
company.
2.9 Security Evaluation
In our security evaluation approach that follows, previous MMOGs security issues are
grouped in accordance with their information security procedures. We follow ISO27001
and NIST 800-30 guidelines, and we adopt implementations from Operational Critical
Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE).
The OCTAVEmethodology was developed in CMU (Carnegie Mellon University) in an effort
to make information-protection decisions of assets. It identifies risks to the confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability of critical information assets [AD01]. Here we try to
use this methodology to address security in MMOGs by identifying and analyzing possi-
ble threats to game assets. Furthermore, we used the detailed taxonomy for common
language for computer security incidents [HL98], and adapted it relevant features in
conjunction with OCTAVE to provide a specific security classification schema for MMOGs.
In this context, we refer to a threat as an indication of a potentially undesirable problem
to the game, e.g. a DoS attack. Threats can therefore be recognized by the following
characteristics:
• Attacker: An attacker is who deliberated breaks the security requirements (con-
fidentiality, integrity, availability) of an asset. He/she attempts one or more
attacks in order to achieve a goal through a variety of methods. Here we classify
attackers in function of what they intend to accomplish:
1. Hackers attack games for challenge, status or the thrill of obtaining access.
2. Gold farmers attack games for personal financial gain.
3. Malicious players attack games usually by cheating to enhance their game
performance but also to harass others and use fraud to deceive players.
4. Insiders are employers that manipulate game data for getting profits by sell-
ing such data to players.
• Vulnerability: In order to reach the desired result, an attacker takes advantage of
a game vulnerability. Vulnerability represents a game weakness that allows for an
unauthorized action. Vulnerabilities can arise in different stages of development
or use of the game. They can be:
1. Design vulnerability is inherent to the design or specification of the game.
2. Implementation vulnerability that occur from errors made in the software
or hardware implementation.
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3. Configuration vulnerability results from an error in the configuration like
not restricting the number of failed tentative accesses to the game server
allowed to users [HL98].
• Asset: something of value to the game (e.g., player credentials, player privacy,
game reputation, game state, game server access point, stored data).
• Implications: consequences to game assets relate to availability, integrity and
authenticity.
1. Availability as the game readiness for correspond to player requests in a
correct form and within the error tolerance boundary.
2. Integrity represents the absence of improper game alterations.
3. Confidentiality is a property of the game that ensures that data or informa-
tion is not made available to unauthorized players employees or processes
[HZ08].






• Outcome: is the result of a successful attack and will result in:
1. Disclosure of information to anyone not authorized to access it.
2. Modification made by unauthorized alteration of game data.
3. Destruction or loss of game information.
4. Interruption of access represents an intentional degradation by blocking game
resources (i.e. denial of service).
In this context we didn’t consider relevant optional OCTAVE characteristics like motive
and access. The security evaluation process involves three steps. First, we have to
identify the assets that are relevant in MMOGs. Then, we delineate a threat profile for
each asset. Finally, and once the first two steps are finished, we end up a more clear
idea about the risk profile.
2.9.1 Asset identification
Considering the previously listed security dimensions in MMOGs, let us now identify
those assets that require security procedures in game play. Following our approach,
we have identified two categories of assets, player assets and game assets, which show
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different perspectives on what is relevant to protect in a MMOG.
Player assets Taking into account the previously enunciated security problems, we
have identified the following player assets:
• User extra game issues like its privacy and client device protection.
• User reputation outside of the game environment.
• User game account credentials protection.
• User payment data stored by the game.
• Player stored information about his/her communications, avatar movements, ac-
tions, and transactions.
• Player avatar identity in the game environment.
• Player avatar reputability among its peers.
• Player avatar assets like skills, powers items, and currency.
Interestingly, this identification of player assets, which is based on our analysis of secu-
rity dimensions, does not match fully those of Barosso’s [BBC+08]. As shown in figure
2.1, Barosso conducted a questionnaire-based survey to identify those most valued as-
sets by players, i.e., those that most cherish and require protection.
From Barosso’s survey, it results that players value the assets that they do not possess
due to EULA. These results also corroborate the game’s negligent perception that play-
ers have about security.
In respect to the assets we have identified above, we elaborated a relational map to
show interconnections and relations among assets from the player’s point of view, where
each terminal node represents an asset that may be prone to threats. This hierarchical
map indicates that if a threat exists for a specific asset node, then all the dependent as-
set nodes may be also compromised and, consequently, attacked. Thus, in our opinion,
the map depicted in figure 2.2 shows the MMOG assets that are relevant to players more
clearly than Barosso’s survey, because it exhibits the dependencies between player as-
sets.
Game assets Taking into consideration the raised problems in the dimension-based
approach above, the relevant game assets are the following:
• Governance and related End User License Agreement (EULA) issues.
• Networking and DoS situations, security of communication channels.
• Extra game issues related with legal jurisdiction, problems with intellectual pro-
priety and financial issues.
28






























































































Figure 2.2: MMOGs player assets
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Figure 2.3: MMOGs game overall assets
• For game managers, game clients are perceived as untrusted partners who require
special attention and monitoring for ensuring fairness.
• Game availability, integrity, and confidentiality.
• Game data, including player data, user personal details, and financial data.
• Game reputation.
• Game environment is a key game asset that is targeted by different means: bots,
gold farmers, frauds, and scams in a similar fashion to real live situations.
The relational diagram between game assets is shown in figure 2.3. The idea here is to
put in evidence the relationships among game assets, and consequently to understand
how a security issue at one node has implications to the overall security. Note that
game assets are hierarchically organized around the central MMOG security node.
2.9.2 Threat classification
We use OCTAVE-based methodology to identify and associate assets to the corresponding
threats. Besides, we have tried to make also a comparative analysis with previous clas-
sifications, in particular those due to Hu and Zambetta [HZ08] , Barosso et al. [BBC+08],
and Park and Lee [PLC08]. The results are presented in the following tables addressing
five levels of threats (dimensions). The first addressing game client threats in shown
in Tab. 2.1, the second dimension regarding threats that occur in networks is summa-
rized in Tab. 2.2, from within the game environment we identified the threats listed in
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Tab. 2.3, the threats to MMOGs originated in the game server are shown in Tab. 2.4, the
last dimension that address threats from players is represented in Tab. 2.5.
Table 2.1: MMOG’s game client threat-asset association and comparison




















































Game fairness Game advan-
tage
Legend: Atk attacker type, MP malicious player, HK hacker, GF gold-farmer, IN insider
Table 2.2: MMOG’s network threat-asset association and comparison
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Legend: Atk attacker type, MP malicious player, HK hacker, GF gold-farmer, IN insider
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Table 2.3: MMOG’s game environment threat-asset association and comparison
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Legend: Atk attacker type, MP malicious player, HK hacker, GF gold-farmer, IN insider
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Table 2.4: MMOG’s game server threat-asset association and comparison
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Legend: Atk attacker type, MP malicious player, HK hacker, GF gold-farmer, IN insider
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Table 2.5: MMOG’s player threat-asset association and comparison
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Financial gain Financial sys-
tem
Legend: Atk attacker type, MP malicious player, HK hacker, GF gold-farmer, IN insider
From tables Tab. 2.1 — 2.5 we shown that our OCTAVE-based methodology is more com-
plete than the previous ones found in the literature [BBC+08, HZ08, PLC08]. With this
methodology, we have a better understanding of how all ingredients involved in MMOGs
security work together, namely: dimensions, attackers, threat-asset relationships, and
attack goals. In this way, we end up presenting a novel approach to MMOGs security
that is based on an essentially practical risk assessment with three steps: what asset
needs to be secured, what is the underlying threat, and to determine the associated
risk [AD01].
2.10 Security Framework
Now we present a possible security framework for identifying security and privacy issues
that occur in MMOGs. The framework shows the three steps followed in the security
evaluation:
• Assets identification (including vulnerability classification).
• Threats assessment.
• Evaluation of each threat-asset pair in respect to the potential risk to the game.
In the framework shown in the tables Tab. 2.1 to 2.5, for each security dimension, we
consider the implications to a given asset if a security breach occurs, as well as the
attacker’s characterization, his/her motivations, and which are the results if security
were effectively compromised. For example, in respect to the dimension concerning
game environment in , a gold farmer explores vulnerabilities of game economy, taking
advantage of the methods on how the game economy was designed, implemented, and
tuned. A gold farming attack has implications on the game economy because it reduces
the availability of items to other players, and therefore raises artificially their value,
what consequently affects game economy integrity. It is clear that confidentiality in
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game economy is also affected due to difficulty in identifying the attacker. Thus, this
kind of attack aims to obtain revenues and also block game resources to others.
As argued before, we have adopted existent security assessment solutions, and then ap-
plied them to MMOGs. In this manner, we end up having a framework that encompasses
several lines of security analysis. Therefore, this framework reconciles diverse points of
view, namely: business model, game implementation models, legal issues, socialization
and privacy, and financial issues. By combining different points of view on MMOGs secu-
rity, our framework allows for a more systematic approach to game’s security threats by
means of the identification of vulnerabilities and corresponding consequences of their
exploitation. In short, we have tried to bring a different perspective to privacy and
security in MMOGs using well-established practical procedures related with information
security. For that purpose, we have made some adaptations to the OCTAVE methodology
to satisfy the requirements imposed by MMOGs.
As shown in this chapter, MMOGs have several security open issues. Let us then quote
some of the corresponding challenges in the future development of MMOGs:
• Develop new algorithms for better end-to-end security.
• Develop new mechanisms for a stronger authentication, one time password, or
using other channels of authentication validation.
• Develop new solutions to ensure atomic transactions in multiple databases.
• Provide new approaches to client security.
• Develop newmechanisms for improving resilience of game servers to DDoS attacks.
• Develop new server certification solutions to improve player trust in game.
• Develop new solutions to user’s privacy and anonymity and, simultaneously, pro-
vide a way of unequivocally identifying avatar with the corresponding user.
• Develop better bot and gold-farmer detection procedures.
• Develop solutions to minimize cheating.
Nevertheless, additional security problems could appear due to signs of migration of
MMOGs to other devices like game consoles, pda’s, tablets, netbooks, and smartphones
[Koi07]. The fact, that the availability is increasing, will probably motivate an in-
creasingly time dedicated to gamming. This situation presents a new paradigm where
“players can play a MMOG everywhere at anytime”. As Shirmohammadi noted, MMOGs
present the potential to be the cornerstone of any eSociety platform in the near fu-
ture, because they bring the massiveness, awareness, and inter-personal interaction of
the real society into the digital realm [SC09]. This dissemination of MMOGs across new
platforms allows players to play in the same worlds with different types of clients, soft-
ware, and rending capabilities. This could bring new and interesting security problems,
not only due to different sorts of client’s applications but also to their support systems
security. There are developments of targeted publicity aimed to players that use avail-
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able player game data as a way of adding more revenues to those that result monthly
fees. This underlying player profiling can be considered as an abuse of player privacy,
and presents security issues to be dealt in the future. The development of better time
and state control to enforce consistency in game design is also a relevant issue that
needs to be tackled [MH07]. Developing trust and reliability mechanisms applicable
to MMOG is a requirement to ensure data security and player privacy [Noo10]. Also,
improving security of clients through client validation approaches can lead to enforce
fairness in gameplay. Yet another trend is related to ensure reliability and protection of
game communication channels. Schluessler’s work on preventing cheating via hardware
represents another approach that could bring interesting results in the future [SGJ07].
2.11 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed and presented most current security issues in MMOGs,
having also shown insights on current problems and addressed possible solutions. In con-
trast, we noted that most players are not aware of the implications of lack of effective
security solutions. We have also proposed a new approach on how to address MMOG
security based on an information security analysis, as well as presented a comparison
with previous approaches. Looking at the current trends in the development of MMOGs
and security systems, we end up proposing a security framework for MMOGs as a contri-
bution for further research on security development and implementation in forthcoming
MMOGs.
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Chapter 3
Trust in Virtual Worlds
Virtual worlds, in particular massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) and online vir-
tual environments, have not been approached by the existing trust models and frame-
works. The chapter intends to fill this gap in the computer science and engineering
literature. In fact, trust research encompasses contributions originated in different
knowledge fields, other than computer science and engineering, therefrom resulting
a plethora of distinct concepts, definitions, models, and frameworks. Therefore, this
chapter will make usage of these multivariate trust elements in order to describe and
compare trust solutions found in the literature, as well to show how they can be em-
bedded in virtual worlds.
3.1 Introduction
Trust is recognized as a fundamental feature of interactions [Luh79]. Interactions be-
tween multiple and different types of entities (people, computers programs, services,
organizations, games, biological beings, virtual entities, countries) result in trust re-
lationships. Trust works as a driving factor for facilitating, inducing and strengthening
relations between entities [Deu58]. Therefore, efforts to clarify and model the con-
cept of trust are being developed in different research fields like philosophy [Bai02]
and computer science [Mar94], because there is a multitude of different and some-
times divergent and contrasting views on the topic [LM54, Fuk95, RCS+10]. Although
there is a persistent lack on unanimity, all those views contribute to enrich knowledge
on trust.
In computing, trust is seen as context-dependent, as computing technologies evolve and
became more ubiquitous over time, so that new ways of interaction end up to show up,
eventually requiring new approaches to trust abstractions. For example, VW/MMOGs
constitute a more immersive and persistent medium than other computing systems over
a network; as a consequence, trust in VW/MMOGs has to be approached in context some-
how. In fact, by definition, a virtual world is a 3D immersive and persistent environment
where multiple remote users interact in real-time through their avatars.
3.1.1 Trust in VW/MMOGs
Traditionally, (un)trust relationships between humans result from their face-to-face in-
teractions. With the advent of the information era, such face-to-face interactions in-
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creasingly tend to be replaced by compute mediated devices. Therefore, as human
interactions increasingly occur through such devices, new methodologies must be de-
veloped to assure trust within these environments. For example, VW/MMOGs are an
example of an environment that requires the incorporation of new trust inference mech-
anisms and solutions to help human users (i.e., avatars and players) in their decisions.
It is clear that this demands for a trust model and a set of trust operators somehow. To
achieve such a trust model, it is first necessary to realize why and how trust does work
as the ground of the human interactions.
3.1.2 Trust Approaches
Trust has been under scrutiny by scholars and researchers since the early half of the pre-
vious century [Luh79]. Early research on trust followed two main approaches. The first
tried to reach consensus on what is trust, initially from a philosophical and sociological
perspective [Luh79] [Deu58], which was later followed by researchers of other scien-
tific areas —in particular, computer science—, in the attempt of reaching some form of
trust formalization that could be independent of context-specific circumstances. This
approach led to a mathematical formalization of trust, more specifically the seminal
work of Marsh [Mar94] (see also [Net06, Kru06, You07, JIB07, CSC11]).
The second approach, seen in recent years, addresses trust in a more practical manner,
in the sense that it is focused on context-specific situations, the so-called empirical
studies [CKN+15, EFK10]. This latter approach benefits from the cumulative knowledge
produced within context-specific scenarios, i.e., within the scope of each research area.
In general, these more practical trust solutions do not take advantage of cross-domain
knowledge about trust. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, trust in cross-domain
environments like VM/MMOGs are practically inexistent in trust-related literature. Even
so, trust in MMOGs was firstly approached by [RCS+10], and [AP11] carried out a study
on trust among avatars in virtual worlds (VW), yet that without a trust computational
implementation. Interestingly, [Gol05] studied trust in social networks, which can be
also considered as cross-domain environments.
3.1.3 Other Surveys
Research in trust is extensive, and consequently the trust-related literature is also ex-
tensive. However, it is too compartmentalized, i.e., it does not go further the limits of
each research area, constraining in this way its pollination across different disciplines.
In computer science, several surveys on trust have been published mainly during the
last decade, namely:
• Internet applications. [GS00] surveyed trust in internet applications.
• Online services. [WE05] wrote a survey on online trust, while Jøsang et al. [JIB07]
surveyed trust and reputation systems for online services.
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Granatyr et al. [GBL+15] ◦ . . . . . . . . . . ◦ . . . . .
Jelenc et al. [JHSMT13] ◦ . . • • • . . • . . • . . . . .
Pinyol and Sabater-Mir [PSM13] • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lu et al. [LLYY09] . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . .
Sabater and Sierra [SS05] • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Online Services
Jøsang et al.[JIB07] ◦ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Artz and Gil [AG07] ◦ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trust Modeling
Chandrasekaran et al. [CE15] . . . . . • . • . • . . . . . . .
Pranata et al. [PSA12] • . . . . . . . . . ◦ . . . . .
Medic [Med12] • ◦ • • • . • • . . . • . . . . .
Marmól and Pérez [MP11b] . . . . . • . • . . . . • . • . .
Noorian and Ulieru [NU10] . . • • • . • • . . . • . . . . .
Social Networks
Sherchan et al. [SNP13] . . . . . . . . . . . . ◦ . . . .
Ziegler and Lausen [ZL05] • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Networks
Kumar and Dutta [KD16] . . . . . . . ◦ . . . . ◦ . ◦ ◦ .
Shree and Basha [SB14] . . . . . ◦ . ◦ . . . . . ◦ . . .
Marmól and Pérez [MP10] . . . . . • . • . . . . • • . . .
Marmól and Pérez [MP09] . . . . . • . • . . . . • . • . .
Other
Viriyasitavat and Martin [VM12] . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .
Legend: • reviewed ◦ refereed . not considered
• Web services. [AG07] wrote a survey on trust in computer science and semantic
web, and more recently [WBOM15] elaborated a survey on trust and reputation
models for web services. See also [BRDM11] for a meta-study on consumer trust.
• Trust management. [RK05] released a survey on trust management, and more re-
cently [ZDB11] also surveyed trust management on various networks, while [PSA12]
developed a more holistic perspective on trust management systems.
• Social networks. [Gol05] approached the trust across social networks in her doc-
toral thesis. [Bhu10] and, more recently, [SNP13] overviewed trust social net-
works.
• Wireless sensor networks. [Mom10] produced a survey on trust models in wireless
sensor networks.
• Digital rights management. [ZPMY09] elaborated a survey on security and trust in
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digital rights management.
• Mobile and ad-hoc networks. [CSC11] carried out a survey on trust management
for mobile and ad-hoc networks. More recently, [ABC+15] surveyed trust-based
detection of malicious users in ad-hoc and sensor networks.
• Heterogeneous networks. [GH11] wrote a survey on trust analysis for heteroge-
neous networks.
• Online auction. [WHS11] wrote a survey on trust models for online auction.
• Software development. Trust play also a significant role in assessment of trustabil-
ity in software development, as identified by the major industry players via Trust-
worthy computing Initiative (https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/) [PMW13]
[HR13].
• Cloud computing. The impact of the virtualization in cloud computing lead also
to trust issues linked with security and reliability of information [FGH11, HHRM12,
Pea13, HN13, FSG+14].
• Internet of Things. In recent years, trust management has been also studied in
the context of the Internet of Things [YZV14, CC12].
• Peer to Peer Networks. [SB14] carried out an exhaustive survey on trust models
in P2P networks.
• Agents and Multi-agent Systems. Recently, [PSM13], as well as [GBL+15], re-
viewed trust and reputation models for agent and multi-agent systems.
In short, one can say that trust solutions are mostly context-dependent. Recall that,
from a historical point of view, trust in computer science can be traced back to 1979,
more specifically to the early works of Nibaldi on trusted computer systems [Nib79] at
MITRE (http://www.mitre.org/). Nevertheless, quite recently it seems to have a trend
to address trust in a more general, cross-domain setting, as observed in the works due
to Medic [Med12] and Cho et al. [CCA15].
However, in the present survey, we only consider the surveys listed in Table 3.1 because
they are the ones that address trust models already implemented in known testbeds,
as necessary for comparison purposes. Such testbeds are listed in Table 3.2, as well
as their 17 trust models to be analyzed throughout the chapter.As shown in Table 3.2,
the majority of the testbeds considered in the survey was developed in the context of
multi-agent systems (MAS), with two exceptions, WSN [GMMPGS09a] and P2P [WAC+09].
3.1.4 Outline
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 addresses trust studies in distinct fields
of knowledge. Section 3.3 describes the trust-influencing factors during in-world inter-
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Field MAS MAS P2P WSN MAS MAS MAS MAS MAS
Language Java Java Java,C Java Java . Java Java .
Source code • • • • ◦ • • • .
Incorporate new models • • • • • • • • •
Trust models
A&H [ARH00] . . . . . . • . .
Sporas [ZM00] . • . . . . . . .
REGRET [SS01] . . . . • . . . .
BRS [JI02] . • . . . . • . .
Y&S [YS03] . . . . • . • . .
EigenTrust [KSGM03] . • • • . . • . •
FIRE [HJS04] . . . . • . . . .
PeerTrust [XL04] . . . • . . . . •
Y&S&S [YSS04] . • . . . . • . .
AppleSeed [ZL05] . . . . . . . . •
TNA-SL [JHP06] . . • . . . . . .
TRAVOS [TPJL06] . • . . . . • . .
PowerTrust [ZH07] . . . • . . . . .
TACS [GMMPGS09a] . . . . . . . . .
BTRM-WSN [MP11a] . . . • . . . . .
LFTM [MMBP12] . . . • . . . . .
TRIP [MP12] . . . • . . . . .
Legend: • available/deployed/tested model ◦ only application available
actions. Section 3.4 describes the trust properties inherent to in-world interactions.
Section 3.5 details the process of determining trust in the trustor-trustee interactions.
Section 3.6 details the most representative trust models in computer science, in the con-
text VW/MMOGs. Section3.7 discusses trust models and testbeds in a summary manner,
and in four areas of application, including VW/MMOGs. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes
the chapter, putting forward the main contribution of the survey.
3.2 Trust Studies
Trust as a multidisciplinary area of research has received a lot of attention [Fuk95,
BFL96] [Gam88] [ARH00] [GS00] [LT01] [XL04]. However, this is not the case of trust in
the context of virtual worlds (including MMOGs) [BGRP01] [Bar03] [PRMSL+09] [DL10].
41
Enhancing Trustability in MMOGs Environments
It is clear that this makes the literature review we carry out in this chapter much more
challenging. Our approach is mainly focused on computer science literature. Also,
we have limited the scope of the approach to the period of 2005-2015, with a few
exceptions like [Mar94] or [KSGM03], because of their instrumental role in the field of
trust computing. Another limitation in terms of scope was the use of trust to specifically
address interactions between humans, although mediated computationally.
3.2.1 Historical Notes
Trust was initially refereed in The Republic by Plato [FG00], in which he stated “We
should trust others only if we are confident that they fear detection and punishment
sufficiently to dissuade them from harming or stealing from us”. This quotation shows a
fundamental characteristic of trust as a society catalyst used to foment compliance with
society rules and in this way promote acceptable society behaviors [McL11]. People are
driven by their own interests, which if taken by the letter would collapse the society
[McL11]. In society, trust plays a pivotal role, as it provides a vehicle to make our
social life simpler and safer, working as the driving force behind the development of
cooperation between humans and societies [McL11].
Another way to characterize trust is due to Deutsch [Deu58], who noted that trust
leads to a non-rational choice when a person is faced with an uncertain event in which
the expected loss is greater than the expected gain [Deu58]. Hosmer [Hos95] argues
that if the reverse was true then trust would be just a rational concept. Luhmann
[Luh79] and others sociologists follow a different conceptual approach, identifying trust
as a fundamental feature in establishing and maintaining relationships between people.
These views have led to further trust developments in knowledge fields so diverse as
marketing [JB08a, UAL09], social organizations, management [CSC11, CC12], economy
and political sciences [KHZF05], and also computer science [Nib79, ARH00, AG07].
Initially, trust in computer science had a flavor of security targeting hardware and soft-
ware reliability. Nibaldi’s work [Nib79] on the specification of a trusted computing base
(TCB) at MITRE is seen as a representative of the early stages of trust developments in
computer science. These initial incursions in trust were important to endeavor the pos-
terior theoretical foundations due to Marsh [Mar94], which constitute a milestone in
trust research in computer science. Nowadays, as seen further ahead, trust computing
spans different research areas.
3.2.2 Trust in Social Sciences
Trust was and is fueled by the emergence of information society, which brings together
new collaboration and interaction possibilities for humans using computational medi-
ated devices. But, this is not without potential risks like, for example, identity theft
[NV12] [BBC+08]. To address threats of this sort, new approaches are necessary to
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preserve online personal identity, personal data, and privacy. In our view, the ways
by which people, services and organizations interact could benefit from the adop-
tion of trust computing, because trust plays an important role in strengthening and
developing social relationships [Luh79]. Current issues and trends represent a new
perspective on trust usability in social networks [SNP13, Bhu10] and virtual worlds
[SLT10, SKK+12, CZDB11]. Nevertheless, trust permeates different research fields in













Figure 3.1: Social Sciences areas that employ trust conceptualizations
3.2.2.1 Trust in psychology
In psychology [Joh74], trust is seen as a personal concept [Deu58]. The definition of
personal trust has been addressed in psychology [Bul13, Lju08], but not in the context
of virtual worlds and MMOGs so far. As detailed throughout this thesis, this concept of
personal trust plays a very important role in our trust theory and model as applied to
virtual worlds and MMOGs.
3.2.2.2 Trust in management
Efforts have been made to address how trust evolves over time within organizations
[Hos95, JB08a]. In this context, trust is understood as vital to enhance management of
organizations [CI06], which is realized as varying over time [CI06]. In general, several
types of trust have been identified within the context of a given organization, which are
hierarchically structured as follows: interpersonal trust, trust in the hierarchy, and trust
in the organization. This perspective correlates with the situation of group development
in virtual worlds and MMOGs guilds.
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3.2.2.3 Trust in marketing
In marketing, trust is seen as a requirement for inducing and developing interactions
with costumers [LJL+15, HLL10] [UAL09]. In fact, trust plays a fundamental role in
the establishment and management of market relationships [MH94, Rai00]. In online
trade, trust is even used as a marketing tool [LT01] and a key feature in buyer-seller
relations [PMD97, WE05]. In regard to VW/MMOG, the active usage of an avatar can
lead to disclosure of information like user behavior, group membership, activities, and
in-world locations susceptible of being used in marketing [CYL13]. In a virtual world
like SecondLife, where users collaboratively develop and share contents, but also en-
hance their social skills within multiple types of social activities, we realize that data
produced from these activities may be used as trusted resources, from which Linden
Labs may develop marketing strategies towards current users and to attract new ones
[PRMSL+09].
3.2.2.4 Trust in sociology
In sociology, trust is seen as a key facilitator for establishing and developing human
relationships and interactions [Luh79, Luh00] [Gol05, PK08]. From a sociological point
of view, trust can seen as an attitude which allows for risk-taking decisions to be made
[Luh79, Luh00], which depends on the context and personal experience [DH08]. Inter-
estingly, in neurology, trust is seen as an in-built human feature that triggers specific
behaviors based on evidence of an existing relation between the hormone oxytocin and
trust. As the hormone promotes “tribal behavior”, trust is tied to empathy between
in-group members and to suspicion and rejection relative to outsiders [KHZF05]. This
fact is a relevant contribution towards existing discussion on how to tune initial trust
values in computer science models [JIB07, Per99, OCB12, WHS11]. When interactions
between users (or avatars or players) take place, and no initial trust values exist, one
can use as default those taken from the biological/hormonal setting as noted above.
This also seems to be relevant in virtual worlds as a way of addressing user assessments
when no previous knowledge about such a user exists.
3.2.2.5 Trust in law
Trust represents a fundamental link between the legal and technical approaches to
digital rights management (DRM) and governance [Hum08, TJG+10], as well as in dig-
ital rights production [ZPMY09], in which multiple entities are involved: individuals,
corporations, enterprises, international entities, and even countries. Taking into con-
sideration that virtual worlds (including MMOGs) mimic real worlds somehow, trust in
computational systems also accounts for jurisdiction and legislation issues, as well as
governance issues [NSB06]. The concerns towards ownership of virtual assets like virtual
items, personal profiles, virtual presence in social networks and other types of online
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presence, are becoming nationally relevant [SLPK09], and addressed by supra-national
entities like EU [(IN11, BBC+08]. The development of a legal framework for trust man-
agement and copyright protection would certainly have implications on trustability of
the governance of virtual worlds and MMOGs, DRM, virtual object propriety assurance,
end-user license agreement (EULA), and in preventing identity theft.
Table 3.3: Comparison on how trust is used in society versus VW/MMOGs.
Areas Trust perception VW and MMOGs
Law Trust in the judicial system.
Trust in the policy body.
Platform/Game Governance.
Management How to strength trust relations within
people in organizations.
Trust among avatars/users and guild
members.
Marketing How to induce trust in a product or ser-
vice.
Behavior tracking.
Economy Mechanisms of trust in predicting scenar-
ios.
Trustability in platform/game trade en-
gine.
Sociology Trust as a tool to promote socialization. Game interaction facilities.
Psychology Trust as a personal assessment tool. Players behavior, notoriety and ranking.
Philosophy Interpersonal trust and the morality of
trust relationships.
Avatar behaviors, like griefing, ganking,
harassment.
Political Science Trust in political science is linked to how
leaders behavior is perceived.
Notoriety and player rankings are fed by
their interactions and achievements.
3.2.2.6 Economy
Trust plays a key role in economic exchanges [WE05], which has much to do with how
trust is established between buyers and sellers, and their products in e-commerce
[LT01]. In fact, there is evidence that indicates that trust contributes to economic suc-
cess [WE05]. We believe that trust in economics can be easily transposed to VW/MMOGs
to address in-world trade, and in-world economic dynamics (e.g., by determining the
level of scarcity of a highly required asset and, in this way, to determine its in-world
value).
3.2.2.7 Political science
As known, trust pervades human societies. In regard to politics, trust plays a key role
not only in the establishment of political legitimacy [KHZF05, Het98, CL16], but also in
the trustworthiness of a country’s institutions and their leaders [Kaa99], not to mention
how international relations are established [Hof02].
3.2.2.8 Philosophy
As mentioned above, trust was addressed initially by ancient greeks philosophers like
Plato [McL11, Bai02]. From a philosophical perspective, we trust to develop relation-
ships with others, including love, advice and help [McL11]. Others see the link between
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our willingness to cooperate and trust as a benefit for the society as a whole [WE05], sug-
gesting the existence of an association between trust in society and philosophy [Hos95].
Table 3.3 summarizes and compares different real-world contexts to their counterparts
in virtual worlds and MMOGs. In short, we can say that these virtual environments tend
to mimic at least some real-world contexts for good and for bad.
3.2.3 Trust in Computer Science
In computer science, the leading idea of trust is to transpose solutions and frameworks
used in our daily lives —and already studied in other areas of research— to computer-
mediated devices and services. Society as a whole evolves over time, so that interac-
tions via such computer-mediated devices tend to become prevalent, what obviously
requires the adoption of new solutions for trust that go beyond the face-to-face rela-































Figure 3.2: Computer science areas that employ trust conceptualizations.
3.2.3.1 Hardware
Trust in hardware is tied to the beginnings of computer systems, and has much to do
with integrity, reliability and performance of integrated circuit designs, and hardware
in general. In fact, trustworthier hardware plays an pivotal role in security [ZYW+15,
IL07]. A prevalent issue regarding hardware is the hardware integrity and reliability
of compute devices, in particular those disseminated via the Internet-of-Things (IoT).
Such hardware integrity and reliability must be primarily assured with the exclusion of
adulterated integrated circuits produced in untrusted foundries, because adulterated
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Table 3.4: Comparison of trust usability in different computer science areas versus VW/MMOGs.
Areas Trust usage VW and MMOGs
Hardware Embedded chip to secure functionality.
Trustworthy computational devices.
Could be used to validate client applica-
tions and prevent client side adulteration




Embed trust modeling in platform en-
gine.
Networks Trust Models.
Trusted and reliable nodes.
Analogy between network nodes and in-
world avatars.
Online Services Trust in e-commerce.
Social networks.
In-world and engine services relation-
ships.
Security Embedded chip to secure functionality.
Trustworty computational devices.
Poor governance and regulation can lead
to security incidents.
HCI Trust in the usability of the interface.
Develop trust between users and online
services.
Trust in the immersive environment from
how it is perceived and sense by users.




hardware is vulnerable to a wide range of malicious attacks via software. Adulterated
chips work as hardware trojans (HTs) and could be exploited as backdoors to disrupt
normal operation of compute devices, which may lead to performance changes and
service degradation [NCD+10].
This has led the industry (within the Trust Computing Group) to develop efforts towards
the adoption of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware chip by the manufactur-
ers. TPM is a dedicated micro-controller designed to secure hardware by integrating
cryptographic keys into compute devices (e.g., laptops, tablets, smartphones, IoT de-
vices), with the primary goal to ensure the integrity of a platform and effectively guar-
antee that hardware operates as supposed to be. This micro-controller is not bounded
to a particular operating system, with the further advantage that it potentially bene-
fits encryption-enabled applications like digital rights management (DRM), protection
and enforcement of software licenses, and also prevention of cheating in VW/MMOGs
[BM07]. The downside of TPM is that it raises privacy concerns in respect to users of
computate devices.
3.2.3.2 Software
Trust in software has given rise to several initiatives, namely by the Trust Computing
Group (TCG) [PMW13] and their TPM usage software developers, in order to assure a
more reliable and trustworthy software, i.e., software with a reduced number of or
even without security faults [ARJ09]. Software is also used to assure data integrity
and data trustability through digital signatures in [DPJX12]. Others researchers and
practitioners address integration of trust in software as a service (SaaS) [DCK16], or
trust in open source software [HR13]. Also, in software agents, trust is used [Pat02]
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crosswise in e-markets in buyer-seller situations, or in trust modeling [JHSMT13].
3.2.3.3 Networking
Trust is also important in networks and communication protocols, mainly in scenar-
ios in which uncertainty is associated to network nodes. Such uncertainty depends on
the node dynamics, i.e., volatility, lack of or incomplete information (on new nodes
characteristics), alleged node behavior, and node capacities, as observed in differ-
ent types of networks, namely: WSN [CC12, MP11a], P2P [SB14], MANETs [GM12] and
also identified in IoT [YZV14, Køi11]. Trust is also essential in certification authorities
[OCB12, Lev04, LA98], PKI [DPJX12, Per99], as well as other specific protocols devel-
opments. Additionally, grid and cloud services and technologies pose interesting trust
challenges [HHRM12, HS13].
3.2.3.4 Online services
Trust has been also addressed in online services, being today one of the most important
trends in the era of the information society [JIB07, Mas07, YZCZ11], with a particular
focus on specific scenarios like e-commerce [BRDM11, ST11, MDH02, MCR12], web ser-
vices [WBOM15, Gol09, AG07, UAL09, MS04], and supra-national initiatives and research
on enabling technologies for security and trustworthiness of network infrastructures and
services [(IN11], so that trust issues related with privacy and identity in information and
communications technology (ICT) are also addressed [VCS07].
3.2.3.5 Security
Security may appear in many flavors. Often it is bound to reliability, availability, but
also addresses features like confidentiality of information, data integrity, vulnerabili-
ties and resilience to faults or attacks as stated in a Trustworthy ICT Research EU FP7
technical report [(IN11]; see also [MSS14, Kou12, ST11, GMMPGS09a, ZPMY09] for fur-
ther details. Trust is a key feature to security. In cybersecurity and digital privacy,
trust plays a pivotal role [(IN11]. The issue of user privacy and how trust relates to
security was developed in [Sei05], but [D’H00] also discusses the issue on how trust
influences security. Other works address infrastructure security [CM02], and how secu-
rity of critical infrastructures depends on trust [CSM+11]. But, security is also an issue
in hardware, so that trust in the device operational reliability is a factor to take into
account [Kou12], in particular in respect to grid computing infra-structures [SHM04].
Sullivan et al. [SCM10] attempted to develop security metrics for trust. In regard to
online services, there is also a concern about security issues in trust and reputation sys-
tems [ST11]. In games and virtual worlds, important security issues were put forward
in [MH07, BBC+08] and [BJB+07].
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3.2.3.6 Human-computer interaction
Human-computer interactions (HCIs) play an important role for users to develop trust on
online services (e.g, like an online bank) [Dix09]. Intuitively, we can say that HCI aggre-
gates contributions from multiple fields, from ergonomy and design to human behavior
studies and computer science. Therefore how the interface is presented, perceived
and used by users can contribute to the establishment of trust relationships between
humans and services [Hwa14, LWH13], as well as among humans via compute medi-
ated interactions like those in social networks [SNP13]. Also, in VW/MMOGs, when the
human-computer interface is an in-world 3D world that lacks real world features like
face-to-face communication, establishing trust across these media is something we need
to develop in the near future [DIG13]. In the literature, the focus of research in human
computer interaction is on online services/applications interfaces [DHMV14]. This focus
is also extensible to immersive environments like VW/MMOGs [Lop07] and augmented
reality environments (e.g., placement of virtual objects in real world) [Har14, Ali97],
which represent new challenges for trust developments in the HCI field.
3.2.3.7 Agents and multiagent systems
Trust in agents and multi-agent systems (MAS) were addressed by Marsh [Mar94] as proof
of concept of the first conceptual approach to trust. Later on, Castelfranchi and Fal-
cone [CF98] established the trust principles of MAS, in order to address agent inter-
actions in a similar way to client-seller market characterizations. Additionally, trust
developments in MAS were addressed in [RHJ04], and [Pat02]. Other approaches used
reputation models to enhance agent interactions [You07]. Also, it is common to see
trust modeling and trust management systems and tools to take advantage of agent-
based trust models like REGRET [SS01], TRAVOS [TPJL06], FIRE [DHJS04, HJS04]. Note
that agent-based trust models have been extensively overviewed in multiple surveys
[GBL+15, YSL+13, PSM13, LLYY09], and also in testbed platforms like Agent Test Bed
(ATB) [EHW13] or DART [SAW12].
Summing up, in computer science, trust tends to be used across compute-mediated
devices, in a similar way as humans do in their daily live. Table 3.3 illustrates how trust
is used in different computer science fields, putting in evidence how it might be used
in VW/MMOGs.
3.3 Trust-Influencing Factors
When we use the term “trust” in our daily live, the basic concept is recognized but it
is meaningless to us without further information, i.e., “I trust ...” would only have a
meaning if we add something to the term in order to bring significance to the concept.
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The tendency to believe or to believe too
readily and therefore to be easily deceived
Greedy, hasty, and/or ignorant users tar-
geted by scams.
Confidence A feeling of trust towards someone or some-
thing. This sometimes is referred as a syn-
onymous of trust.
I have confidence in other guild members.
Distrust The opposite of trust, i.e., suspicion or with
lack of confidence in, doubt on someone’s
honesty.
The usual trust state when facing unknown
avatars.
Entrust To confer trust upon (“The messenger was
entrusted with the general’s secret”), im-
plies the delegation of something (i.e., usu-
ally a task) from trustor to trustee.
e.g., lending a sword to a friend to enter in
a PvP fight.
Different and sometimes overlapping definitions of trust coexist in the literature [MDH02].
As was noted by [Deu58], trust incorporates the reciprocal and bi-directional link be-
tween trustor and trustee, which was later, and in another context, also identified by
[CI06]. However, in our view, trust is not reciprocal, i.e., trust is a direct relationship
between a trustor and a trustee, not the other way round; e.g., “I trust my car to my
mechanic, but he does not trust his car to me to fix it”.
Trust has been subject to several unsuccessfully attempts to come up to a formal and
concise definition. In fact, there is a lack on consensus about what trust is, simply
because it is a multi-faceted concept that incorporates cognitive, emotional, and be-
havioral dimensions, amongst others, with the further difficulty of being used inter-
changeably with other related concepts [WE05]. As illustrated in Table 3.5, the con-
cepts of credulity, gullibility, confidence, and entrust may be mistaken as trust, but
they distinguish from each other in a subtle manner.
3.3.1 Main Trust Factors
Trust is necessary when humans need to make decisions (or choices). For each individ-
ual, a trust-based decision is made with reference to a number of factors, here called
trust-inflencing factors, or simply trust factors. The main trust factors are the follow-
ing: past experience and risk. Also, as illustrated in Table 3.5, these trust-influencing
factors are common to real and virtual worlds, including MMOGs; for example, when a
player lend an high value object to a guild member he accepts the risk that it could not
be returned, but he knows him, he is in is team. Further ahead, we shall see that there
are other trust factors that help humans to make decisions.
In social sciences, we find a number of definitions for trust in different contexts. Herein,
we are interested in definitions originated in psychology and sociology, because they
have to do with the individual and groups of individuals (i.e., communities), respec-
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tively, as usual in VW/MMOGs. In psychology, the following definition shows that the
question of trusting/untrusting is inherent to personal choices. Moreover, any choice
has a consequence or associated risk.
Definition 1 Trust represents the reliance on another’s good will, therefore letting
others taking care of something the trustor cares about which involves some exercise
of discretionary power [Bai86].
On the other hand, the following definition shows that past experience is a factor to
take into account in the process of making a decision (i.e., choice) based on trust:
Definition 2 When we trust other people, we expect that they will fulfill their promises,
either because we know that they have usually done so in the past, or because we be-
lieve that we shall fare better if we presume that others are trustworthy [Usl02].
In fact, as argued by [Luh79], from the sociological point of view, trust is a mean for
reducing the complexity of living in society. Such complexity stems from the interac-
tion between individuals with different perceptions and goals [Luh79]. This sociological
perspective on trust due to [Luh79] shows that trust essentially is an interpersonal con-
cept [Jal06]. Therefore, trust is a way of simplifying the human-human interactions (or
trustor-trustee relationships) underlying the living in society. Luhmann’s sociological
view of trust as a interpersonal concept translates itself into a one-to-one relation in
computer science as follows:
Definition 3 Trust is a relationship established between a trustor and a trustee avatar
in which the trustor makes himself vulnerable to the actions of the trustee in the
expectation that the trustee will produce a good outcome.
It is clear that this definition of trust is atomic and does not fully feature the sociological
view of trust as argued by Luhmann. To comply with this sociological view of trust, we
have to extend the trustor-trustee relationship to all members of a group, community,
or society. In computer science, this sociological view can be represented by a graph,
where nodes represent individuals and edges represent trust relationships.
Definition 4 The trust associated to a given agent (or graph node) is a subjective assess-
ment by another agent (or graph node) on the reliability and accuracy of information
received from or traversing through that node in a given context [GM12].
This graph representation of trust relationships constitutes a first step to be able to
quantify trust, as required in computer science, though trust supposedly is not quan-
tifiable in social sciences. In fact, the first serious attempt to quantify and formalize
trust, as needed to be implemented and thus evaluated on computer, was carried out
by Marsh [Mar94], who used a testbed populated by trusting agents to illustrate the
usefulness of the trust as a computational concept. In truth, trustor’s subjective view
on the trustee together with a set of available information sources (e.g., other avatars,
guild members, friends, reputation systems, trust networks) can be used to evaluate
and assess the trustee in terms of trust. For that purpose, it is crucial to identify and
be able to quantify more trust-influencing factors (see Table 3.6).
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Table 3.6: Trust influential factors from real world situations.
Real world situations Hypothesis Factor
I have trust in my car to drive me to work.
I rely on my car brand so I’ll buy them my
next car. I flight often with my country air-
line because I trust them.





I trust in my mechanic to fix my car. I don’t
trust my mechanic to babysitter my toddler.




I trust himmy car again although he crashed
one a year ago.
Trust is influenced by time [ABC+15,
AHC13, AG07], since past events relevance
to trust decays with time.
Time
I trust in my gardener because my friend
suggested. I book a hotel room with high
rate of positive comments.





I trust my wife despite my friend opinion. I
trust that this week I will win the lottery.
Subjectivity determines trust decisions
as they are based on past individual
experience, understanding, and feelings
[WBOM15, PSM13, JB08a, WE05]. The way
we envision situations has an higher influ-




I lend my special powered sword to friend
in a MMOG.
Taking a risk is an essential part of a trusting
relationship [BRDM11].
Risk
I trust in my child to mowing, but not to
drive my car. I distrust my child to swim
without supervision in a pool.
Trust depends on context [GS00, JGK06,
SS05].
Context
I made him a personal loan because he is a
friend. I trust him because he is from my
family. I trust in my supervisor decisions.
Friendship, intimacy and, in general, prox-




3.3.2 Other Trust Factors
Trust as an abstraction concept can be better understood when we identify and relate it
to specific real-world situations (or scenarios) in which trust is addressed from a point
of view of human-human interactions. Therefore, the feeling of trust reveals itself in
distinct ways when humans interact with other entities of the surrounding world, in-
cluding other humans. In a way, one can say that there are several context-dependent
trust hypotheses, i.e., a number of suppositions put forward on the basis of limited
evidence, which work as a starting point for a deeper investigation. In order to clarify
how trust works in human-human interactions, it is important to identify the trust fac-
tors (or trust-influencing factors) from those trust hypotheses, as well as examples of
real-world situations that make such hypotheses more plausible, yet using the common
sense approach.
In Table 3.6, we present illustrative real-world trust situations, for each one of which we
put forward a trust hypothesis found in the literature in order to reinforce its evidence,
being then possible to derive the corresponding trust factor. In fact, using Table 3.6, we
were able to identify the following trust-influencing factors underlying many human-to-
human interactions in real-world scenarios:
• Past experience is a key factor to enhance trust decisions (see also Section 3.3.1).
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• Risk is another key factor that has always to be taken into account whenever a
trustor makes a trust-based decision relative to a trustee (see also Section 3.3.1).
• Trustee skills constitute an important factor to make a trust decision .
• Time plays an important role in the trusting process because past decisions are
less relevant than recent ones.
• Opinions (i.e., reputation) expressed by other users contribute to the formation
of an individual trust assessment.
• Personalization is a mind set experience that determines how trustor makes a de-
cision based on his/her personal perception about the trustworthiness of a trustee.
Trust varies from a person to another, i.e., trust represents a personal view.
• Context is of paramount relevance to determine suitability of the trustee to per-
form the allocated task.
• Social proximity influences how trust is established between trustor and trustee,
since a trustor tends to more readily trust on a family member or a friend than on
an unknown individual.
Summing up, we can say that there are factors that contribute to know how a trustor
develops trust on a trustee. In other words, trust factors can be seen as information
sources used in the trust building process, as expressed in the following definition:
Definition 5 A trust factor is information used by the trustor to build the knowledge
required to the establishment of a trust relation with a trustee.
In [JP05], trust-influencing factors were classified as intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic
factors constitute trustee information directly collected by the trustor, while extrinsic
factors comprise trustee information obtained from other sources. In the context of web
services, nineteen factors were identified in the process of how users determine trust
in web content [GA07], and are the following: topic, context, popularity, authority,
direct experience, recommendation, related resources, provenance, expertise, bias,
incentive, limited resources, agreement, specificity, likelihood, age, appearance, de-
ception, and recency. Others like [Yan08a, YZV14] see these factors in five categories:
context factors, trustee’s objective factors (e.g., trustee’s reputation), trustee’s sub-
jective factors (e.g., trustee’s honesty and benevolence), trustor’s subjective factors
(e.g., trustor’s attitude and willingness to trust), and finally the trustor’s objective
factors (e.g., trustor’s criteria specified for a trust decision).
3.4 Trust Properties
In order to address how to deploy and develop a trust representation in computer sci-
ence, it is necessary to come up to an understandable set of trust properties associated
to trustor-trustee relationships (or, more specifically, human-human interactions), yet
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taking into consideration the trust factors addressed in the previous section. This is
illustrated in Fig. 3.3, where one describes the cycle of trust initiated and concluded
at the trustor. The experience-based knowledge develops and improves with the trust
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Figure 3.4: Trust properties and influence factors.
Considerable efforts have being made in order to identify a subset of common trust
proprieties [GS00] [MDH02] [WE05] [Yan08b] [VM12], as shown in Fig. 3.4. They are the
following:
— Unidirectional. Trust is unidirectional, as it represents a relationship from the trustor
to the trustee [Yan08b], not the other way round.
— Asymmetrical. Trust is asymmetrical in the sense that the impact of a negative out-
come surpasses the impact of positive outcome, i.e., a negative outcome is usually more
relevant than positives outcomes previously obtained [CSMT02, CCA15].
— Subjective. Trust is subjective and, thus, personal [GS00]. Besides, it depends on the
context the task and the trustee skills (and willingness) to fulfil such task [WE05] and
Yan [Yan08b].
— Dynamic. Trust is dynamic because it changes over time, i.e., trustee’s trustworthi-
ness changes over time from the trustor’s point of view, being highly correlated with
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the knowledge that trustor has about the trustee at a given time [VSMH10, ZKB11].
— Transitive. Trust is transitive in the sense that it flows along a chain of (or network)
of recommendations (i.e., reputation). Transitivity is often bound to the context and
the trustor’s objective factors [Yan08b]. Note that trust degrades along the chain, so
that trust is not perfectly transitive in the mathematical sense [Gol05].
— Mesurable Trust must be measurable in the sense that it is feasible to quantify trust,
i.e., distinct numeric values to represent different degrees of trust. “Trust is mea-
surable” also provides the foundation for trust modeling and computational evaluation
[Yan08b].
— Compound. Trust may possess multiple attributes, namely reliability, dependabil-
ity, honesty, truthfulness, security, competence, and timeliness, among others, which
may have to be considered depending on the context in which trust is being specified
[GS00]. Therefore, composition is an important property to take into account in trust
computations.
As shown above, the trust properties depend on how trust works in the human-human
interactions. That is, these properties become clear after understanding how the trust-
influencing factors work during human-human interactions, in order to determine whether
or not an individual trusts in another individual. When a trustor-trustee interaction
runs well (i.e., if the interaction outcome is positive), the trust score associated to the
trustee tends to slightly increase; otherwise (i.e., if the interaction outcome is negative
or behind trustor’s expectations), it tends to noticeably degrade.
3.5 Trust Inference Process
The establishment of a trust relation between two humans (i.e., a trustor and a trustee)
is a complex process, which is illustrated in the diagram depicted in Fig. 3.5; the blue
diagram elements concern the trustor, while those in pink are associated to the trustee.
Trustor and trustee are represented by ellipses, while the tasks/actions involved in the









Figure 3.5: The trust decision making process.
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The trust inference process is obviously initiated by the trustor, and consists of the
following steps:
— Trust intention. This is a necessary pre-condition for the trustor because it is him/her
who establishes a goal to be achieved (and the potential associated risk) with the his/her
interaction underlying the trust relationship [CCA15]. The concept “intention to trust”
was employed in a normative model of trust proposed by [Bew08]. A clear distinction
between trust intentions, trust beliefs, and trust behaviors was addressed in [MDH02].
Others like [JB08a] saw trust intention closely tied with managing user’s behaviors by
creating positive perceptions of one’s behavior and intentions.
— Trust collecting. This is a key stage (or task or action) to develop trust knowledge
about one or more individuals [AG07], agents [ABC+15], or else [CSC11]. The lead-
ing idea for the trustor is to collect and aggregate trust-related data from available
information sources (e.g., other users, reputation systems).
— Trust assessment. This step aims at calculating a trust value associated to the trustee
from existing trust knowledge sources [CE15], while others like [CCA15] consider trust
assessment as the trust inference process itself.
— Trust decision. A trust decision about the trustee is made by the trustor with refer-
ence to his/her natural tendency to trust, beliefs and past experience with the trustee
[GS00] [CSC11] [CCA15]. As argued in [SNP13], in sociological and psychological terms,
the trust decision process is calculative, relational, emotional, and cognitive, so that
these features must be considered to reflect the human trust decision-making process
[SNP13].
— Trust action. In our view, a trust action represents the action carried out by the
trustor after his/her decision making. But, in some contexts, it may also represent
an action performed by the trustee as he/she executes the task on the behalf of the
trustor [VM12]. This delegation procedure was approached within a MAS context, with
the argument that delegation makes relations more robust and truthful [GBL+15]. The
delegation occurs when an trustor intent to to exploit the actions of a trustee to achieve
his/her goals [CCA15].
— Trust outcome. The trust outcome represents the result of the action performed by
the trustee after completing the task delegated by the trustor.
Fig. 3.5 shows a diagram of the main steps involved in the decision-making procedure, as
part of the trust inference process diagramatically represented in Fig. 3.3, which shows
how a trust relationship is established between humans (and mediated by avatars),
as usual in VW/MMOGs. Note that we are here using trust to address human-to-human
interactions computationally mediated by avatars as needed in VW/MMOGs. That is, we
are not much interested in other types of interactions as, for example, agent-to-agent
and node-to-node interactions. It is clear that social science perspective is relevant in
human-to-human interactions, particularly in respect to the reputation of the trustee,
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which has to do with the community assessment about the trustee. But, the perception
of the trustor about the trustee is also important, i.e., the individual assessment made
by the trustor about the trustee plays an important role in the decision-making process
performed by the trustor.
3.6 Trust Models
Trust modeling is a complex process because quantifying trust is not an easy task. In
fact, trust is a multidimensional, multidisciplinary, and multi-faceted concept [YP11,
GBL+15, MT11], so that finding a solution for representing trust as a quantifiable value
is a real challenge. As seen above, trust congregates different properties originated in
trust-influencing factors during the human-human interactions, which have much to do
with not only cognitive and individual perceptions, but also reliability of information
and communication [CCA15], in a way as illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Note that, as far as we know, computational trust models targeting VW/MMOGs are
inexistent in the literature, simply because most trust models have been designed for
agent-agent interactions, but we can find also solutions for node-node interactions in a
number of networks. Thus, our approach intends to identify trust models in the liter-
ature that are susceptible of being employed in trust model solutions for VW/MMOGs.
We are now in position to say that such trust model here put forward for VW/MMOGs
was mainly inspired in those due to [VM12, Mom10, AKW+11, ABC+15].
3.6.1 Trust Modeling Framework
A general trust framework is shown in Fig. 3.6. It consists of three tiers: data sources,













Figure 3.6: Trust computational model key components.
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3.6.1.1 Trust framework tiers
Taking into consideration multiple contributions and studies on trust modeling and trust-
related surveys found in the literature [SS05, ABC+15, NU10, GBL+15, JHSMT13, LLYY09,
HZNR09, PSM13, SNP13, Tav12], we come across with a trust modeling framework that
consists of the following three tiers:
• Data represents the bottom level of the framework as a set of multi-dimensional
data sources, which comprises the input data that feed up the trust engine (second
tier).
• Trust engine constitutes the middle level of the framework, which is responsible
for transforming trust related-data into a quantifiable trust result. Therefore, it
implements one or more trust models.
• Entities represent the trustor and trustee of any human-human interaction; they
constitute the top level of the framework.
In general, existing computational trust models described in the literature [PSM13,
CSC11, WE05] include in a way or another the tiers (and their components) displayed


















Figure 3.7: Data sources.
3.6.1.2 Data sources
Data sources (first tier) work as input for the trust engine (second tier) that imple-
ments one or more trust models, which will be discussed further ahead. They are of
paramount importance because they determine which trust representation will be used
in the trust model. It is clear that data sources and their representations in a given
trust model varies in conformity with the context. In a simple MAS buyer/seller scenario
[CE15, BRDM11], one may only include data concerning direct agent-agent interactions
[JHSMT13], but in more complex scenarios like MMOGs we have to further include data
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retrieved from ranking sites, reputation systems, high rank users, and guilds, some of
which are external to the virtual world.
A classification of data sources is shown in Fig. 3.7, which is a result of combining differ-
ent taxonomies existing in the literature [GBL+15, CCA15, VM12, PK08]. Data sources
divide into main classes: direct and indirect. Direct data sources are generated from
entity-entity interactions (current and past interactions), which are human-human in-
teractions in VW/MMOGs. In turn, indirect data sources are third-party sources as,
for example, other users/friends (opinions) [JHSMT13, TB06, TPJL06], rating systems
(e.g., buyer/seller market) [Med12, NU10, GS00], reputation systems [JIB07, GM12,
LLYY09, SNP13], certification authorities [OCB12, GS00], trust networks (e.g., Face-
book) [JGK06, AKW+11, VGCK11, GM12, LLYY09, SNP13], societal sources, i.e., social
networks [SS05] [SNP13] [McL11, NV12, Hos95], prejudice, which represents a mecha-
nism to derive a set of preset characteristics to the trustee based on signs that identify
the trustee as a member of a given group (e.g., a guild in MMOGs) [SS05, PSM13].
3.6.1.3 Trust engine
A trust engine essentially is an implementation of a given trust model. Its data structures
are a computational representation of data retrieved from data sources (see Fig. 3.6).
These data are important to calculate a trust value for a trustee. Taking into account
trust modeling solutions found in the literature [WBOM15, SS05, JIB07], we can say that
a trust engine (and its underlying trust model) consists of the following steps:
• Collector represents the process by which the engine collects and aggregates
data relevant for building a trust representation on others (e.g., using direct in-
teraction, reputation systems, trust networks, opinions) [GM12, YZCZ11, Med12,
WBOM15, KD16]. In some circumstances, a initialization process (or bootstrapper)
precedes the data collector step to cope with initial state or lack of information
[ABC+15, CKN+15, NU10, OCB12, SB14, WBOM15].
• Calculator is the process used to calculate a trust value for a trustee based on the
data collected about him/her in the previous step [CSC11], i.e., the trust value
represents the degree of trustability of the trustee as perceived by the trustor. In
the absence of such data, one uses the default data taken from the bootstrapper.
• Decisor is the process that leads to a decision making with reference to the trust
value calculated in the previous step [JIB07, AG07, CCA15, GS00]. Note that this
trust value can be changed by the own opinion of the trustor at this stage; let us
called it trust outcome. That is, the trustor may opt for a discretionary decision,
i.e., according to his/her beliefs and intuition [WBOM15, AG07].
• Updater is the process used to update or/and forward the trust outcome—determined
in the previous step— to different data sources (e.g., a reputation system, a per-
sonal knowledge base, or even other users) [WHS11, GM12, Mom10].
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Note that the general trust model description presented above is compatible with the
majority of existing computational trust models described in recent surveys [ABC+15,
CSC11, CCA15, LLYY09, SS05, JHSMT13]. Note that the decision step is not considered
in some MAS trust models. This is so when the aim is not to provide a decision, but,






























Figure 3.8: Trust methods.
3.6.2 Trust and Reputation Models
The scope of our approach is aimed to VW/MMOG trust solutions as previously stressed,
although current research in computational trust solutions target to human-to-human
interactions mediated by avatars in a virtual immersive environments is to the best of
our knowledge neglect by the research community.
To devise possible trust modeling solutions suitable for VW/MMOGs, an assessment of
existing literature was made that resulted in a selection of seventeen trust models.
Aiming with this procedure to evaluate their potential for usage in VW/MMOGs. The
selection process was based on two key features: the first similitude with VW/MMOG
issues and the existence of a suitable testbed platform in which the modeling solution
could be experimental assessed, further evaluated and or used further in experimental
developments targeted to VW/MMOGs.
Regarding the choices made in the selection of the models were based in a wide coverage
of contributions that span different areas from agent andmulti-agent systems to P2P and
WSN networks, using different types of data and trust assessments and trust decisions
mechanisms. We present next a brief description of the models main features regarding
its implementation (i.e. types of data used, aggregation trust mechanism and trust
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Table 3.7: Trust models and their sources and trust methods (engines).





























































































































Direct experiences • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Opinions/witnessed • . • • • • • • • . . • • . . . •
Authority . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . •
Social . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Role based . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .
Trust methods (engines)
Deterministic . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . .
Probabilistic . . . . . • . . • . . • . • . . .
Machine learning . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Statistical/geometrical . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . •
Dempster-shafter . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . .
Subjective logic . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . .
Beta probability . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Subjective probability . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .
Bayesian learning . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .
Fuzzy logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • .
Other • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .
Legend: • used ◦ not used . not applicable
decision as well as its key proprieties). For a more detailed view on the models consider
the authors publication in the references and the existing surveys that address these
trust models illustrated in Tab. 3.1.
3.6.2.1 Abdul-Rahman (2000)
Abdul-Rahman’s trust model is inspired in a sociological view of trust as of real world sit-
uations, aiming the virtual communities in this manner [ARH00]. Data sources: There-
fore, it is based on real-world social interactions (i.e., direct interactions), and also on
reputation data (i.e., recommendations) produced by the word-of-mouth mechanism,
this way empowering individual users with trust decisions about others, rather than re-
lying on a centralized approach [Mom10].
Data collection and representation: Each agent is associated to two sets (or data struc-
tures). The first is the set D of direct interactions, whereas the second is the set R of
recommendations, a recommendation per recommender agent.
The set of direct interactions can be expressed asD ⊆ C×A×E, where C = {c1, . . . , cn}
is the set of contexts faced by the agent, A = {a1, . . . , am} is the set of agents with
whom the agent has interacted with, and E = {(G, g, b, B)} is the set of past expe-
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riences, where G is the integer accumulator for very good experiences, g the integer
accumulator for good experiences, b is the integer accumulator for bad experiences, B
the integer accumulator for very bad experiences.
The set of recommendations can be expressed asR ⊆ C×A×T , with T = {(TG, Tg, Tb, TB)}
denoting adjustment experiences relative the (trustor) agent. As explained further
ahead, the domain of TG, Tg, Tb, and TB is the set {−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3}, with each
value expressing a possible semantic distance between the trust degree determined
by the trustor and the trust degree determined by the recommender agent. In fact,
the trust degree d takes on one of the following qualitative values: very trustworthy,
trustworthy, untrustworthy, and very untrustworthy [ARH00]. Then, let ai be a trustor
agent and aj a recommender agent; if aj recommends to ai that ak is very trustworthy
in a given context, and ai assessment of its experience with ak is very untrustworthy,
we can say that ai experience with ak downgrades aj recommendation by 3 (i.e., the
adjustment difference is TB = −3).
Trust computation and decision: As said above, the trust degree d (or trustworthiness)
of an agent takes on one of the following values: very trustworthy, trustworthy, un-
trustworthy, and very untrustworthy. The trust degree depends on past experiences
with other agents. For example, let ai be the trustor agent and ak the trustee agent,
and (G, g, b, B) = (9, 4, 5, 3 the tuple consisting of the number of very good past experi-
ences (G = 9), the number of good past experiences (g = 4), the number of bad past
experiences (b = 5), the number of very bad past experiences (B = 3).
Taking into account that the trust degree is defined as d = max(G, g, b, B), we see that
the trustor ai considers the trustee ak as very trustworthy, because there is one-to-one
correspondence between the qualifier of past experiences and the qualifier of trust
degree. After calculating the trust degree, the direct interactions take the form of
3-tuples (a,c,d), where a stands for the trustee agent, c the context of interaction, and
d the trust degree.
Note that this model is capable of learning and correcting opinions, mainly because
of the downgrading and upgrading mechanisms provided by the semantic distance ex-
plained above. In a way, it is a simplification of Marsh’s work as only four trust values
are considered. But, nothing is said about how to discover other agents that have inter-
acted with the trustee agent being assessed, so that updating the data structures may
be very time-consuming, in particular for systems for a large number of agents. For
further details about the model, the reader is referred to [ARH00].
Surveys and Testbeds: The reader is referred to Table 3.7 for further details about this
model when compared to other trust models. This model is also described an compared
to others models in various surveys [JHSMT13, Med12, NU10, TPJL06], as shown in Ta-
ble 3.1. As a proof of concept, this model developed as a MAS platform testbed [ARH00]
(see Table 3.2).
Usage in VW/MMOGs: In our opinion, this trust model might be incorporated in VW/MMOGs,
because it copes with misbehaviors, with the advantage that it uses a learning mecha-
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agents its opinions are downgraded) [JHSMT13].
3.6.2.2 Zacharia & Maes (2000)
[ZM00] proposed two reputation mechanisms for trust management, called Sporas and
Histos, in the context of electronic commerce, though they argue that those mech-
anisms are applicable to electronic communities (e.g., chatrooms, newsgroups, and
mailing lists). These two complementary mechanisms are based on collaborative rating
and personalized assessment of the various ratings ascribed to each user. Sporas was
thought of to be applied to loosely connected communities, whereas Histos is more ad-
equate for highly connected communities.
Data sources: Sporas’ data sources only consider direct interactions (called transac-
tions) in the rating procedure, while Histos also considers opinions.
Data collection and representation: Essentially, Sporas’ representation is a set of pairs
(ui, ri), where ui stands for the i-th user and ri its global reputation value in the com-
munity. The reputation of each user is updated over time with the interactions he/she
experiences with other users. That is, Sporas fosters the collaborative rating in respect
to reputation.
Unlike Sporas, Histos represents the pairwise ratings as a directed graph, whose nodes
represent users, while directed edges represent the most recent reputation ratings as-
signed to users by others. Thus, when a transaction starts taking place between two
users, we have to check whether there is a graph path between them, in order to con-
sider the reputation ratings associated to the edges of such path. The leading idea is
to calculate the trustworthiness of someone using a transitivity-based mechanism that
translates into the following: we tend to trust someone who has the confidence of
someone in whom we trust. This allows for online transactions with someone a user
has never interacted with before, since there is a path between them in the graph.
Histos uses a breadth-first search (BFS) algorithm to determine all the paths between
two users, selecting then the most recent of them.
Trust computation and decision: Sporas uses amachine-learning method that calculates
a global reputation value for each user belonging to the online community. Basically, it
uses a recursive formula that updates the reputation value ascribed to each user when-
ever a new transaction with a third party takes place. This means that the most recent
ratings have more impact on the global reputation value of a user than the less recent
ratings. In fact, the model does not take into account a track record of past behaviors,
nor the context within which the interactions take place; as a consequence, it does not
possess anti-cheating mechanisms to deal with misbehaviors [PSM13].
In regard to Histos, it also uses a recursive reputation formula or function to calculate
personalized reputation values, which takes into consideration the graph path between
two interacting users. This formula can be seen as a modified version of Sporas’ repu-
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tation formula. However, Histos does not consider the existence of loops in the paths
between two users. Note that the recursion of both Sporas and Histos reputation for-
mulas provide a straightforward mechanism to proceed to reputation updates.
Surveys and Testbeds: For more details about this model, when compared to other mod-
els, the reader is referred to Table 3.7. This model was surveyed by [Med12] (see Ta-
ble 3.1), though it was also considered and studied in [MP10] [Tav12] [MMH02] [Urb13].
For one of its implementations, it is convenient to have a look at the testbed described
by [SVB05] (Table 3.2).
Usage in VW/MMOGs: As explained above, this model is not adequate for VW/MMOGs
because it is not able to deal with misbehaviors in a proper manner.
3.6.2.3 Regret (2001)
This model has been proposed by [SS01]. Its applicability is focused on complex e-
commerce environments where coexist several types of agents in which social relation-
ships play a relevant role [NU10]. Nevertheless, Regret lacks a trust update mechanism
[WHS11], and does not allow anonymity [MP10]. However, this model differs from others
described above because the social stance of each agent in society plays an important
role in weighting of opinions of other agents. That is, the social group of a given agent
influences the reputation value ascribed to the agent itself.
Data sources: Taking into consideration that this model essentially comprises not only
agents, but also groups of agents, and their interactions.
Data collection and representation: Results or outcomes of interactions are collected
into impressions, which are represented as 6-tuples (a, b, o, ψ, t,W ), where a, b ∈ A de-
note members of the set A of all agents, o ∈ O is the outcome of a given interaction
between a and b, ψ is the variable of the outcome that is judged by a, t is the time of
the occurrence of the impression, and W ∈ [−1, 1] represents the subjective opinion of
the agent a relative to ψ for the particular outcome o.
The 6-tuples above are used for impressions resulting from direct interactions a→ b be-
tween two agents a ∈ A ⊆ A and b ∈ B ⊆ A. Similar tuples can be used for impressions
that result from other three types of interactions, namely: (i) a → B for interactions
between the agent a and the group B, to which the agent b belongs; (ii) A → b that
translates into impressions featuring what the (members of) group of a think about b;
(iv) A → B that translates into impressions featuring what the (members of) group of a
think about the (members of) group of b. The direct interactions aim at capturing what
we call individual reputation, while other three types of interactions aim at capturing
what we call social reputation.
Trust computation and decision: This model comprises five reputation measures. The
first concerns the computation of individual reputation (i.e., direct interactions) as the
weighted mean of the impression rating factors, though considering that recent impres-
sions are more relevant than any other ones, i.e., this measure follows a statistical
approach. The next tree measures concern the social reputation fueled by the three
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types of social interactions. Each one of these three social reputation measures is de-
fined as convex combinations of individual reputations, i.e., these measures follow a
geometric approach.
Regret combines the above four reputation measures concerning the individual and so-
cial reputations relative to a number of aspects, with each aspect defined by the vari-
able ψ in the impressions, in order to calculate the overall reputation of a given agent
represented by a node of an ontological graph. Thus, the model strengths lie in the
compositional approach that successfully deal with many of the issues of trust and rep-
utation in virtual communities [Pat07]. However, Regret does not distinguish dishonest
from incompetent agents [Med12].
Surveys and Testbeds: This model is surveyed by [NU10] and [Med12] (see Table 3.1),
though it appears also discussed in [Bhu11] [MP10] [Tav12] [MMH02] [Urb13] [MP10]
[You07]. Its characteristics are summarized in Table 3.7. As shown in Table 3.2, it was
incorporated in TREET testbed [KC10].
Usage in VW/MMOGs: As noted by [Med12], Regret is not capable of distinguishing dis-
honest from incompetent agents, so its applicability to VW/MMOGs is undermined.
3.6.2.4 BRS (2002)
The trust model underlying the beta reputation system (BRS) is a probabilistic model
based on the beta distribution [JI02]. Unlike the majority of prior reputation systems,
which in a way were intuitive and ad hoc, the BRS has firm foundations in the theory
of statistics. BRS was designed for online communities (in particular e-commerce ap-
plications) according to a centralized approach, but it can be easily reformulated to be
used in a distributed manner.
Data sources: This model uses direct interactions (here called transactions) between
agents. Each agent provides feedback (i.e., opinions) about the other agent involved
in the same transaction.
Data collection and representation: Transactions are collected into a centralized repos-
itory called feedback collection and reputation rating centre. Transactions are repre-
sented by two 5-tuples, (a, b, p, n, t) and (b, a, p, n, t), where where a and b are the partic-
ipating agents in the transaction, p and n stand for the positive and negative feedbacks,
respectively, which are provided simultaneously, and t is the time of the occurrence
of the transaction. These 5-tuples extend the 2-tuples (p, n) called feedback tuples
referred by Jøsang [JI02].
Trust computation and decision: BRS is based on the computation of beta probability
density functions in order to combine positive and negative agent feedback and de-
termine reputation ratings. In order to prevent that feedback tuples accumulate over
time, one uses a recursive formula that expresses the overall feedback about each agent
as the result of combining all of its partial feedbacks in transaction tuples; this formula
also incorporates a forgetting factor that models the decay of the newest feedbacks to
oldest feedbacks. Besides, this formulation also considers that feedback from agents
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with high reputation rating is more significant (i.e., more weighted) than agents with
low reputation rating, using a discount operator for that purpose.
Surveys and Testbeds: For further details about the BRS trust model, the reader is re-
ferred to Table 3.7, where its characteristics are shown. It also appears discussed in
the surveys due to [JHSMT13, Med12, NU10], as listed in Table 3.1. As far as we know,
implementations of this model are available in two testbeds, Simulator [SVB05] and ATB
[JHSMT13] (see Table 3.2).
Usage in VW/MMOGs: The model do not consider misbehaviors explicitly in its deploy-
ment. However, it supports a protection mechanism against unfair ratings (positive
or negative), which can be used to diminish the risk of misbehaved users’ attempts to
manipulate the reputation system for their own benefits. The model uses statistical
filtering techniques based on beta distribution to dynamically expel users with unsatis-
factory rating levels [NU10]. In short, BRS seems to be relevant to minimize the impact
of misbehaviors in VW/MMOGs reputation services.
3.6.2.5 Yu & Singh (2003)
This trust modeling solution was put forward by [YS03], and is a follow-up of an approach
towards social reputation management [YS00], in which the belief ratings of an agent
about another are represented as scalars, which are then combined with testimonies,
using for that purpose combination schemes that are similar to certainty factor mod-
els. But, these models have drawbacks that led to search for alternative approaches,
more specifically an evidential model of reputation management [YS02] based on the
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence [S+76], which ended up being further extended to
consider the concept of deception in the present model [YS03].
Data sources: The model uses two different sources of information: direct interactions
and opinions. Opinions are relevant in the absence of direct results. In this model, rec-
ommender agents are called witnesses and opinions are named testimonies. But, there
is here a subtle difference between a recommender and a witness in the sense that
an opinion may lead to rumors (i.e., an agent may hold an opinion that it heard from
another agent, a problem known as double counting of evidence), while a testimony is
based on independent direct observations.
Data collection and representation: Each agent holds a set of acquaintances, some of
which are known as its neighbors. These neighbors play the role of witnesses because
they are those agents that firstly a given agent will contact for testimonies, but they
are also those that such an agent will refer to others. It is clear that each agent may
change the state of its acquaintances as a result of the following events: (i) based on
its direct interactions with a particular acquaintance; (ii) based on interactions with
agents referred to by a particular acquaintance; and (iii) based on ratings of this partic-
ular acquaintance as received from other agents. It is also clear that an agent changes
its neighbors among its acquaintances over time. Testimonies are thus obtained from a
trust network (in the form of a directed graph) of its acquaintances that can also refer
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to other agents (i.e., transitivity) but using a depth bound in the chain, in order to limit
the processing burden of running large multi-agent systems.
Trust computation and decision: The model uses a straightforward aggregation mech-
anism of testimonies as a way of avoiding the effect of rumors. Such testimonies are
represented using Dempster-Shafer belief functions, which are still used not only to cap-
ture uncertainty but also to proceed to rating. For rating purpose, one uses a particular
weighted majority algorithm (WMA), because the ratings that come from witnesses are
belief functions, not scalars. In fact, this WMA variant was thought of to predict the
trustworthiness of a given agent from a set of testimonies provided by witnesses. In-
terestingly, this model uses a simple mechanism to detect deception in the aggregation
process of ratings.
Surveys and Testbeds: For a comparison of the model characteristics with other trust
models, the reader is referred to Table 3.7 for additional details. The trust model due
to Yu & Singh appears in the surveys [JHSMT13, Med12, NU10] listed in Table 3.1. To the
best of our knowledge, implementations of this model are carried out in two testbeds,
TREET [KC10] and ATB [JHSMT13] (see Table 3.2).
Usage in VW/MMOGs: Taking into consideration that this model addresses the adulter-
ation of reputation to help an agent to distinguish reliable witnesses from deceptive
witnesses, minimizing the effect of testimonies from deceptive witnesses, we can con-
clude it is relevant for VW/MMOGs. Nevertheless, it considers that a reliable witness is
always reliable, and a deceptive witness is always deceptive, i.e., it does not consider
that a witness changes its behavior over time. Later on, this constraint was relaxed in
the follow-up model described further ahead in Section 3.6.2.9.
3.6.2.6 EigenTrust (2003)
Unlike BRS, which is based on a centralized system to store transactions and manage
trust ratings, EigenTrust relies on a distributed trust model, provided that it was de-
signed for peer-to-peer systems [KSGM03]. Peer-to-peer systems are a common choice
for sharing and distributing information. However, given the anonymous and open na-
ture of these networks, they provide the ideal environment for the spreading of mal-
ware. EigenTrust proposes a method to address this issue by assigning a global trust
value to each peer in the network based on its past activities or interactions with other
peers. As peers use these global trust values to make their choices, malicious peers are
easily identified and their impact on the system is minimized since measures are taken
in order to isolate them in the network.
Data sources: EigenTrust’ data sources hold direct interactions between agents, as
needed in the rating procedure.
Data collection and representation: EigenTrust represents trust in a distributed man-
ner, so that it is considered as a peer-to-peer reputation system. This means that each
peer a holds the interactions with other peers in the form of 3-tuples (b, n, p), where b
denotes the trustee peer (i.e., the peer judged by a after the transaction), n is the ac-
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cumulator holding the number of negative interactions with a, and p is the accumulator
holding the number of positive interactions with a. The local trust value of b hold by a
is then given by the difference p− n.
Trust computation and decision: The challenge for peer-to-peer reputation systems like
EigenTrust is how to aggregate the local trust values spread over the peers to determine
the global trust value for a given peer, i.e., without using a centralized repository. To
obtain such a global trust value associated to a peer b, one has to aggregate the local
ratings of all peers —though weighted by their global reputations—, but this would con-
gest the network with system messages requesting the local trust value of b to every
single other peer. Note that local trust values have to be normalized to ensure that
malicious or untrusted peers are identified are excluded from the trust network.
To overcome this problem, EigenTrust uses transitive trust, i.e., the peer a asks its ac-
quaintances (or friends) for their opinions about peer b, and in turn a asks its acquain-
tances’ acquaintances, and so forth. Interestingly, transitive trust leads to a matrix of
normalized local trust values left principal eigenvector represents global trust values.
This method of computing global trust has a probabilistic interpretation similar to the
Random Surfer model [BP98].
Surveys and Testbeds: The reader is referred to Table 3.7 that summarizes EigenTrust’s
key features. EigenTrust is also briefly described an compared to others models in vari-
ous surveys [CE15, HZNR07, JHSMT13, PSA12, LLYY09], namely those listed in Table 3.1.
As far as we know, EigenTrust model is implemented in five testbeds listed in Table 3.2.
Usage in VW/MMOGs: This approach is particularly adequate for VW/MMOGs because
it allows us to identify misbehaved avatars by means of the normalization of the local
trust values that an avatar holds about others [CG14].
3.6.2.7 Fire (2004)
This is a trust and reputation model for open multi-agent systems [DHJS04] [HJS06].
This model considers trust relationships as one-to-one relationships between agents,
and reputation relationships as many-to-one relationships between society and each
agent, i.e., trust is understood as being individual and societal.
Data sources: Themodel exploits four information sources: direct interactions, context-
based roles, (witness) testimonies, third-party referrals or credentials. The first two
sources allow for rating individual trust, more specifically interaction trust and role-
based trust. Interaction trust is determined from each agent’s past experiences in its
direct interactions with other agents, whereas role-based trust builds upon on direct
interactions between agents of the same group or context (or role) as, for example,
group of friends [NU10].
The last two sources allow for rating reputation (also called societal trust), i.e., witness
reputation and certified reputation. Witness reputation is built upon testimonies (or
reports or observations) of witnesses in respect to an agent’s behavior , while certified
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reputation stems from certified or third-party references made available by the agent
itself upon request.
Using four data sources makes FIRE more robust and reliable when compared to other
models. Of particular importance, it is the fact that FIRE puts forward with a novel
type of reputation, here called certified reputation. The other three ways of building
trust (i.e., interaction trust, role-based trust, and witness reputation) have well-known
limitations. In fact, certified reputation is particularly beneficial for the initial inter-
actions among agents, when no other prior input is available.
Data collection and representation: As usual, individual interaction-related data are
represented in the form of tuples (a, b, c, i, v), where a and b represent agents par-
ticipating in the interaction i, v ∈ [−1, 1] (i.e., -1 for absolutely negative and +1 for
absolutely positive) is the trust rating ascribed by a to b in respect to the term c (e.g.,
honesty, quality). Societal data represent many-to-one interactions, which can be de-
composed into one-to-one interactions as before. For example, witness interaction is
an aggregate of a number of one-to-one interactions that a trustor agent collects from
other agents that have interacted with the trustee agent before. Nevertheless, given
the limited memory space resources, each agent only holds the latest ratings ascribed
to any other agent. This means that FIRE is a decentralized model so that each agent
stores its local rating database.
Trust computation and decision: This model combines those four trust sources from
multiple agents to achieve a trust value for a target agent. More specifically, trust
is defined as the subjective probability given by the weighted mean of all available
ratings as follows:
TK(a, b, c) =
∑
ri∈RK(a,b,c) ωK(ri) . vi∑
ri∈RK(a,b,c) ωK(ri)
(3.1)
where TK(a, b, c) stands for the trust value ascribed by agent a to agent b relative to
term c, which is determined by the component K ∈ {I,R,W,C}, with I standing for
interaction trust, R role-based trust,W witness reputation, and C certified reputation;
RK(a, b, c) denotes the set of ratings associated to component K in the computation
of trust of a in b; ωK(ri) stands for the rating weight function that determines the rel-
evance of the rating ri; and vi stands for the value of the rating ri. For more details
about the computation of this trust formula, the reader is referred to [HJS06].
Surveys and Testbeds: The FIRE model has bee discussed in prior surveys [Med12, NU10]
(see also Table 3.1), and briefly addressed in the trust-related literature in general
[AG07, Med12, Tav12, PSM13, You07]. Its key characteristics are listed in Table 3.7,
where it is compared with other modeling solutions. Let us also mention that the FIRE
trust model was implemented in TREET testbed [KC10] (see Table 3.2).
Usage in VW/MMOGs: The FIRE model solution [HJS04, DHJS04] employs multiple data
sources to build a trust assessment. Therefore it is based on a more complex represen-
tation that can lead to more accurate assessments. Its multi-variate representation may
work as a basis to design a valuable approach in the development of trust assessments
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in VW/MMOGs avatar interactions.
3.6.2.8 PeerTrust (2004)
The PeerTrust model was developed in the context of trust and reputation solutions
for P2P e-commerce communities [XL04], i.e., it follows a decentralized approach.
PeerTrust is a reputation-based trust framework that builds upon an source-adaptive
trust model. This model is based on transaction-based feedback mechanisms that allow
us to quantify and compare the trustworthiness of peers. In more specific terms, the
trust ascribed to each peer is determined by five factors: (i) the other peers’ feedback
received by a peer; (ii) the total number of transactions performed by a peer; (iii) the
credibility of the feedback source or peer; (iv) transaction context factor for distin-
guishing critical transactions from less or non-critical ones; and (v) community context
factor that represents community-related characteristics and vulnerabilities.
Data sources: The input sources are the transactions (or direct interactions) between
peers. It is clear that each agent provides feedback (i.e., opinions) about any other
agent with whom it interacts.
Data collection and representation: As usual, transactions are represented as tuples.
In conformity with the trust formula further below, each transaction tuple at least in-
cludes the evaluator peer, the target peer, the transaction identifier, the occurrence
time of the transaction, the satisfaction value assigned by the evaluator peer to the
target peer after the transaction.
Trust computation and decision: Taking into account the five aforementioned parame-
ters, PeerTrust uses a deterministic formulation to compute the peer u’s trust value as
follows:
T (u) = α .
n∑
i=1
Si .Ki . Ti + β .C(u) (3.2)
where n stands for the total number of transactions involving peer u and other peers, Si
represents the normalized amount of satisfaction that peer u receives from the other
peer participating in the i-th transaction, Ki denotes the credibility value of the feed-
back provided by other peer participating in the i-th transaction, Ti is the adaptive
transaction context factor associated to the i-th transaction, and C(u) is the adaptive
community context factor relative to peer u, while α and β stand for the normalized
weight factors concerning the collective assessment and the community context factor,
respectively. Note that the trust value T (u) assigned to peer u is cumulative, i.e., it
can be calculated in an incremental manner without the need of storing all past trans-
actions locally.
Surveys and testbeds: PeerTrust’s key characteristics are listed in Table 3.7, but we can
find further details about this model, as well as a comparison with other modeling so-
lutions in a number of surveys, namely those due to [Pat07, GMMPGS09a, NU10, Xin11,
Med12, PSA12, VM12] (see also Table 3.1). It also worthy noting that PeerTrust’s model
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was implemented in two testbeds, TRM-Sim [GMMPGS09a] and Testbed [CE15], as indi-
cated in Table 3.2.
Usage in VW/MMOGs: The model incorporates the advantages of feedback information
from peers, as a key feature in trust development. This is also a feature that could be
incorporated in future trust models for VW/MMOGs.
3.6.2.9 YSS (2004)
YSS is a shorthand of authors’ surnames of trust model put forward by [YSS04]. YSS trust
model was developed for multi-agent systems over P2P networks with high scalability,
where each peer is a software agent. In fact, it is a follow-up of the Yu-Singh trust model
described above [YS03]. This model introduces a new distributed reputation mechanism
capable of detecting malicious or unreliable peers in P2P systems. In fact, it goes a step
forward relative to prior models in the sense that it effectively aggregates noisy (dis-
honest or inaccurate) ratings based on weighted majority techniques, no matter they
originate from independent or collusive peers. Besides, it allows for the analysis and
defence against eventual attacks on reputation mechanisms. Note that YSS model does
not take any advantage of using trusted third parties or authorities.
Data sources: As in [YS03], this model uses two types of data, direct interactions
and opinions. Note that others’ opinions are a particular case of indirect interactions
[JHSMT13].
Data collection and representation: Similar to [YS03], YSS also uses tuples to repre-
sent interactions, and each peer owns a set of acquaintances, among which a subset of
neighbors is adpatively selected when it comes the time of rating someone else. A given
peer’s neighbors work as the preferential interface between it and the community when
it needs to get/provide feedback about a third-party peer, what may help in detecting
malicious peers.
Trust computation and decision: Contrary to most existing methods at that time, which
use binary ratings, YSS uses a probabilistic method for both local and aggregate ratings,
which take on values values between 0 and 1. This method uses aggregate ratings to
produce a trust value either as simple averaging or as exponential averaging, and this
makes a difference in relation to authors’ previous approach [YS00, YS02]. In addition,
YSS model also addresses attacks from colluding groups.
Surveys and testbeds: YSS’ key characteristics are listed in Table 3.7. This model has
been discussed in the literature as, for example, in [Pat07, Xin11, CE15], including in
a previous survey due to [JHSMT13] (cf. Table 3.1). Note that the YSS trust model was
implemented in two testbeds, Simulator [SVB05] and ATB [JHSMT13]. For further de-
tails, the reader is referred to Table 3.2.
Usage in VW/MMOGs: Essentially, this model computes trust from direct experiences,
so that opinions are only taken into account when there is not enough supporting ev-
idence from such experiences. But, an incorrect opinion results in a cut by half in
the corresponding agent credibility [JHSMT13], what is advantageous for VW/MMOGs
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because allows us to deal with liars.
3.6.2.10 AppleSeed (2005)
This trust modeling solution was designed for the semantic web, and uses a flow-based
assessment to devise a local group trust network [ZL05], though its authors noted its
suitability to other purposes, namely group trust in online communities, open rating
systems, and ad-hoc and peer-to-peer networks. Appleseed takes advantage of spread-
ing activation models used in psychology to simulate human semantic memory, relating
their concepts to trust assessment in an intuitive manner. These spreading activation
models were first proposed by [Qui68].
Data sources: As usual, this model uses direct interaction between agents as input.
Data collection and representation: Direct interaction data are then employed to pro-
duce a directed weighted graph, whose nodes and edges represent agents and trust
relationships, respectively; the weight associated to each edge denotes the trustwor-
thiness of an agent in another. This graph is used to determine the amount of trust that
flows across the trust network.
Trust computation and decision: AppleSeed is based on a deterministicmethod for trust.
Similar to Advogato [LA98] [Lev04], yet the latter is a non-deterministic model, Apple-
Seed aims at helping online community members to discover and distinguish between
trusted users and untrusted users. Both models proposed local group trust metrics,
but Advogato is based on the maximum network flow computation, while Appleseed’s
leading idea lies in spreading activation models.
The assessment process is initialized with a trust seed, an energy value, a spreading
factor decay and a convergence threshold, Appleseed then produces a trust score of
agents from the perspective of the trust seed. To avoid occurrence of loops in Ap-
pleseed trust graph processing a termination condition is required to be associated to
Appleseed decay factor. The motivation for the approach has two goals. The first is to
use a partial trust graph exploration to reduce computational complexity. The second
approach eliminates the need to explore a global trust graph in most cases, thus helping
to reduce the computational complexity by limiting the scope of the computation to a
reduced trust graph [SNP13].
Surveys and testbeds: AppleSeed was evaluated in the following surveys [CE15, SNP13,
Bhu10, AG07] and further detailed in [Gol05, Bhu11, Sei05, Tav12]. Currently, Apple-
Seed is deployed and implemented in Chandrasekaran & Esfandiari testbed [CE15], as
shown in Table 3.2. However, the testbed is not publicly available at current time.
Usage in VW/MMOGs: The concept of trust network representation can also be used
in VW/MMOGs as the partial trust graph exploration could reduce the computational
burden on VW/MMOGs from the additional trust solution.
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3.6.2.11 TNA-SL (2007)
Trust Network Analysis with Subjective Logic (TNA-SL) is a trust model that uses a trust
network to represent trust relationships and uses subjective logic to calculate trust
between arbitrary network nodes [JHP06]. Recall that a trust network consists of tran-
sitive trust relationships that may involve people, organizations or/and software agents,
which interact through some communication medium.
TNA-SL is different from TNA based on normalization (e.g., PageRank and EigenTrust).
Normalization-based trust models have the advantage of allowing for the analysis of
large highly connected random graphs in their entirety. However, these normalization-
based trust models cannot express and handle (e.g., propagation of) negative trust,
what makes trust metrics relative instead of absolute, as needed in measuring, for ex-
ample, statistical reliability. On the contrary, TNA-SL can express and propagate neg-
ative trust in a transitive manner. In addition, TNA-SL trust measures are equivalent
to beta PDFs; as a consequence, trust measures can be straightforwardly interpreted
in statistical terms (e.g. as measures of reliability). The main shortcoming of TNA-SL
is that a trust network has to be simplified before its trust analysis, which may lead to
loss of relevant information.
Data sources: This model resorts to a data source of direct interactions to represent
trust relationships.
Data collection and representation: TNA-SL essentially builds upon the analysis of trust
networks (i.e., graphs), which can be represented by means of canonical expressions.
Nevertheless, such trust networks are simplified as directed series-parallel graphs (DSPG)
—what amounts to simplifying canonical expressions—, before combining such expres-
sions with subjective logic operators in order to derive a trust value about someone.
Trust network simplification consists in finding all DSPG paths between trustor and
trustee, i.e., paths along which an edge appears only once; in other words, there is
no room for cycles.
Trust computation and decision: This model takes advantage of subjective logic [Jøs13]
—a generalization of binary logic and probability calculus that includes degrees of un-
certainty in addition to belief and disbelief— to calculate a trust value between any ar-
bitrary nodes of a trust network. In fact, it is capable of deriving a trust value between
any two nodes, even when there is no explicit trust path between them [JHP06, CG12].
Recall that subjective logic is a particular belief calculus (from the belief theory) that
makes usage of a belief metric —called opinion— as necessary to express beliefs.
Surveys and testbeds: The key characteristics of the TNA-SL model are listed in Ta-
ble 3.7, which are also addressed in a number of publications [JHP06, CG12, WAC+09,
YZCZ11, PAS13, ZXL+12]. The reader is also referred to Table 3.1 for a comparison with
other modeling solutions found in the literature. Note that, as shown in Table 3.2, the
TNA-SL model was implemented in the P2P-Sim testbed [WAC+09].
Usage in VW/MMOGs: Regarding its suitability for VW/MMOGs in-world avatar trust re-
lationships could use this modeling solution to assess trust among avatars.
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3.6.2.12 TRAVOS (2006)
Trust and Reputation Model for Agent-Based Virtual Organizations (TRAVOS) model was
conceived to grasp an agent’s trust in another agent with which it has just finished inter-
acting [TPJL06]; more specifically, it was developed for large open multi-agent systems
(MAS) [Med12]. TRAVOS is similar to the Beta Reputation System (BRS) discussed above,
since they use the beta family of probability functions to determine the probability of
a trustee’s behavior from past interactions with such trustee. But, the models diverge
in the way they handle inaccurate reputation. TRAVOS rates each reputation source
in an individual manner from the supposedly accuracy of past opinions, whereas BRS
starts from the assumption that most reputation sources provide accurate opinions, dis-
carding any opinion that is noticeably far from the average. Recall that BRS does not
distinguish reputation from direct observations. Moreover, TRAVOS’ estimation errors
decrease noticeably as the number of reputation sources increases, while BRS’s error
estimation performance remains constant, i.e., BRS does not learn from past experi-
ence.
Data sources: The model uses two types of data sources, whose data are obtained from
direct interactions (or direct experiences) and opinions collected from other agents.
Data collection and representation: The direct interactions between trustor a and trus-
tee b are represented as 4-tuples (a, b, n,m), where n and m stand for the number of
successful and unsuccessful interactions of a with b, respectively. Opinions are formu-
lated from the direct interactions between any other agent and b, i.e., they are based
on the reputation of the trustee.
Trust computation and decision: TRAVOS calculates trust using probability theory. As
usual, the computation of trust builds upon past interactions between agents, as well
as upon reputation data aggregated from third parties when there is no record of past
interactions between such agents. More specifically, this trust computation method
employs beta distribution probability functions [NU10, TPJL06].
Surveys and testbeds: TRAVOS key characteristics are listed in Table 3.7, while Ta-
ble 3.1 compares TRAVOS with other trust models found in literature’s surveys [GBL+15,
JHSMT13, Med12, PSA12, WHS11, NU10, LLYY09]. The reader is also referred to [CE15,
Xin11, Pat07] for more details about TRAVOS’ model. Let us also mention that TRAVOS
was implemented in two testbeds, Simulator [SVB05] and ATB [JHSMT13] (cf. Table 3.2).
Usage in VW/MMOGs: This modeling solution provides a measure of trust based on direct
interactions and opinions [TPJL06], and has the advantage of distinguishing reputation
from direct observations. This specific feature is relevant in avatar interactions taking
place in immersive environments like VW/MMOGs.
3.6.2.13 PowerTrust (2007)
PowerTrust was thought of as a P2P reputation system. This model is due to [ZH07],
and can be seen as an extension of EigenTrust [KSGM03], in the sense that it takes into
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account the distribution of peer feedbacks. More specifically, [ZH07] discovered that
essentially distributed e-commerce systems like eBay follow a power-law distribution
in user feedbacks (see also [HCH07]).
Data sources: The model uses as input direct interactions and feedback opinions.
Data collection and representation: Trust derived from individual interactions among
peers are aggregated into a trust overlay network (TON) built on top of the P2P system.
Trust computation and decision: PowerTrust computes the global trust values in exactly
the same way as that computed by the EigenTrust, but now with pre-trusted peers re-
placed by power nodes [HCH07, ZH07]. In fact, PowerTrust dynamically selects a small
number of power nodes that are most reputable using a distributed ranking mechanism.
The democratic idea of replacing power nodes as soon as they become less active or
exhibit doubtful behavior seems to be reasonable in the context of decentralized sys-
tems. On the contrary, in EigenTrust, the choice of trusted peers is static, which is an
over-optimistic assumption because pretrust peers may become non-trustful over time.
In PowerTrust, one generates feedback scores using Bayesian learning [BB04] or a peer
satisfaction-based average rating. The local trust scores are normalized so that their
summation equals 1. Identical normalization applies to global reputation scores. Pow-
erTrust follows an ahead random walk (LRW) strategy to aggregate global reputations
in an efficient manner. Therefore, each TON’s node stores its own local trust scores
and aggregates local trust scores of its first hand neighbors. Then, the surfer makes the
decision built upon cummulative knowledge from itself and ahead (i.e., its neighbors).
Besides, PowerTrust significantly improves global reputation accuracy and aggregation
speed. The model is robust with high scalability to support large-scale P2P applications
and resist malicious peers [KD16].
Surveys and testbeds: PowerTrust’s key characteristics are listed in Table 3.7. It is de-
scribed an compared with other trust models in a number of publications [KD16, HZNR07,
MP09], including a survey due to [MP11b] (see also Table 3.1). Moreover, PowerTrust
was implemented in two testbeds, Simulator [SVB05] and ATB [JHSMT13], as shown in
Table 3.2.
Usage in VW/MMOGs: The modeling solution provided by POWERTRUST [ZH07], estab-
lishes a scalable P2P reputation system that initially selects a set of most reputable
nodes (known as power nodes) using a distributed ranking mechanism. The authors
claim that improves global reputation accuracy and aggregation speed. This reputation
system is a relevant feature, that has applicability also in VW/MMOGs, where high rank
users/avatars could be considered as the equivalent of the model power nodes. Issues
due to misbehaved and colluding users are also a feature to address and develop further
in future integration in VW/MMOGs.
3.6.2.14 TACS (2009)
Trust Ant Colony (TACS) System incorporates a trust model developed in the context
of P2P networks, which uses an ant colony optimization algorithm for finding good and
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reliable nodes in a P2P network [GMMPGS09a]. Its novelty lies in the fact it is the first
evolutionary bio-inspired trust model built upon the ant colony system. This model has
the particularity that it not only gets the most trustworthy node to interact with, but
also the most trustworthy path leading to the most reputable peer [FGM11]. The leading
idea is to solve the problem of how distinguish reliable nodes from misbehaved nodes.
Data sources: The model uses direct interaction between a client node and the most
trustworthy server node that provides a specific service [GMMPGS09a].
Data collection and representation: In TACS, one uses a weighted graph to represent a
P2P network, with each edge owning two weights taking on values in the interval [0, 1]:
τ (pheronome) and η (heuristic). For a given service, the pheronome τ stands for the
trust that each edge’s start node possesses on reaching the optimum server, though
passing through edge’s end node. In regard to the heuristic η, represents the similarity
between the service requested by the client node and the service offered by the most
trustworthy server node. It is clear that, a benevolent server provides exactly the ser-
vice requested by the client (η = 1), while a fully malicious server does not provide the
service at all (η = 0).
Therefore, it is the service similarity that allows us to distinguish honest from malicious
nodes in providing a given service. In fact, as soon as the server supplies a service to the
client, the client assesses its satisfaction relative to the received service, which may
differ from the one initially offered by the server. A client’s satisfaction is computed
by measuring the similarity between the requested service and the provided one. This
allows to TACS applying a punishment to malicious and dishonest nodes.
Trust computation and decision: TACS incorporates the ant colony optimization algo-
rithm (ACO). ACO method is a probabilistic method suited to solve problems that can
be reduced to finding good paths across graphs. Among the possible server nodes offer-
ing a given service, the client chooses the optimal server node, as well as the optimal
path from the client to server (i.e., the path whose nodes possess the higher level of
pheromones, and which be followed by the majority of ants [SB14]).
In order to find such good paths, the method uses the so-called transition rule. This
rule allows us to calculate the the probability of the ant k located at a given node c of










if b ∈ Jk(a)
0 otherwise
(3.3)
where τab stands for the pheromone of the edge eab, ηab the heuristic information (i.e.,
service similarity) of the edge ηab, Jk(a) the set of reachable nodes from a that were not
visited yet by the ant k, and α and β are two weights establishing a balance between
memory information and heuristic information, respectively.
The transition rule is the core of TACS, but the punishment procedure is its key because
it allows us to distinguish reliable nodes from misbehaved nodes. This latter procedure
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builds upon the satisfaction of the client as expressed after its interaction with the
server. Satisfaction is another face for what we call trust, and is expressed in terms of
the service similarity η ∈ [0, 1]. If the provided service is unsatisfactory, the server is
punish with a η value under 0.5; otherwise, η takes a value over 0.5.
Surveys and testbeds: The model is cited by [SB14, VSP16], as well as in a follow-
up development by [FGM11] which extended TACS by incorporating a genetic algo-
rithm to optimize the working parameters. TACS trust model is available at http:
//sourceforge.net/projects/tacs, and was deployed in TRMSim-WSN (Trust and Rep-
utation Models Simulator for Wireless Sensor Networks) [GMMPGS09a] (see also Ta-
ble 3.2), a simulation platform developed in Java to test trust and reputation mod-
els for WSNs [MP10]. This simulation platform also implemented other trust models,
namely PeerTrust [XL04], Eigentrust [KSGM03], LFTM Linguistic Fuzzy Trust Mechanism
[MMBP12], and BTRM-WSN (Bio Trust and Reputation Model for Wireless Sensor Networks)
[MP11a].
Usage in VW/MMOGs: In real life we ask our friends or acquaintances for their opinions
about a future decision, so that we expect that this procedure would be equally ben-
eficial in VW/MMOGs virtual communities. Also as envisaged by [GMMPGS09a] in the
context of P2P networks, the usefulness of an mechanism to assess the global trust or
reputation of a peer from collected opinions of other peers limited the probability of
being cheated by a malicious peer, is something that is a valuable approach we could
employ to address trust in avatar-to-avatar relationships in VW/MMOGs.
3.6.2.15 BTRM-WSN (2011)
This model is a bio-inspired trust and reputation model for wireless sensor networks
(BTRM-WSN) that was developed to provide security and trustability between interact-
ing nodes, a key feature for the network reliability and usability [MP11a]. In practice,
it is a follow-up of TACS, but applied to WSNs.
Data sources: Data sources are built on direct interactions (or experience) between
WSN nodes.
Data collection and representation: A network representation of WSN nodes interac-
tions is derived from individual interactions.
Trust computation and decision: the BTRM-WSN trust model uses ant colony systems
conceptualizations to deploy agents (ants) through the WSN network aiming to identify
the most trustworthy path towards the most reputable service provider in the network.
In the process agents leave traces in each node traversed as a confidence value that
would be use to identify the most trustworthier path [MP11a]. Once the ants reach a
node with the requested service, a score has to be given to each of those paths. Regard-
ing the modeling assessment, the path with the highest value pheromone is selected by
BTRM-WSN as the one leading to the most trustworthy node in the network. Then the
client explicitly requests the service to the selected node it will evaluate the received
service to computes his satisfaction with the performed transaction [MMBP12, MP09].
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In case of a satisfactory outcome a reinforcement in terms of pheromone addition to the
path leading to the node is carried out. Otherwise, a pheromone evaporation process
is applied to downgrade the path leading to that node.
Surveys and testbeds: The model is also addressed in [MMBP12, MP11b, KD16]. In re-
spect to testbeds, BTRM-WSN trust model is deployed in TRMSim-WSN [GMMPGS09a] (see
Table 3.2), which implemented other trust models, namely PeerTrust [XL04], Eigentrust
[KSGM03], LFTM Linguistic Fuzzy Trust Mechanism [MMBP12].
Usage in VW/MMOGs: Note that WSN nodes resemble avatars, because a node’s action
radius resembles avatar’s AoI (area of interest); in fact, WSN node dynamics has sim-
ilarities with avatars’ dynamics in terms of their interactions. Besides, its minimal
deployment requirements can be also used with advantage in VW/MMOGs. But, more
importantly, the trust network representation and the ant colony algorithm used here
to assure reliability between nodes could also be used in VW/MMOGs to identify reliable
avatars to interact with and to discard misbehaved ones.
3.6.2.16 LFTM (2012)
According to its authors, the linguistic fuzzy trust mechanism (LFTM) model is one of
the first models that combine bio-inspired algorithms and fuzzy logic in the field of trust
and reputation systems [MMBP12]. In fact, LFTM is a follow-up of BTRM-WSN, which in
turn incorporates the TACS trust and reputation model (see above). Essentially, LFTM
combines TACS bio-inspired trust and reputation model and linguistic fuzzy sets for rea-
soning and to enhance the interpretability of the model from the human user’s point
view [KD16]. That is, the main goal of LFTM is to enhance TACS in order to benefit from
the advantages of expressiveness of fuzzy sets and linguistic labels.
Data sources: As for TACS, the data source of this trust and reputation model consists
of direct interactions between network nodes, in particular a client node and the cor-
responding most trustworthy server node, which supposedly provides a specific service
under request. Nevertheless, while TACS was designed for P2P networks, LFTM was
though of to WSNs.
Data collection and representation: Similar to TACS and BTRM-WSN, the LFTM model
uses a weighted graph to represent the network, with each edge possessing two weights;
the first weight is given by the pheronome τ that takes on values in the interval [0, 1],
which represents the trust of edge’s start node of such edge on reaching the opti-
mal server, yet passing through edges’s end node. the second weight is provided by
the heuristic η, which represents the similarity between the service requested by the
client node and the service provided by the optimal server node. But unlike TACS and
BTRM-WSN, the heuristic is fuzzy and not numeric in order to be more human friendly.
In practice, the interval [0, 1] is divided into five sub-intervals that are fuzzified into
the following linguistic labels: ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’, and ‘very high’.
Trust computation and decision: Similar to TACS and BTRM-WSN, the LFTM model uses
a probabilistic method in the computation of trust. Its novelty stems from the fact
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that it uses a linguistic fuzzy logic approach and fuzzy reasoning not only for knowledge
representation, but also for inference within a distributed network system based on an
ant-colony optimization solution [KD16].
Surveys and testbeds: The LFTM trust model was implemented in TRMSim-WSN (Trust
and Reputation Models simulator for Wireless Sensor Network) testbed, as shown in Ta-
ble 3.2. See also [KD16] for further details about LFTM model.
Usage in VW/MMOGs: Regarding usability in VW/MMOGs the usage of a fuzzy logic as a
human friendly feature, allow us to consider extending its usage to other scenarios like
in avatar interactions chat messages to express trustability.
3.6.2.17 TRIP (2012)
Trust and Reputation Infrastructure-based Proposal (TRIP) was developed in the con-
text of vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) [MP12], in order to resolve unsettled issues
related to security and reliability communication channels [AB16]. According to its
authors, TRIP represents a trust and reputation modeling solution to enforce honest in-
formation sharing over the network and at same time identify misbehaved nodes (e.g.,
nodes that do not share resources and/or spread bogus and false messages) in a simple,
light, fast, scalable and accurate manner [MP12]. However, its simplicity makes it vul-
nerable to specific security threats as it is the case of “partially malicious collectives”.
Data sources: Within a VANET, network nodes are the vehicles on the road. The TRIP
trust model uses three types of information sources, namely direct interactions (or ex-
periences) between nodes, node recommendations (i.e., referrals or opinions) of other
vehicular nodes, and authority recommendations through road side units (RSU), whose
central authority may be a government organization or department.
Data collection and representation: TRIP was conceived for VANETs, so each network
node is responsible for holding the data concerning the outcomes of its interactions
with other nodes.
Trust computation and decision: Whenever the vehicle vi interacts with any other ve-
hicle vj, from which vi receives a traffic warning or message, vi computes a reputation







wk rkj + γi ρj (3.4)
where n stands for the number of recommender vehicles (after being queried) at time t,
rkj ∈ [0, 1] represents the recommendation vk provided by node vk about node vj, wk ∈
[0, 1] denotes the reliability of recommendations delivered by node vk, ρj ∈ [0, 1] stands
for the recommendation provided by the central authority (infrastructure) through RSUs
about node vj (which is commonly cached and refreshed), and αi, βi, and γi represent
the weights associated to direct previous experiences of node vi, recommendations of
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neighbor nodes vk, and infrastructure recommendation about vj, respectively. Note
that Eq. (3.4) is a recurrence formula, which is in conformity with storage limitations
of each node. Besides, this formula is a convex combination because αi + βi + γi =
1; in addition, the recommendations of other nodes other than vi also form a convex
combination because
∑n
k=1wk = 1. In short, TRIP uses a geometric method to compute
the reputation score of each node.
After computing a reputation score for node vj, one has to make a decision on what
to do with a given traffic warning or message received from vj. The reputation score
determines the trustworthiness (or level of trust) of vj. TRIP defines three trust levels
represented as fuzzy sets, namely “not trust”, “+/- trust”, “trust”; “not trust” deter-
mines that the node vj would be excluded by rejecting all data exchange with it, “+/-
trust” determines that data exchange is accepted but not forwarded, and “trust” de-
termines that all exchanges are allowed.
Surveys and testbeds: TRIP’s key features are shown and compared with other models
in Table 3.7. TRIP was implemented in TRMSim-WSN (Trust and Reputation Models Sim-
ulator for Wireless Sensor Network) [GMMPGS09a] testbed (see Table 3.2).
Usage in VW/MMOGs: Regarding is potential for VW/MMOGs we identified several char-
acteristics relevant like the exclude a particular node from sending messages could also
be extrapolated to address ganking and harassment from misbehavior avatars.
3.7 Discussion
As seen above, and to our best knowledge, trust models and testbeds have not been de-
signed and implemented for VW/MMOGs so far. In fact, we have found trust models and
testbeds in three major areas of computing research: multi-agent systems (MAS), online
services (e.g., e-commerce and social networks), and networking. Among the seventeen
trust models described in the previous section, six of themwere specifically designed for
multi-agent systems, namely A&E [ARH00], REGRET [SS01], Y&S [YS03], FIRE [HJS04],
Y&S&S [YSS04], and TRAVOS [TPJL06]; three models were thought of for online services,
namely SPORAS [ZM00], BRS [JI02], and AppleSeed [ZL05]; at last, the remaining eight
models were developed for networking, and are the EigenTrust [KSGM03], PeerTrust
[XL04], TNA-SL [JHP06], PowerTrust [ZH07], TACS [MP09], BTRM-WSN [MP11b], LFTM
[MMBP12], and TRIP [MP12].
In the context of VW/MMOGs, the most important point to bear in mind is the ability of
a trust model in distinguishing reliable avatars from misbehaved ones over time. It hap-
pens that only seven out of those seventeen trust models are capable of identifying mis-
behaved users in an explicit manner, namely: Y&S [YS03], EigenTrust [KSGM03], Y&S&S
[YSS04], PowerTrust [ZH07], BTRM-WSN [MP11a], LFTM [MMBP12], and TRIP [MP12].
However, a reliable avatar may become a misbehaved avatar in some circumstances,
and vice-versa.
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Apart the theories/models behind the computation of trust (i.e., the trust engine itself),
we can distinguish a model from any other model with reference to their data sources
as follows:
• All trust models are based on interactions. In this sense, any trust model described
above is adequate for VW/MMOGs.
• Not all trust models use opinions (of others) to evaluate trust, namely: SPORAS,
AppleSeed, TACS, BTRM, and LFTM. This may arise some difficulties to the trustor,
particularly when the trustor has never interacted with the trustee before.
• In addition to interactions and opinions, some trust models use supplementary
data sources, namely sociograms (see REGRET [SS01]) and certification author-
ities (see FIRE [HJS04] and TRIP [MP12]). This would be particularly useful for
VW/MMOGs, because allows us to take advantage of multiple data sources.
It is clear that there are also other issues related to strategies to limit the computational
burden of trust engines, in particular issues related to networking latency, but this out
of scope in this thesis. Nevertheless, let us refer that AppleSeed is capable of reducing
the computational complexity of graph search by limiting the search to a small part of
the graph in order to calculate the trust value tied to trustee.
3.8 Summary
With some exceptions, this chapter only approaches trust models that have been im-
plemented in testbeds in the last fifteen years, and susceptible of being incorporated
in VW/MMOGs later on; exceptions are those due to [KSGM03] and [Mar94]. Note that
trust in VW/MMOGs have been already addressed in the past from a sociological per-
spective, but exclusively using online questionnaires [DH08], as a way of studying human
behaviors from in-world interactions.
On the contrary, in the current survey, we follow a computer science perspective by
considering that we have incorporated a trust engine in a given VW/MMOG, which is
fed with real data concerning avatar-avatar interactions, and data originated in other
sources like opinions and certified authorities. In a way, this translates into the general
trust framework shown in Fig. 3.6. As seen above, this framework fits in most societal
applications, namely multi-agent systems, online services, and networking, as well as
in VW/MMOGs. The main difference between these applications lies in the interaction
entities, i.e., agents, users, nodes, or avatars, which determine the domain of applica-
tion. Therefore, the main contribution of this chapter lies in the fact that it presents
the first systematic approach to compare trust models in the context of VW/MMOGs.
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Chapter 4
Trust Framework
Trust conceptualizations in virtual worlds andmassively multiplayer online games (VW/MMOGs)
are not covered as a whole by existing trust models and frameworks. Apparently, the
representation and modeling of trust in a computational environment is an elusive task,
largely because that seems to depend on the context within which entities (e.g., users)
interact with each other. Hence, the existence of multiple trust solutions that ad-
dress domain-specific problems. These solutions are scarce, or even inexistent, in
VW/MMOGs. In this chapter, we thus elaborate on a trust framework for VW/MMOGs.
For this purpose, we carry out a study in order to identify and characterize the VW/M-
MOG specific features or data sources, as well as to assess how extant trust models (say,
TNA-SL, Regret, EigenTrust, Stereotrust and TACS) satisfy VW/MMOGs requirements. As
a result, we get a valuable insight on how to build up a trust framework for immersive
environments.
4.1 Introduction
Trust is recognized as a fundamental feature of interactions [Luh79]. These interactions
can occur between multiple and different types of entities (people, computer programs,
services, organizations, games, biological beings, virtual entities, countries), and span a
multitude of environments and scenarios. Trust usage is widely disseminated, as it acts
as a driving factor for facilitating, inducing and strengthening relations between entities
[Deu58]. Therefore, efforts on concept clarification and modeling are being developed
in different research fields [Mar94]. They represent a multitude of contrasting views
on the topic [DH08]. Despite the persistent lack on unanimity, all contribute to enrich
knowledge on trust [JB08a]. As their approaches follow different paths to identify and
develop trust relevant features [AG07].
In several scenarios, trust is seen as context-dependent, in which coexist different de-
grees of reliability in respect to user’s intent and goals to achieve. Therefore, as sup-
porting technologies evolve and became more ubiquitous, new ways of interaction arise
that require new approaches to trust integration in these new, more immersive, and per-
sistent media like virtual worlds and massively multiplayer online games (VW/MMOGs)
[Bel08]. VW/MMOGs (e.g., SecondLife, and World of Warcraft) promote another type of
online human interaction that provides an additional dimension not present in existing
online interaction environments like social networks or online chat services [Bar03]. In
VW/MMOGs, interactions occur in an immersive environment that recreates a 3D virtual
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scenario where users interact through their avatars. The virtual environment dynam-
ics resembles to how humans perceive the real world, therefore allowing an in-world
immersion user experience. The specific features of these environments, where multi-
ple entities interact, contribute to the development of socialization in which trust and
trustability issues play an important role on how users behave within the environment
[ARH00, RCS+10]. VW/MMOGs are used in many different contexts other than online
games like MMOGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Games). VW/MMOGs are used in team
cooperation scenarios (e.g., military forces performing simulation exercises), in collab-
orative work within organizations, in learning on virtual lecturing sessions and attending
virtual conferences [BL12], and also in trading within the virtual world, just to mention
a few. Therefore, a VW/MMOG distinguishes itself from other types of online services
and systems in that it is an immersive environment that is perceived in a different way
by users [Bar03]. In particular, the in-world interactions between users resemble much
of what happens in the daily life of human beings. This gives us an idea of how much
challenging is to deploy a trust framework in VW/MMOGs. And this is precisely the main
purpose of this chapter.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly reviews the related work. Sec-
tion 4.3 approaches VW/MMOG’s in a broadly sense, identifying existing features and
challenges and making a parallel with other environments regarding interactions and
data availability. Section 4.4 describes the trust framework (TFW) proposed in the
current chapter. Next, an assessment of the proposed framework is discussed in Sec-
tion 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Related Work
Research on trust follows two main approaches. The first approach is tied to a consen-
sus on what is trust, initially from a philosophical [McL11] and sociological perspective
[Luh79], [Deu58] later followed by other areas that tried to reach some form of trust
formalization that was recognized as context-independent, as it was the case of the
mathematical formalization introduced by Marsh [Mar94, You07]. In regards to the sec-
ond approach, it addresses trust in a context-dependent manner, so that we find trust
solutions focused on P2P networks [KSGM03], online services [BRDM11], and so forth.
That is, it takes advantage of the context in order to identify and model trust features
susceptible of being used in a solution to a specific problem.
Recently, interesting surveys on trust have appeared in computer science literature
[ZDB11, CSC11, GMMPGS09a]. Nevertheless, they propose context-dependent trust so-
lutions. These contributions can be categorized by application area: networking, secu-
rity, artificial intelligence, human-computer interaction, and so forth. In networking
and protocols, trust is used to assess nodes reliability prior to exchange information in
an attempt to ensure that there are not rogue nodes tampering data or altering its con-
tent, as observed in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
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and peer-to-peer (P2P) [WE05, CSC11]. Yet another situation emerged from the trusta-
bility of the authentication procedures via certificates, public key infrastructure (PKI)
and others [YWS03]. In artificial intelligence, more specifically in agents and multi-
agent systems (MAS), trust is used as a framework tool to enhance reliability in agent
interactions [Mar94]. Other areas like human-computer interaction, trust plays a vital
role in interactions with online services, what has to do with trust usability [BRDM11].
Trust also plays a significant role in assessment of trustability in software and hardware
development, as it was identified in the industry through the Trustworty Computing Ini-
tiative [TCG11]. The impact of the virtualization has also led to trust issues linked with
security and reliability of information [DPJX12]. These problems were approached in
grid contexts, but now are prevalent in the cloud [vLAV05, DPJX12].
In regards to a historical perspective, trust in computer science can be traced back to
1979 in early works of Nibaldi on trusted computer systems at MITRE [Nib79]. In a way,
humanity always resorts to trust, existing thus a need to adopt new trust vehicles in new
scenarios, in particular for a society that is increasingly dependent on digital media. In
fact, as interactions migrate to a new medium, new cues and methodologies must be
developed to provide trust within the new reality. In virtual reality of VW/MMOGs,
there are only a few contributions targeted on trust [RCS+10]. These contributions are
mostly focused on entities and issues like infrastructures (e.g., hardware and software),
networking, load balancing, world state consistency, data replication control, digital
rights management (DRM) [ZPMY09], privacy, etc., and not that much of users/avatars
and their behavior in the immersive world. However, a few works have approached
the concepts of fairness [CLPC08], reputation [HHJ08], recommendation [HSRF95] as
data sources or vehicles for in-world trust management in MMOGs, as well as for user
behavior profiling [SM12b] and in-world governance [Hum08]. But, we find also works
of the same sort in online services [Gol09, Tav12] and social networks [Bhu10, ZXL+12].
Fairness systems (if they even will exist in the future), reputation systems and recom-
mendation systems are here seen as producers of data for trust systems. That is, trust
systems are data consumers. A trust system is built on some trust model; examples
of trust models are the following: Travos [TPJL06], Regret [SS01] and TNA-SL [JHP06].
But, the seminal work of Marsh [Mar94] remains as one of the most significant contribu-
tions towards the formalization of trust as a computational concept. Note that we are
interested in approaching trust inside virtual worlds, and the same applies to fairness,
reputation, recommendation, and other types of judgments and opinions that result
from human-like interactions. As observed by Ratan [RCS+10], MMOG players tend to
interact with those having good looking, to fear high rank players and gold farmers, and
also to consider their in-game friends and guild members more reliable than others,
with whom they tend to use voice channels more frequently.
Summing up, although there are significant contributions addressing trust in many do-
mains, only a few of them deal with trust in VW/MMOGs. We intend thus to bridge this
gap in VW/MMOGs by means of a trust framework proposal we outline in this chapter.
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4.3 Multi-user Virtual Environments
VW/MMOGs are a special type of environment that allows multiple and simultaneous
users/avatars to interact in a virtual world [DC07]. VW/MMOGs provide a set of features
that empower users as seen in SecondLife [MMG+08]. In VW/MMOGs, users involve
themselves in the development of the virtual world instead of just using it [Bel08].
These virtual building capabilities that users have created a trade market of assets
using virtual currencies, so that a virtual economy ended up emerging after all [Dam08].
Then, new types of functionalities, services and activities started to appear to better
customize avatars, lending them a more rich human appearance. Also virtual worlds
started to be used for learning and attending virtual conferences. Trading virtual land
was also made possible in the virtual economy.
4.3.1 Types of VW/MMOGs
In the literature, we find a number of types of VW/MMOGs, namely: multi-user dungeons
(MUDs), massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs), virtual learning environments
(VLEs), and general-purpose immersive virtual environments (IVEs). MUDs were the
precursors of MMOGs. An example of a MUD is the famous Dungeons & Dragons. They
are also multiplayer real-time virtual worlds, but at the time they were created it was
difficult to interact with other users, unless via a text-based procedure. The World
of Warcraft (WoW) is a well-known example of a MMOG. The in-world interactions take
place by typing commands much like a natural language. MMOGs are more sophisticated
than MUDs, in largely because they take advantage of graphics to get visual realism. A
VLE is an e-learning system based on the web that mimics the conventional education
system. The classes are virtual, so that teacher and students have to sign in to be
granted access to the virtual world. This means that the virtual world is also a social
space. IVEs, in general, take advantage of two important features: immersivity and
interactivity. But immersion makes all the difference in relation to other interactive
systems. Immersion into a virtual world is the perception of being physically present
therein. SecondLife and OpenSimulator are two examples of general-purpose IVEs.
4.3.2 Interactions
There are many types of interaction between entities in different contexts. In this
chapter, we are interested in immersive interactions when users/avatars presentially
interact with each other in/and the virtual world. This is so because without inter-
actions it is not possible to formulate an idea about trust. The sorts of interaction
in VW/MMOGs have evolved substantially since the text interface of the early MUDs
[Dam08, Bar03] up to the current full fleshed immersive virtual environment of virtual
worlds and MMOGs like Secondlife, OpenSimulator and World of Warcraft [SM12b]. Users
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interact with other individuals and their environment in many ways when they perform
activities therein, among which we find:
• Exploring. This activity can be defined as a number of avatar movements in the
virtual world, eventually leading to interactions with avatars, non-playing char-
acters (NPCs), and the world itself.
• Building. Users build up items in the virtual world.
• Socializing. This activity describes face-to-face interactions with other users in
social situations like conversation, gossip, brainstorming, etc.
• Trading. A commercial activity that an individual has with others.
• Cooperation. An activity involving a number of individuals in order to fulfill a
common task.
• Role playing. This activity aims at earning items, prestige and virtual currency
(usually found in MMOGs).
• Fighting. Fighting occurs against NPCs or other users in duels or in cooperation
with others in guilds (usually found in MMOGs).
It is clear that these interactions are limited on what can be exchanged and with whom,
in largely as in the real world. A person cannot directly interact with a huge group of
people simultaneously. Analogously, as happens in the OpenSimulator, the radii of chat
circles can be tuned to conversational, whisper and shout in order to determine how and
which messages go to other avatars and guilds. As in real life, the amount of avatars
per area unit is limited by their sizes, but also by engine constraints imposed by the
processing power of computers and networking bandwidth.
4.3.3 Trustworthiness
The problem to ensure trustworthiness of an entity have several dimensions. In respect
to virtual worlds, trustworthiness depends on the nature of interactions, which are ei-
ther immersive or not. Trust issues related to non-immersive interactions have to to
do with, for example, the integrity of client side (modified client software, memory
tampering, network packets manipulation) of an online game, in particular when the
client software is altered by the player to get unfair advantages in the game. Mitigation
solutions have been adopted by the industry by placing a controlling agent at every sin-
gle user device to monitor client integrity. Another trust issue has to do with the server
side, in particular when it poses the question of ensuring that game state sent in client
updates wraps “trustable data”. This is very important for the trustable perception
that players have about the game itself. And if this is important to client-server archi-
tectures, it must be said that it is even more important in peer-to-peer architectures,
in which the users interact directly over a network without an intermediate entity as a
server.
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In respect to immersive interactions, trust is built incrementally based on the user
experience within the immersive environment (e.g., game world), who perceives and
learns from the interactions he/she establishes with other users and his/her surrounding
virtual world. Immersive interactions may be assisted by a third-party or not. The
third-party here is another user, a group of users (e.g., game guild), or the virtual world
engine itself. Indeed, some engines provide visual cues that may be used by the user
to trust/untrust in other user actions; for example, displaying enemy avatar’s name in
different colors is an alert to take into account, as it is also the case of delivering a
emotional message to other users through the actions of his/her avatar (e.g. WoW’s
/mad command makes your avatar to raise its fist in anger). These actions contribute to
build an image on how a player is seen by others in the game world. In a way, trust is
tied to risk associated to every single user’s action, which normally provokes a reaction.
This action-reaction is an abstraction of what we call interaction. Trust is fundamental
in interactions involving trading, cooperation to kill a monster, participation in a quest,
advice from other player on how to perform or fulfill a task, and so forth, simply because
user’s experience and knowledge may be not enough to excel on any sort of interactions.
In fact, as suggested above, trust on someone or something may be risky. For example,
the reputation systems based on user’s feedback can be used to promote or demote
players artificially, as it has been seen in reputation-based online services. This happens
because malicious players may also complain on a player that they want to expel directly
from the game or virtual world. Mimicking the reality in virtual worlds has other flavors.
For example, homophily is also present in VW/MMOGs [AKW+11], that is, the tendency
that many individuals have in identifying and associating themselves with others who
are similar to them. This common identity reveals in many ways, namely: age, race,
gender, dress code, social class, status, expertise and organizational role. Therefore,
trust may originate from analyzing features like user avatar dress code and behavior,
and also from user data made available from in-world statistics.
4.3.4 Trust Data Sources
Acquiring trust data from diverse sources existing in a virtual world is hampered by
the difficulty in transposing real life trust mechanisms to any new interactive medium.
VW/MMOGs present several challenges to trust representation, modeling, and manage-
ment, namely:
• How to find adequate computational replacements for the traditional trust, fair-
ness, recommendation, and reputation cues used in the physical world [JIB07].
• Which data sources to use to derive reliable measures for trust and reputation in
VW/MMOGs [RCS+10].
• How to identify within the existing solutions, which have been proposed and val-
idated in other knowledge areas, the ones that could be transposed and adapted
to VW/MMOGs.
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It is clear that cognitive and behavior data inputs extracted from our interactions in the
virtual world can be used to provide a set of features susceptible to be employed in a
trust model. This is the ground of current recommendation and reputation systems.
Tracking user’s behavior has been used as a way to improve performance, adaptability
and resilience of VW/MMOGs systems [SM12b]. But, user’s behavior data can be also
used to identify and trace bots [CLPC08] and gold farming users [BBC+08]. Other user’s
trust data are dependent on the model of computing. For example, in a client-server
architecture, client side data includes user location, avatar’s look, items and skills,
while server side data comprises authentication data, logs, and so on. In a peer-to-peer
architecture, the existence of trustable data is more compelling for the users because
there is not central entity as a server to regulate as much as possible the data exchange
between users or players.
In general, we can say that computational counterparts of fairness, recommendation,
and reputation systems can also work as data sources for trust systems. Reputation
systems have been used in electronic commerce and auction sites like Ebay, well as in
other computer-mediated services, enabling users to forward feedback on transactions.
However, these systems provide limited functionalities and its outputs can be easily
tampered. In some VW/MMOGs, this sort of system is also rather limited as it simply
calculates the accumulated sum of positive and negative feedbacks of users in virtual
banks and auction houses. Recommendation systems are not usual in VW/MMOGs. To
mitigate these problems users use complementary sources or develop add-ons and mid-
dleware solutions [BHRS09]. Fairness systems are also unusual in VW/MMOGs either, or
at least are not perceived as such by users. Current approaches include profiling players
from their behavior for detecting cheaters, bots and gold farmers. Usually the adopted
solutions are limited to ban users. It is not accurate and could lead in many cases to
false positives and unfair decisions [YK13]. Existing security and trust mechanisms are
not coping with the VW/MMOGs needs [BBC+08, MMG+08]. From a business perspective
the developments made in electronic transactions only thrived when the secure sockets
layer (SSL) was incorporated in browsers, and in this way it was possible to assure the
privacy and security of a transaction to the user, in spite of the overall medium being
insecure. It also provided a way to guarantee the authenticity of the other entity by
validation certificates from a certification authority (CA). These features have not been
transposed to VW/MMOGs yet.
4.4 Trust framework
Let us now outline a conceptual framework for VW/MMOGs in order to address in-
world trust as it is perceived by users. The novelty of the proposed framework lies
not only in the trust-based interactions occurring inside a virtual world, but also in
multi-dimensional trust models that help in-world users (i.e., avatars) to take decisions
in specific situations. In a way, this framework is an attempt to mimic the interactions
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between individuals in the real world, where we have trustors and trustees in specific
circumstances. Trust is an individual manifest about trustability, while reputation is a
collective manifest about trustability.
Thus, the approach we have followed in the design of our framework focuses on the user
perception about the surrounding virtual world, and on his/her interactions with other
in-world entities, no matter they are trustor or trustee entities. Trust will be referred as
a trustor’s manifest about the trustee in regards to a specific goal; for instance, “I trust
him to trade!” Note that most of computational trust models do not target to be used
as human aids in taking decisions; instead, they try to transpose human trust relevant
features to non-human scenarios in which there is not a human direct intervention like
in MAS and P2P networks or even MANETs.
The framework includes three major components: inputs, engine, and outputs (Fig-
ure 4.1). The input component is responsible by inputting as much as possible data (not
necessarily only trust data) into the engine. This data is mainly about users/avatars’
data. The engine via its trust kernel feeds trust model-based system with specific user’s
data retrieved from a database, which produces manifold trust results about a user/a-
vatar that are then forwarded to the decision system, which in turn decides about the
trustability of the user. Taken a decision, it is delivered to output module, being it then
forwarded to the trustor avatar who takes the final decision about the trustee avatar.
4.4.1 Input
The input data is manifold and includes contextual data, external data, and user profil-
ing data. This data is collected from different sources and stored within the VW/MMOG,
what is in a way related to the variety of trust models we have embedded in the engine.
Trust data can be collected from a number of sources, namely: attitudes, behaviors, and
experiences. Attitudes result from the information gathered from a user’s interactions
like expressing a opinion about someone or entity. Behaviors correspond to observed be-
havioral aspects of other users. Experiences include explicit and implicit experiences;
explicit experiences are direct first-hand interactions with others, while implicit expe-
riences are those that are vehiculated through others, regardless of whether they are
friends, feedback mechanisms or anything else.
The inputs considered in our framework conceptual approach are obtained from three
different types of information sources, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The first, the contex-
tual sources denotes the information on user actions in specific contexts of interaction
with other avatars in the virtual world. The external sources correspond to inputs ob-
tained from external data sources (e.g., list of friends, trust networks, as well as inputs
from reputation system if available). The user profile corresponds to data specific to
each user in accordance to his/her own trust specifications; for instance, “I always trust
others at beginning”.
Engine. The trust engine comprises various systems: kernel, trust model-based system,
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storage database, update system and decision system.
Kernel. The kernel is the central element of the trust framework (TFW). The kernel is
responsible for determining which data sources and trust models are to be used in each
user’s trust assessment, but has also the function of collecting trust results produced by
the trust model-based system and to forward them to the update and decision systems.
Update system. The update system is necessary because the perception about an user’s
trustability may change over time. A trust change in the user profile occurs when he/she
interacts with another user for the first time or when his/her behavior has changed.
That is, a trust change is the result of interactions between users inside the virtual
world, and leads to a change in the storage database.
Storage database. The storage database is designed to house data for each user/avatar
profile, his/her trustability, well as his/her inter-relationships and interactions within
a VW/MMOG, what results in a trust graph or network.
Trust model-based system. Currently, trust model-based system houses the following
computational models:
— Trust Network Analysis with Subjective Logic (TNA-SL). This model incorporates trust
networks representing the transitive trust relationships between entities (e.g., people,
organizations or software agents), taking advantage of the subjective logic to calculate
trust between arbitrary nodes in the trust network [JIB07], which is represented as a
directed series-parallel graph (DSPG). The subjective logic generalizes binary logic and
probability calculus, which includes degrees of uncertainty. In VW/MMOGs, these nodes
are users/avatars and TNA-SL is used to assess trust from the existing transitive trust
relationships represented by the edges of the trust graph. Interestingly, subjective logic
is able to derive a level of trust between any two nodes of a trust network, even when
no explicit trust paths between them exist.
— Regret. This model has a multidimensional perspective on trust as it aggregates
three dimensions: individual based on direct interactions, social from past interactions
of group members, and also a dimension represented by a hierarchical ontology struc-
ture to address different types of complex concepts [SS01]. It allows for subjectivity in
trust assessments as well as a temporal-effect factor giving more relevance to recent
data [MP10]. In addition, in the presence of conflicting information, it is able to still
provide methods for calculating degrees of trust [AG07]. The model strengths lie in the
compositional approach that successfully deal with many of the issues of trust and rep-
utation in virtual communities [Pat07]. But, a functional update mechanism is missing
[WHS11], and it does not allow anonymity as referred in [MP10]. By examining truth-
fulness of information, it does not distinguish between dishonest and just incompetent
[Med12]. The subjectivity, flexibility, temporal effect and multidimensional character-
istics present in Regret are important features to take into account in the design of the
TFW for VW/MMOGs.
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— Eigentrust. This model enables to choose peers of a P2P file-sharing network with ref-
erence to their history of reliable downloads [KSGM03] according to a PageRank [BP98]
approach. Each peer is assigned a unique global trust value that accounts for the expe-
riences of all peers with such a peer. For that purpose, each peer ranks its downloads
from other peer nodes, and this information is placed in a trust matrix. The concept
of transitive trust is at the core of this model; consequently, one assumes that a peer
will have a high-ranked opinion of those peers from whom it has downloaded authentic
files, so that such a peer is likely to trust those peers because they presumably will be
honest in also reporting their local trust values. This notion of transitive trust leads
to a system where global trust values of peers are related to the left principal eigen-
vector of a matrix of normalized local trust values. The normalization of these local
trust values ensures that malicious or untrusted peers can be excluded from the trust
network. In VW/MMOGs it can be used for identifying misbehaved avatars or to identify
the trustworthier avatar in a specific context situation.
— Stereotrust. In general, trust models make usage of past behavior information of
any entity that is being evaluated, but this information is not always available simply
because there is not any historical information when one faces a stranger. In this case,
one uses the “instinct”, which is nothing more than a number of stereotypes devel-
oped from our interactions experienced in the past with someone that looks “similar”.
Therefore, Stereotrust is a computational trust model that was inspired by real life
stereotypes [LDRL09]. Therefore, features like profile data, past behavior and types
of interactions/transactions of a specific entity with others are used to build its own
stereotype. As a generic model, Stereotrust can be easily, not to say desirably, applied
in VW/MMOGs because user’s behavior in the virtual world tends to be similar to user’s
behavior in the real world.
— Trust Ant Colony System (TACS) is a model developed in the context of P2P networks.
It uses an ant (or agent) colony optimization algorithm for finding good and reliable
peers. More specifically, it uses probabilistic techniques to find trust paths to trust-
worthier nodes in a P2P network [GMMPGS09a]. Due to the dynamics of P2P networks
topology (e.g., nodes can leave or enter the network at any time) it was later improved
using genetic algorithms to tune and optimize TACS working parameters. Without hav-
ing prior information about the existing peers, TACS showed high accuracy in detecting
the most reliable peer, although on static networks its results were only satisfactory
and in highly dynamic networks, they weren’t conclusive [GMMPGS09a]. In relation to
VW/MMOGs TACS can be employed to identify the most trustworthy avatar regarding a
specific situation (e.g., the best content developer offering services in-world).
Summing up, the trust model-based system is scalable in the sense that it is designed
to house more computational trust models if needed. However, for the time being, we
believe that the trust models approached above are more than enough to support trust
judgments of a user/avatar about any other user/avatar he/she may meet somewhere
in the virtual world.
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Figure 4.1: Outline of the Trust Framework (TFW).
Decision system. This is the last module of the trust framework (TFW) shown in Fig-
ure 4.1. This module is in charge of producing a computational decision about the
trustworthiness of an trustee (e.g., user or avatar) based on the trustee data available
in the database and on the most appropriate trust models embedded in the trust engine.
This trust judgment is then forwarded to the trustor who takes a final decision about
the trustee, acting then accordingly in the virtual world with the trustee. It is clear
that trustor’s final decision will be also sent to the database via the kernel component
in order to update the trustee profile.
4.4.2 Output
The output is the judgment produced by the trust decision system, which is forwarded
to the user through the client interface. The framework output should be intuitive
to users. We also intent to use the framework in real time in a preemptive constant
evaluation of the avatars in avatar’s AoI (Area of Interest); for instance, if an avatar is
going to an auction house, we assume that he/she has the intent of trading something,
so it would be advisable to notify the auctioneers about that because a number of
transactions/interactions are going to take place likely therein.
4.5 Discussion
In practice, trust in immersive worlds has not been accomplished yet, although virtual
worlds present a more familiar representation to users than online services. In a way
this comes from the fact that trust in VW/MMOGs cannot be evaluated from a single
point of view. A trust framework for a VW/MMOG must be multidimensional and flexible
enough in order to enable adjustments to the aggregated final value for trust; hence,
the trust models incorporated in our TFW. For example, stereotypes of the Stereotrust
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model allow for judgements on trusting someone or something without any prior data,
while other models require a historical trust data as it the case of trust networks can
be processed also by TNA-SL, Eigentrust and TACS, so that we end up having means to
improve the global assessment.
In fact, users of VW/MMOGs do not have access to relevant information that is being
generated in the VW/MMOG, preventing them from being able to judge other users
before initiating any interactions with them. These limitations are overcome by users
with the use of external sources (e.g., WoW Armory), or with the development of these
capabilities as middleware as seen in MMOGs in [BHRS09], or with the implementation
of alternative sharing data solutions like SecondLife trustnet (i.e., an alternative rating
system) and banlink (i.e., a system for sharing ban list between users). On the other
hand, the industry acts by banning malicious users by inducing scarcity of items and by
promoting those users who participate in the development of the in-world [BL12].
Trust plays a key role because if users do not trust in the VW/MMOG capabilities to
provide satisfaction fairness, security and privacy they start to flee. Unlike the current
state-of-the art in VW/MMOGs, the FWT is relevant because it supports each user in
his/her judgment about other users in the virtual worlds. The proposed models in the
FWT present a way to represent and maintain trust data relevant to each user. An effort
was made in order to have a broader representation of the available data, together with
the required tools to aggregate and rate the different inputs to an overall trust value.
4.6 Summary
Trust concepts in VW/MMOGs have not been addressed in the past from a integrated
perspective. In this chapter we have presented an introductory view on existing prob-
lems related to trust in VW/MMOGs. A special effort was made in order to identify trust
models susceptible to be integrated in a VW/MMOGs trust framework. An effort was also
made in order to analyze the adaptability of well established solutions or models to this
specific scenario of VW/MMOGs. Future developments include to achieve reliable trust
metrics as features for enhancing management and usage of trust mechanisms by users
of these environments.
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Chapter 5
Trust Representation
In virtual worlds (including computer games), users develop trust relationships from
their in-world interactions with others. However, these trust relationships end up not
being represented in the data structures (or databases) of such virtual worlds, though
they sometimes appear associated to reputation and recommendation systems. In ad-
dition, as far as we know, the user is not provided with a personal trust tool to sustain
his/her decision making while he/she interacts with other users in the virtual or game
world. In order to come up with a computational formal representation of these per-
sonal trust relationships, we need to succeed in converting in-world interactions into
reliable sources of trust-related data. In this chapter, we develop the required for-
malisms to collect, aggregate and represent in-world interactions — which are based on
the activity theory —, as well as a method to convert in-world interactions into trust
networks. In the chapter 6, we use these trust networks to produce a computational
trust decision based on subjective logic. This solution aims at supporting in-world user
(or avatar) decisions about others in the game world.
5.1 Introduction
The fact of Internet is more and more ubiquitous, with an increasingly number of users
having access to broad-band networks, together with a sustainable rise in power and
graphics capabilities of client compute devices has led to an increasing interest in virtual
worlds (also known as multi-user virtual environments or VW/MMOGs) [Bel08, Bar03].
This is largely due to their applications in domains that are far beyond entertainment
and gaming industry [DF11, BL12], including online business and commerce [MMG+08],
research and education [BL12, DC07], military training (e.g., OLIVE) [Mac07], as well as
industrial training (e.g., aircraft maintenance procedures), pilot training, and medical
procedures [DF11].
Trust stems from the interactions that avatars (i.e., virtual representations of users, also
called in-world users) end up setting with other avatars, places or objects. That is, trust
is at the heart of all user’s activities taking place within a virtual world. Similar to real
life, users socialize somehow through interactions, whose trustworthiness has much to
do with first impressions, opinions of others, and past experience. The grand challenge
is then how to represent and operate on impressions, opinions, and user experience in
virtual worlds, in order to help the user in decision-making in respect to the trust value
of in-world interactions.
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Trust elements can be identified in several aspects of virtual worlds. For example, in
World of Warcraft (WoW), color is used to differentiate the Alliance from the Hord.
The friends list of an in-world user (or avatar) gives also insights on the trustability
and reliability of other users, as friends are considered more reliable and trustworthy
than other users. Also the user-perceived behavior contributes to develop trust/distrust
opinions about him/her by other users.
As noted in user behavior studies in massively multi-player online games (MMOGs) [RCS+10,
SSM11], in-world users develop their knowledge from how they perceive the environ-
ment and from how the environment responds to their actions. The way how the user
(inter)acts within the virtual world results in vast amounts of data about interactions,
which are usually discarded because they are not systematically stored or are not made
available to users.
The principal issue regarding trust usability (i.e., trust from user’s point of view) lies in
the fact that the knowledge that results from user interactions is not well represented
in the virtual world, limiting so user’s experience [BL12, MMG+08]. What we know is
that part of these data is retained by the owner (or seller) company of the virtual world,
which controls the management and governance of the overall virtual world platform
[Hum08], mainly for user profiling and to predict user behavior. Therefore, only a small
part of the data is made available to users, usually in aggregated statistics.
In other words, users are not provided with trust mechanisms in virtual worlds, what
results in important constraints on the interactions that users establish with each an-
other. For example, when a user is about to make a transaction with an unknown user
(i.e., without any previous contact), the user tends to refrain from interacting with the
unknown user when a relevant/important asset or goal is at stake.
To address this issue, we introduce an innovative trust approach that allows us to col-
lect, aggregate, and represent existing trust-related data into a unifying trust model.
The principal difference with other approaches is that a trust model is created for each
in-world user, i.e., a user trust model that features how an individual perceives and in-
teracts with others in the virtual world. For that purpose, current and past experiences
of each in-world user contributes to enhance his/her current and future trust decisions
on how interact with others. Also relevant it is the contribution that each user can bring
to the overall system if his/her trust decisions were disseminated and used to enhance
decisions of others, something that has not been feasible with current virtual worlds.
Thus, in this chapter, we address trust in terms of its computational representation and
usability [Mar94, SS05, MMH02] in virtual worlds, taking advantage of its sociological
perspective [DH08], in order to create a user-centric trust system to assist the user in
his/her decision-making in respect to interactions with others. At the best knowledge
of the authors, this kind of personal trust system is inexistent in the game-related lit-
erature, and far less in virtual worlds like the OpenSimulator [Lop07], which has been
used in our research work.
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5.1.1 Research Questions
In the present chapter, the grand challenge we are facing is to answer the following
research question (Q):
Q — Assuming that interaction data are available, how can in-world users (i.e., avatars)
benefit from the data generated in the virtual world to sustain their trust decisions?
To properly respond to this question, we propose a bottom-up methodology to col-
lect/aggregate (first stage), represent (second stage) trust-related data, on which we
operate to produce a trust recommendation (third stage) about a given in-world user.
Such methodology leads us to the following subsidiary research questions:
Q1 — What kind of in-world data are available and how can they be collected?
Q2 — Can we turn in-world data gathered in the environment into a persistent compu-
tational trust representation?
Q3 — How can we derive the trust to evaluate the trustability of an avatar even when
no previous direct interaction with it took place in the past?
Q4 — Can we demonstrate the validity of our proposal?
The first two questions are addressed in the present chapter, while the last two re-
search questions concerning the trust assessment procedure and its validation will be
approached in the next chapter (Chapter 6[CGF16b]).
5.1.2 Methodology
To answer to Q1, it is necessary to be aware of the resources provided by the virtual
world in use. We have used the OpenSimulator [Lop07] as our virtual world, in largely
because it is open-source, but more importantly because we are allowed to access
to system-generated events directly. So, unlike proprietary virtual worlds like WoW
(World of Warcraft), we can easily filter out those events related with avatar-avatar
interactions. As explained further ahead in Section 5.3, these interactions are those
in which we are interested, because they will allow us to establish trust relationships
between avatars.
Regarding Q2, we can indeed turn avatar-avatar interactions into trust relationships
(Section 5.4), which express positive and negative outcomes of past interactions be-
tween two avatars. A graph of avatars (i.e., nodes) and their trust relationships (i.e.,
edges) is thus formed into what we call trust network. Then, as described in Section 5.5,
we can use the subjective logic to convert trust relationships into trust opinions [JHP06].
These trust network and opinions will be used in the next chapter (Chapter 6)to evaluate
the trustability of a given avatar from a personal point of view (cf. Section 5.7).
Q3 is addressed in the chapter 6[CGF16b]. We will employ the concept of user trust
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network, as the result of assembling direct trust trees (i.e., a tree per user) in order to
establish a trust path between two avatars, the trustor (start node) and the trustee (goal
node). After finding such trust path, we use subjective logic operators to calculate the
trustability value (of the trustee) along the path connecting the trustor to the trustee, so
that the trustor will act accordingly making then a decision. This is briefly approached
in Section 5.7, and detailed in the next chapter [CGF16b].
Q4 is also addressed in chapter 6[CGF16b]. For that purpose, we built up various sce-
narios within OpenSimulator with a varying number of users and behaviors (i.e. honest,
malicious, pure malicious, and sybil users), a varying number of interactions between
users, as well as the impact of trust processing in the overall system performance.
5.1.3 Organization of the Chapter
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we briefly review
the work related to VW/MMOGs, together with trust studies carried out in other fields of
knowledge. Section 5.3 characterizes the concept of interaction as the source of events
from which trust-related information will be obtained. Sections 5.4-5.6 describe the
process of aggregating trust relationships into trust opinions and trust networks. Sec-
tion 5.7 advances with some insights on the trust inference process detailed in chap-
ter 6.Section 5.8 puts the personal trust system in context of the research questions
mentioned above, with a discussion on trust representations and operators as mecha-
nisms of inference and reasoning. Finally, Section 5.9 draws important conclusions to
bear in mind, together with some clues for future work.
5.2 Related Work
Trust has been a research topic in social sciences for a long time [Luh79, McL11]. In
computing, only recently trust has attracted a lot of attention, though its roots date
back to the seminal work of Marsh [Mar94], in 1994. The driving force of this interest in
trust computing has been the Internet, more specifically social networks [ZKB11, SNP13,
Bhu10, Gol09, CZDB11, ZDB11, CSC11].
Currently, trust pervades many fields of computing, including networking and secu-
rity [CG12], critical infrastructure (CI) services [CSM+11], cloud computing [vLAV05,
DPJX12], service virtualization [DPJX12], artificial intelligence [Mar94], human-computer
interaction (HCI) [BRDM11], just to mention a few. For example, in networking, trust is
employed to pre-assess nodes reliability in an attempt to ensure that there are not rogue
nodes tampering data or altering its content, as observed in mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs), wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and peer-to-peer (P2P) [WE05, CSC11], not
to mention the authentication procedures via certificates, public key infrastructure
(PKI), and others [YWS03]. In artificial intelligence, more specifically in agents and
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multi-agent systems (MAS), trust is used as a framework tool to enhance reliability in
agent interactions [Mar94]. In human-computer interaction, trust plays a vital role in
interactions with online services, what has to do with trust usability [BRDM11]. Yet
another example is the assessment of trustability in software and hardware develop-
ment, as it was identified in the industry through the Trustworthy Computing Initiative
[TCG11].
Altogether, trust-related contributions have been mostly focused on addressing platform
technical issues [CC13], like infrastructures (e.g., hardware and software), networking
[SM12a], load balancing, world state consistency, data replication control, digital rights
management (DRM) [ZPMY09], privacy, etc., and not that much on users/avatars and
their behavior in the immersive world [SSM11], or the assessment of security and privacy
risks in virtual worlds [BBC+08]. However, a few works have approached the concepts
of fairness [CLPC08], reputation [HHJ08], recommendation [HSRF95] as data sources
or vehicles for in-world trust management in VW/MMOGs, as well as for user behavior
profiling [SM12b] and in-world governance [Hum08]. We find also works of the same
sort in online services [Gol09, Tav12] and in social networks [Bhu10, SNP13]. In short,
although there are many studies directly focused on trust in computing [Mar94, You07,
KSGM03], only a few of them address virtual worlds and games [RCS+10, CG14].
In this chapter, we are interested in approaching trust in virtual worlds (including
MMOGs), and the same applies to fairness, reputation, recommendation, and other
types of judgments and opinions that result from human-like interactions. As observed
by Ratan et al. [RCS+10], MMOG players tend to interact with those having good looking,
to fear high rank players and gold farmers, and also to consider their in-game friends and
guild members more reliable than others, with whom they tend to use voice channels
more frequently. In a way, humans interact with each other developing trust/distrust
relations that evolve over time, existing thus a need to adopt new trust vehicles in new
scenarios, in particular for a society that is increasingly dependent on digital media.
In the following sections we intend to bridge the gap of trust in virtual worlds (including
those of games) by developing a process to collect and store trust relevant informa-
tion, which feeds a computational trust representation that supports in-world users (or
avatars) in their decision-making processes during transactions and interactions with
others. In principle, this would help in-world users to develop relationships with oth-
ers, as well as to develop their own assessment and risk management capabilities.
5.3 Interactions
Interactions play a pivotal role in virtual worlds. In a way, users develop their knowledge
from their interactions with and within the world, in the sense that more interactions
likely mean more knowledge about the environment, objects, and other users. The
interactions are conditioned by various factors, namely: user perception about the en-
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vironment, user perception about the behavior of others, immersion, presence, avatar
embodiment, and time. In fact, the environment looks more appealing to the user when
he/she identifies himself/herself with the surrounding virtual world; the user adheres
more easily to others when they belong to the same guild or member list. Immersion
into virtual world has to do with a perception of being physically present therein, while
presence refers to the sense of others in his/her vicinity [BCRT08]. Finally, virtual
embodiment has to do with endowing an avatar (i.e., a virtual body) with the same
appearance and sensations as for the user body [BCRT08, KGS12]. Also, time represents
a relevant asset to assess user’s commitment to virtual worlds, and also to enhance
his/her knowledge about the in-world environment characteristics and the behavior of
other users.
5.3.1 Activities
Within a virtual world, one may develop one or more activities over time. Trading is
a sort of activity that features, for example, the selling and buying of in-world items.
Other types of activities commonly found in VW/MMOGs are listed in Table 5.1. An
activity involves at least an avatar; for example, the avatar’s action of creating an in-
world artifact is a representative of the activity of building. Also, when two guilds face
themselves in a battle ground, they are developing a fighting activity; more specifically,
a battle-playing activity. Furthermore, according to the activity theory [BM14], every
single activity develops towards a goal. For example, in a PvP (Player vs Player) fight,
the goal is to win the opponent and increase its in-world ranking/status.
In the context of virtual worlds, a (virtual) activity can be defined as follows:
Definition 1 An activity denotes an exercise of a specific function by one one more
avatars (or users) to achieve a specific goal (or objective) within a given time frame,
being thus represented by the triple
A = (s, g, t) (5.1)
where s denotes the scope or type of activity, g the goal of the activity, and t the time
frame that lasts the activity.
It is clear that distinct virtual worlds may foster different activities with specific goals
and time frames. For example, WoW promotes role playing and competition, while in
SecondLife socialization is a key feature.
A human agent (subject) undertakes an activity in order to solve a problem or purpose
(object), being that such an activity is mediated by tools [Fre95] (artifacts) in collabo-
ration with others (community). Note that an activity undertaken in nature by animals
is typically unmediated, i.e., it is an instinct-guided activity. Even humans perform
unmediated activities; for example, when an individual picks up berries in the wild and
directly eats them is an activity without mediation. But, collecting a mushroom in the
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Table 5.1: Types of users activities in VW/MMOGs.
Type Description
Exploring Movement of the avatar in-world.
Building Create items in the virtual world.
Socializing Interactions with other in-world users that resemble face-to-face hu-
man interactions.
Trading Commercial activity that an in-world user has with others.
Cooperation Activity involving at least two in-world users in order to achieve a goal.
Role play-
ing
MMOG’s activity that aims to rise the user prestige and status by earning
items and virtual currency as user play a role.
Fighting MMOG’s activity concerning fights with non-player characters (NPCs),
other users in PvP, and also fights with multiple in-world users like in
battles and raids.
wild and eating it is an activity that is ill-advised without some kind of mediation, i.e.,
without the direct advice of an experienced mushroom forager [Lur81]. That is, many
human activities, independently of whether they are real or virtual, are mediated in
some extent. Mediation means interactionwith others more experienced and with more
skills in respect to a specific activity. Thus, an activity is seen as a set of interactions,






Figure 5.1: Hierarchical structure of data gathering.
5.3.2 Interactions
Informally speaking, an action is what an entity can do, no matter whether such entity is
a human being, a machine, an agent, an avatar, etc. In turn, an interaction is defined as
an action between two entities. In this chapter we extend this notion of interaction to
a sequence of actions between two or more entities within the scope of a given activity,
so that an action of the first entity usually triggers a reaction of the second entity, and
vice-versa. For example, an interaction between avatars could involve multiple actions
(e.g., avatar motion, behavior commands and a chat session).
In general, we classify interactions in respect to the types of interacting entities, as
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Figure 5.2: Interaction process within an OpenSimulator’s client window.
follows:
• Avatar-Avatar Interaction. This sort of interaction involves two avatars (or users);
for example, two avatars are trading a single in-world virtual item (e.g., a sword).
• Avatar-Environment Interaction. In this case, only an avatar is involved in the
interaction; for example, an avatar is opening a door to get in a building.
• Avatar-System Interaction. Similar to previous interaction, this interaction in-
volves only a single avatar; for example, the avatar is interacting with a VW/M-
MOG reputation system in order to retrieve data about a specific user for assessing
purposes. Another example is when an avatar accesses a VW/MMOG service to get
a profile statistics on a user, or to make a complaint, or to report a flaw.
• User-Service Interaction. In this case the service is external to the VW/MMOG, so
that the idea is to get additional information about other users; for example, such
an information can be obtained by querying for WoW ranks in the Armory online
service.
In this chapter, we are limited to in-world avatar-avatar interactions because we are
approaching trust between users immersed in a VW/MMOG, not anything else.
5.3.3 Avatar-Avatar Interactions
As seen above, every single in-world interaction between two users are mediated by
their avatar alter egos. As in real life interactions, we have the following:
Definition 2 An interaction ΥAB between two avatars, A and B, can be represented as
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follows:
ΥAB = (i, s, g, t, r, d, o) (5.2)
where i stands for the identifier of the interaction, s the scope of the interaction,
also called activity (e.g., a trading activity), g the goal to achieve to fulfill with the
interaction, t the timeline of the interaction, r the risk associated with the interaction
(e.g., “I would lend him my special sword during a ride event in WoW in the expectation
that he will return it to me”), d the decay factor associated to the interaction (i.e.,
the importance or strength of an interaction decays over time), and o the interaction
outcome as seen by each interacting user.
The interaction outcome takes on a binary value, 0 (unsuccessful) or 1 (successful), and
is thus similar to the ‘like’ system used in social networks. This interaction outcome
is of paramount importance as input for the subjective logic-based trust network to be
approached in Section 5.5. As shown in Section 5.4 onwards, from the 7-tuple repre-
sentation (5.2) for avatar-avatar interactions, we are able to derive the trustworthiness
of any user from the point of view of his/her interacting partner.
00 --- A starts the interaction
01 --- A seeks others in her vinicity
02 --- A starts a chat, asking others for the item x
03 --- B replies positively , but only trades x for z
04 --- C also replies positively for sharing x
05 --- A sends a IM to C asking for x
06 --- C replies saying she will drop x for sharing
07 --- A moves towards C
08 --- C drops the item x
09 --- A picks up the item x
10 --- A thanks C in the chat
11 --- A ends the in-world interaction
12 --- A rates the interaction with C
13 --- A stores the interaction with C
14 --- A ends the interaction
Figure 5.3: Actions performed within an interaction between A, B, and C (cf. Fig. 5.4 for the
corresponding action types).
Example 1 A in-world scenario involving three avatars is shown in Fig. 5.2, where an
avatarA (Anna) interacts withB (Beth) andC (Charlotte) in her AoI (area of influence).
The avatar A intends to obtain a special item x for her inventory. To achieve that goal,
A starts an interaction with B and C who are nearby. This interaction between A, B,
and C comprises the actions shown in Fig. 5.3. In this interaction scenario, A ends up
obtaining the item x from C in the context of a trading activity.
As illustrated in Fig. 5.4, this avatar-avatar interaction involved a number of actions
over time, namely: movement/seeking, chat, instant messaging, drop and pick from
inventory. As a result, the state of A (and also of C) has changed.
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Processing interaction Storage










Figure 5.4: Action types of the interaction between A, B, and C over time illustrated in Fig. 5.3.
5.3.4 Actions and Events
An avatar’s action takes place when the user types in keyboard or moves the mouse of
his/her compute device (e.g., laptop or smartphone). Thus, avatar’s actions have to do
with user inputs. The OpenSimulator translates the keyboard and mouse inputs of the
user into actions of the respective avatar.
Definition 3 An action a of an avatar A is a process of doing something with a specific
aim, and is characterized by the following tuple representation
a = (id, A, t, α, i) (5.3)
where id is the identifier of the action a, t stands for the time of the occurrence of
the action, α denotes the action type, and i the type of input employed in the action.
Fig. 5.5 shows different types of actions (α) commonly found in virtual worlds when
avatars interact with each other on behalf of their users. Note that each type of action
is associated to a few input devices (keyboard Ï, mouse Í, and microphone ).
Events describe the state changes caused by avatar actions [HSS+12, Heg13]. Therefore,
an action triggers one or more events.
Definition 4 An event is an occurrence of an action.
That is, an event is an identifiable occurrence that something has happened within the
VW/MMOG. The VW/MMOG engine global state is managed through events. In Open-
Simulator, these events are employed in multiple areas of the platform architecture
and services, as illustrated in Fig. 5.6. Table 5.2 lists the events concerning the ac-
tions of the interaction between the avatars A, B, and C in Figs. 5.3-5.4. Accessing
events of a VW/MMOG like OpenSimulator is made possible because it is open source
[Lop07, HMB03]. Some events are triggered automatically by OpenSimulator platform
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Figure 5.6: OpenSimulator architecture and services.
server when a preset condition or conditions occur, while others are initiated from the
client side.
Typically, a message is issued either from user-generated events (e.g., keystrokes and
mouse clicks, among others), in-world events triggered from interactions (e.g., a door
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opens in response to avatar movement), or even system events (e.g., lack of memory).
As already suggested, we are only interested in in-world events triggered from avatar-
avatar interactions, because these interactions are the ones from which avatars develop
the feeling of trust in others.
Table 5.2: Deployed Events.
Id Events
00 A starts the interaction
public UserEvent(UUID userId, string userName, string eventType, string gridId, string
regionName, DateTime datetime)
01 A seeks others in her vinicity
public void TriggerOnClientMovement(ScenePresence avatar)
02 A starts a chat, asking others for the item x
public UserChatEvent( UUID userId, string userName, Vector3 origin, ChatTypeEnum chatType,
string text, int channel, string gridId, string regionName, DateTime datetime):
base(userId, userName, "chat", gridId, regionName, datetime)
03 B replies positively, but only trades x for z
public UserChatEvent( UUID userId, string userName, Vector3 origin, ChatTypeEnum chatType,
string text, int channel, string gridId, string regionName, DateTime datetime):
base(userId, userName, "chat", gridId, regionName, datetime)
04 C also replies positively for sharing x
public UserChatEvent( UUID userId, string userName, Vector3 origin, ChatTypeEnum chatType,
string text, int channel, string gridId, string regionName, DateTime datetime)
05 A sends a IM to C asking for x
public UserImEvent( UUID userId, string userName, UUID receiverId, string receiverName,
bool isReceiverGroup, string text, string gridId, string regionName)
06 C replies saying she will drop x for sharing
public UserImEvent( UUID userId, string userName, UUID receiverId, string receiverName,
bool isReceiverGroup, string text, string gridId, string regionName)
07 A moves towards C
public void TriggerOnClientMovement(ScenePresence avatar)
08 C drops the item x
public void TriggerOnNewInventoryItemUpdate(UUID agentID, UUID AssetID, int userlevel)
09 A picks up the item x
public void TriggerObjectGrab(uint localID, uint originalID, Vector3 offsetPos, IClientAPI
remoteClient, SurfaceTouchEventArgs surfaceArgs)
public void TriggerOnNewInventoryItemUploadComplete ( UUID agentID, UUID AssetID, String
AssetName, int userlevel)
10 A thanks C in the chat
public UserChatEvent( UUID userId, string userName, Vector3 origin, ChatTypeEnum chatType,
string text, int channel, string gridId, string regionName, DateTime datetime)
11 A ends the in-world interaction with C
public UserEvent(UUID userId, string userName, string eventType, string gridId, string
regionName, DateTime datetime)
12 A rates the interaction with C
Loads P (uA); o=1;
13 A stores the interaction with C
$insertquery = insert into interactions(i, trustor, trustee, s, g, t, r, d, o) values
(2341,'A','C','trade','obtain item',2014-04-27 12:44:40 168, 'low',0.5,1);
14 A ends the interaction
public UserEvent(UUID userId, string userName, string eventType, string gridId, string
regionName, DateTime datetime)
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5.3.5 Collecting Interaction Data from Events
Events are registered and handled through the EventManager of OpenSimulator. The
pre-defined events of OpenSimulator have a global (the entire world), regional (a world
region), or local (a scene or avatar’s area of interest) coverage.
The avatar-avatar interactions taking place within OpenSimulator fires off events. To
illustrate a type of events considered in the interaction we describe instant messaging
(IM) events in OpenSimulator’s format as follows:
εAB = (iA, nA, iB, nB, b,m,G,R, t) (5.4)
where iA and nA stand for the id and name of the trustor A (who sends the message), iB
and nB are the id and name of the trustee B (who receives the message), b is a boolean
flag that indicates whether the receiver is a group or not, m is the text message, G the
virtual world grid identifier, R the virtual world region identifier, and t the time of the
occurrence.
In fact, OpenSimulator is here used for avatar behavior analysis, in which chat sessions
and IM events serve the purpose of tracking user behaviors [ORMCB12]. For example,
as the interaction activity develops, the actions performed by the participant avatars
described in Fig. 5.3 trigger the events described in Table 5.2. Initially, the event
ClientMovement was triggered (action 01) when A started the interaction. Next, the
event UserChatEvent was generated (action 02) when A opened the chat window. It is
clear that subsequent actions continued to generate other events. The collected events
are those associated with the chat and IM actions, movement and picking objects, as
well as those associated to inventory state updates. The interaction is concluded when
A rates C, and the interaction ΥAC (cf. Eq. (5.2)) is stored in OpenSimulator’s MySQL
database as an entry (i, trustor, trustee, s, g, t, r, d, o) of the interactions table. For ad-
ditional details on OpenSimulator events and storage formats, the reader is referred to
[Lop07].
Automatic gathering Interactions between avatars usually occur when they are within
reach of one another, i.e. when an avatar crosses the AoI of another avatar. In order to
automate the data gathering process, the decision taken to start and end each avatar-
avatar interaction is based on events that detect when an avatar enters or leaves the
AoI of another avatar. For example, we have five avatars A, B, C, D and E in Fig. 5.7,
where the AoI of A is structured into three concentric circles: shout (outer circle in
light green), speak (middle circle in green), and whisper (inner circle in dark green);
the remaining avatars appear depicted with their AoI’s speak circles. Fig. 5.7 shows
four speak interactions, namely: ΥAB and Υ
A
C because B and C get in the AoI of A, Υ
B
A
because A gets in the AoI of B, and ΥCA because A gets in the AoI of C. Also, Fig. 5.7
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Figure 5.7: A records an interaction with B and another interaction with C, and vice-versa, because B
and C are inside the AoI of A.
Rating process Every single avatar-avatar interaction is rated as either positive or
negative automatically. The key features relevant for an avatar to automatically rate
his/her interaction with another avatar are the following:
• Member of friends list.
• Amount of time within the AoI.
• Number of chat messages.
• Number of words/expressions employed within the chat considered offensive (e.g.,
compared with a list of bad expression/words from the user).
• Number of words/expressions employed within the chat considered helpful and
kind (e.g., compared with a list of good expression/words from the user).
• Number of IM messages exchanged (sent and replied by the trustor avatar).
• Change on the number of items in the inventory.
• Voice communication.
• Gathering in-world statistical information about the avatar.
• Adding the avatar to user friends list.
• Adding avatar to the avatar blocking list.
• Social distance (e.g., time within whisper AoI).
• Avatar dress code (e.g. if similar to mine it is more trustworthier).
• In-world cues (e.g., like race or guild identifiers in WoW).
• Avatar behavior (e.g., gestures like dance).
• Avatar address directly in the chat.
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• It dropped an item (e.g., that I picked).
• Location (e.g., if avatar is in a dungeon it is likely to be hostile, in opposition if it
is within its home location.)
• Access user statistics (e.g., amount of time connected, ranking).
For example, if the avatar is added to the user blocking list of the first avatar, then such
a membership feature is rated as negative; otherwise it is rated as positive. The rating
is done for all the features automatically. Note that the type and amount of rateable
features are susceptible of being set up or changed by each user. Therefore, the process
by which each feature is rated is subjective and susceptible to be tuned by each user.
Interaction aggregation The interaction aggregation mechanism proposed is based on
a two-layer approach. All features are aggregated and averaged by type, after which
the different collections of features are rated by relevance according to the user pa-
rameterizations. The resulting rate value is then compared with a predefined threshold
in order to determine the outcome of the interaction as either positive or negative (cf.
event 12 in Table 5.2).
As illustrated in Algorithm 1, the process of collecting interaction data is initiated by
the loading of user preferences (e.g., the events and activities to track) P (uA) of the
trustor uA from the database. Then, if an event ε involves the trustor uA and the trustee
uB, we have then to check whether the scope s of the activity is in the preferences of
uA, setting then the remaining parameters of the interaction, including the assessment
outcome o of the trustor about the trustee.
5.4 Trust Relationships
In the previous section, we have seen how to gather and aggregate actions/events into
in-world interactions. We intend now to show how to generate trust relationships from
such interactions. As much as we know, this trust inference from interactions has not
been tried and achieved before, in particular in online games and virtual worlds. Nev-
ertheless, this inference mechanism may be also applicable to social networks, P2P
networks, online services like auction sites because they have commonalities with on-
line games and virtual worlds, in particular as socialization spaces [DIG13, SNP13].
5.4.1 Trust Relationships
In general terms, a trust relationship between two avatars, a trustor (A) and a trustee
(B), is formulated from the set of past interactions between them, which are main-
tained in some database. More formally, we have the following definition:
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Algorithm 1: Collecting data into interactions.
Data:
uA: in-world user id for truster (sender)
uB: in-world user id for trustee (receiver)
s: scope of the activity
o: assessment outcome of the truster about trustee
Result:
ΥAB (i, s, g, t, r, d, o): interaction
1 begin
2 Load preferences P (uA) from database;
/* automatic gathering */
3 begin
4 while uB in uA AoI do
5 Read and store event εi in uA AoI;
6 i← i+ 1;
/* rating process */
7 begin
8 for all εi do
9 Rate of the collect data εi based on the featurej detected;
10 i← i+ 1;
11 j ← j + 1;
12 return rate(i, j)AB;
/* aggregate ratings by feature and by relevance */
13 begin
14 for all j do
15 for all i do
16 sumrate(j) = rate(i, j)AB;
17 i← i+ 1;
18 return sumrate(j)AB;
19 j ← j + 1;
20 return sumrateAB;
/* calculating interaction outcome */
21 begin
22 Calculate o from sumrate(j)AB ponderation;
23 if o > preset− threshold then
24 o = 1;
25 else
26 o = 0;
/* storing interaction */
27 begin
28 A = uA;
29 B = uB;
30 s(ΥAB ) = s;
31 t(ΥAB ) = now;
32 i(ΥAB ) = i(Υ
A
B ) + 1;
33 g(ΥAB ) = g(P (uA));
34 d(ΥAB ) = d(P (uA));
35 o(ΥAB ) = o;
36 Store ΥAB(i, s, g, t, r, d, o) in database;
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Definition 5 A trust relationship ΓAB between two avatars, A (trustor) andB (trustee)
is given by
ΓAB = (i, s, g, t, r, d, a, p, n) (5.5)
where, i stands for its id, s the scope of the activity, g the goal to be achieved, t the
time instant of the assessment of A about B, r the risk for the trustor, d the decay
factor over time, a the base rate obtained from trustor parameterizations P (uA), p
is the sum of positive outcomes (i.e., o = 1) of past interactions, and n is the sum of
negative outcomes (i.e., o = 0) of past interactions of A with B.
In the present implementation, we opted not to include the risk r and the decay fac-
tor d in the computations of the trust relationships for simplicity sake. Therefore, all
interactions share the same risk and the same relevance. Otherwise, we would have
to give more or less relevance to the outcome o of each interaction, depending on the
risk r is lower or higher, respectively. The fact that we do not use the decay factor d
in our computations means that we are not discarding any interactions behind in time
(e.g., interactions that occurred 5 days ago or more). This also means that we are not
considering when such interactions occurred in the past; as a consequence, if the time
of occurrence of any interaction were considered, the decay d would allow us to rein-
force recent interactions in detriment of old interactions. Therefore, we end up using
the following simplified version trust relationship:
Definition 6 A simplified trust relationship ΓAB between two avatars, A (trustor) and
B (trustee) is given by
ΓAB = (i, a, p, n) (5.6)
where, i represents its id, a the base rate obtained from trustor parameterizations
P (uA), p is the sum of positive outcomes (i.e., o = 1) of past interactions, and n is the
sum of negative outcomes (i.e., o = 0) of past interactions of A with B.
As illustrated in Algorithm 2, in-world trust relationships (Γ ) are build from stored inter-
actions. Therefore, representing a trust relationship between A and B within a scope or
activity requires the aggregation of positive (p) and negative (n) interactions between
A and B in the vector o of outcomes (cf. Eq. (5.2)).
5.4.2 Plain Trust Networks
The trust relationship ΓAB denotes how much A trusts in B, while the trust relationship
ΓBA denotes how much B trusts in A. Therefore, trust relationships essentially are
unidirectional. This means that a trust network can be conceptualized as directed
graph (or digraph) as follows:
Definition 7 A plain trust network ⊤ of a virtual world is a directed graph (A, Γ ),
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Algorithm 2: Creating and storing trust relationships (Γ ).
Data:
uA: in-world user id for truster (sender)
uB: in-world user id for trustee (receiver)
s: scope of the activity
ΥAB (i, s, g, t, r, d, o): data from A interaction with B
Result:
ΓAB : trust relationship of A with B
1 begin
2 Load s;
3 while ΥAB (i) exist do
4 if o(ΥAB (i)) = 1 then
5 p(ΓAB ) = p+ 1;
6 if o(ΥAB (i)) = 0 then
7 n(ΓAB ) = n+ 1;
8 adjust ΓAB (i, a, p, n) with decay d;
9 adjust ΓAB (i, a, p, n) with risk r;
10 i++;
11 store ΓAB ;
where A = {A1, . . . , An} stands for the set of avatars (or nodes), and Γ = {Γ1, . . . , Γm}
the set of trust relationships (or directed edges) established between avatars in the
virtual world.
Recall that we are only considering trust relationships associated to avatar-avatar in-
teractions, though other types of trust could be used if necessary. Besides, we are
assuming that such interactions occur within the same scope s, but we also might con-
sider other scopes in the assessment of trust of a given avatar by other avatar.
5.4.3 A Case Study Example
As seen above, a plain trust network essentially is a network of avatars, whose avatar-
avatar interactions are enhanced with trust data. Thus, the generation of a plain trust
network is straightforward from avatar-avatar interactions and their trust relationships.
An example of a plain trust network is shown in Fig. 5.8, where we have 7 avatars (nodes)







Figure 5.8: A plain trust network ⊤ concerning 7 avatars interacting within an OpenSimulator region.
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The trust network (⊤) in Fig. 5.8 was built up from the aggregation of the individual
trust networks(⊤i) of the seven avatars present regarding the same specific scope and
represented as: ⊤Ai = {B,F}, ⊤Bi = {A,C,D, F}, ⊤Ci = {A,B,E}, ⊤Di = {B,C, F},
⊤Ei = {C}, ⊤Fi = {A,B} and ⊤Gi = {A,B,C}. Note that an individual trust network
(⊤i) represents the direct interactions of a single avatar with others, as illustrated in
Fig. 5.9. For the sake of trust reasoning, later approached in the context of subjective
A













Figure 5.9: Individual trust networks (⊤i) of 7 avatars interacting in a game scenario.




users A B C D E F G
A 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
B 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
C 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
D 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
E 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
F 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
G 1 1 1 0 0 0 0

(5.7)
The matrix ⊤ represents the 49 (7x7) possible trust relationships of the scenario, but
only 18 correspond to existent interaction relationships; in particular, ‘1’ denotes the
existence of interaction relationships, while ‘0’ indicates the inexistence of interaction
relationships.
However, the matrix ⊤ does not incorporate the trust relationships Γi explicitly, but
only their existence. To do so, we collect their aggregated outcomes Υ (o) from previous
interactions as positive p and negative n, replacing each entry ‘1’ by the corresponding
113
Enhancing Trustability in MMOGs Environments
vector of outcomes as follows:
⊤ =

users A B C D E F G
A 0 [ 121 ] 0 0 0 [
7
3 ] 0




2 ] 0 [
13
1 ] 0
C [ 50 ] [
1
0 ] 0 0 [
3
1 ] 0 0
D 0 [ 10 ] [
1
0 ] 0 0 [
3
2 ] 0
E 0 0 [ 41 ] 0 0 0 0
F [ 10 ] [
0
2 ] 0 0 0 0 0




0 ] 0 0 0 0

(5.8)
For example, the trust relationship ΓAB is a result of 13 previous interactions between
A and B, twelve of which were positive (p = 12) and one was negative (n = 1); another
example is ΓDF , which consists of 3 positive interactions and 2 negative interactions.
Altogether, we count 89 interactions in this plain trust network involving 7 avatars acting
within an in-world region of OpenSimulator.
Of course, the plain trust matrix ⊤ is not enough for an avatar to formulate a trust
opinion about another avatar while they do not interact with one another. In order to
formulate such opinion at first sight, i.e., before any interaction, we need to use some
kind of logical inference. In this chapter and in chapter 6,we use the subjective logic
as our opinion engine.
In the context of online games, a trust network can be defined as a plain trust network
(cf. Definition 7) whose connections (or edges) are endowed with trust opinions, that
is, a directed graph of avatars whose edges denote the opinions (and their underlying
trust relationships) they establish with each other.
5.5 Trust Opinions
Our opinions on others are subjective in some way, and this is determined by the human
condition itself. That is, an opinion is a belief built on trust, but not sustained on
any proof. The subjective logic is particularly adequate for modeling and analyzing
situations involving uncertainty and incomplete knowledge. In these circumstances,
subjective logic can be seen as a probabilistic logic for uncertain probabilities.
In this chapter, we will use a model of subjective logic, here called subjective algebra,
which consists of a pair of opinions and subjective operators. For the time being, we are
only interested in the representation of trust opinions across trust networks. In respect
to subjective operators, which are necessary for reasoning and inference, they will be
approached in the next chapter (Chapter 6; see [CGF16b] for further details).
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5.5.1 Opinions and Subjective Logic
In order to build up a trust opinion network (or, simply, a trust network) for avatars
within the game world, we first need to convert trust relationships into trust opinions
(or, simply, opinions). This conversion is accomplished using subjective logic [JHP06,
Jøs13].
In subjective logic, the notion of opinion is as follows:
Definition 8 Let x be a proposition. An opinion ωAx of the belief owner A about the
proposition x is denoted by an ordered quadruple
ωAx = (b, d, u, a) (5.9)
where b, d, u, a ∈ [0, 1] stand for belief (belief that x is true), disbelief (belief that x
is false), and uncertainty (the amount of uncommitted belief), respectively, such that














ω = (0.5, 0.25, 0.25, 0.4)director
projector
Figure 5.10: Example of the representation of a trust opinion in the subjective logic space triangle.
From the previous definition of opinion, we can state that the variables b, d, and u
define a barycentric coordinate system, in which the location of a point is specified as
the center of mass (or barycenter) of the values of b, d, and u (see Fig. 5.10), so that
the certainty c of a proposition x can be formulated as follows:
c = (1− u) = (b+ d) (5.10)
This means that the opinion space is an equilateral triangle. Equivalently, an opinion
is represented by a point of such triangle, which is specified as the center of mass
(or barycenter) of the values of b, d, and u ∈ [0, 1] (see Fig. 5.10). For example, the
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opinion w = (0.5, 0.25, 0.25, 0.4) is found as the point of intersection between the lines
perpendicular to axes at b = 0.5, d = 0.25, and u = 0.25. Note that each axis is
perpendicular to each triangle side. As said before, the fourth component a of an
opinion stands for the a priori probability (or a priori trust) assigned to any individual
of a given community. The value of a in the probability axis (i.e., bottom side of the
triangle) and the top vertex u of the triangle define a director line. This director line is
important because it allows us to compute the opinion’s probability expectation value
as follows:
E(ωAx ) = b+ a u (5.11)
which is the result of the projection of the opinion point onto the probability axis along
a line parallel to the director line.
Similar to Kleene logic [Fit91], the subjective logic is a three-valued logic [JHP06,
Jøs13]. However, Kleene logic lacks from the concept of base rate, so that proba-
bility expectation values can not be determined at all. Additionally, depending on the
values of b, d, u, we end up having distinct classes of opinions as follows:
• Class of True Opinions. In this case, we have opinions with b = 1, being this
equivalent to the binary logic ‘true’.
• Class of False Opinions. In this case, we have opinions with d = 1, being this
equivalent to the binary logic ‘false’.
• Class of Certain Opinions. In this case, we have opinions with u = 0 or, equiva-
lently, b+ d = 1, being this equivalent to the the traditional probability.
• Class of Uncertain Opinions. In this case, we have opinions with u ∈]0, 1[ or,
equivalently, b+ d < 1, opinions with some degree of uncertainty.
• Class of Totally Uncertain Opinions. In this case, we have opinions with u = 1 or,
equivalently, b+ d = 0, being this equivalent to total uncertainty.
In a way, subjective logic generalizes the standard logic because part of the propo-
sitions are considered to be either true or false. Also, subjective logic constitutes a
generalization of the probabilistic logic because the propositions can be expressed as a
probability in the range [0, 1]. But, more than that, it is fact the subjective logic makes
it possible to express propositions with uncertainty. Remarkably, as shown later, this
allows us to formulate an opinion about someone who we never found before.
In the context of trust computing, the proposition x mentioned above in the context of
subjective logic synthesized as “A trusts onB”, that is, the belief ownerA is the trustor,
and B is the trustee. Therefore, apart the abuse of language, we can express ωAB as
a trust opinion of A on B. In these circumstances, the value of c given by Eq. (5.10)
denotes the confidence degree of a trust opinion ωAB. On the other hand, the value
of E(ωAB) given by Eq. (5.11) denotes the trust predicted value (i.e., the probability
116
Enhancing Trustability in MMOGs Environments
expected value) of a trust opinion ωAB, that is, it represents trustability as a quantifiable
value.
5.5.2 Trust Relationship-Opinion Conversion
Converting a trust relationship (i.e., a set of avatar-avatar interactions) ΓAB into an
opinion ωAB involves two steps. First, we express the probability density over the space
of binary outcomes (i.e. positive p and negative n) resulting from avatar-avatar inter-
actions as beta probability density functions, which are denoted by Beta(α, β). Recall
that a beta distribution is a family of continuous probability distributions defined on the
interval [0, 1], which are parametrized by two positive shape parameters, denoted by α
and β. Let p and n stand for the number of positive and negative past interactions of
A with B, and let a express the a priori or base rate, then α and β can be determined
as follows:
α = p+ 2 a and β = n+ 2 (1− a) (5.12)
Second, by using the bijective mapping between the opinion parameters and the beta
parameters [JHP06, Jøs13], we can express the opinion parameters in terms of positive





a = base rate of x
⇔

p = 2 bu
n = 2 du
1 = b+ d+ u
a = base rate of x
(5.13)
Thus, we use the set of equations on the left hand side of Eq. (6.9) to express an opinion
ωAB(b, d, u, a) of the avatar A on the avatar B in terms of the positive p and negative n
outcomes of their past interactions.
5.5.3 Abstract Case Study: A Revisited Example
In the context of online games, a trust network can be defined as a plain trust network
(cf. Definition 7) whose connections (or directed edges) are endowed with trust opin-
ions, that is, a directed graph of avatars whose edges denote the trust relationships and
opinions they establish with each other. For example, recall the trust network involv-
ing 7 avatars interacting within an in-world region of OpenSimulator, as illustrated in
Fig. 5.8, where 18 different trust relationships were set from 89 interactions between
avatars (cf. Eq. (5.8)).
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By applying subjective logic, in particular the equalities on the left hand side of Eq. (6.9),
it is straightforward to convert the trust relationships into opinions; equivalently, it is
an easy task to convert the trust matrix (cf. Eq. (5.8)) into an opinion matrix as follows:
ω =

users A B C D E F G
A 0 ωAB 0 0 0 ω
A
F 0









B 0 0 ω
C
F 0 0
D 0 ωDB ω
D
C 0 0 ω
D
F 0
E 0 0 ωEC 0 0 0 0
F ωFA ω
F





C 0 0 0 0

(5.14)
5.6 Assembling Trust Networks
As seen above, we have shown how to derive a trust network from avatar-avatar in-
teractions, aggregated into trust relationships, from which we derive trust opinions.
In order to allow an avatar to formulate an opinion about another avatar without any
previous direct interaction, we have been led to the concept of extended individual
trust network ⊤e, which is built up by assembling a tree of individual trust networks
⊤i. Therefore, the concept of extended individual trust network is the key mechanism
behind the inference engine detailed in chapter 6.This is illustrated in Fig. 5.11, which
shows the extended individual trust network of the avatar A. For example, despite the
inexistence of any previous interaction between A and C, A is able to formulate an
opinion about C because C belongs to its extended individual trust network.
As shown in Fig. 5.11, assembling individual trust networks into an extended trust net-
work ⊤Ae of the avatar A is a procedure of attaching individual trust trees as subtrees
of ⊤Ai recursively; more specifically, A had interacted with B and F , so we attach the
trees of B and F to the nodes B and F of A, and repeat the procedure for each of their
nodes. The stopping condition for attaching a tree is when it already exists in the tree.
As illustrated in Fig. 5.11, the ⊤Ae building process initiated in A follows a Breadth First
Search (BFS) process that results in the following edges:
1. A→ B (obtained from ⊤Ai )
2. A→ F (obtained from ⊤Ai )
3. B → C (obtained from ⊤Bi )
4. B → D (obtained from ⊤Bi )
5. C → E (obtained from ⊤Ci )
For inference reasoning purposes, we encode this extended individual trust network ⊤Ae
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Figure 5.11: Example of an extended trust network ⊤Ae for A.
⊤Ae =


















This process can be employed as a personal trust assessment mechanism that any user/a-
vatar can use to assess others.
5.7 User’s Trust Inference System
As shown in Fig. 5.12, the personalized trust inference system is structured as a trust
pipeline with three stages: collecting, representing, and reasoning. This chapter has
detailed the first two stages, while the third stage is approached in the next chapter
(Chapter 6).
5.7.1 First Stage: Collecting Avatar-Avatar Interactions
In the first stage, events (ε) and actions (A) are gathered and handled in order to con-
struct and represent avatar-avatar interactions (Υ ). This is achieved by conversion of
in-world occurrences from user/avatar actions and events into interactions as VW/M-
MOG permanent storage representations (e.g., a MySql database in OpenSimulator is
employed for data storage). This was detailed in Section 5.3.
5.7.2 Second Stage: Storing Trust Relationships and Opinions
The second stage is the core of the personalized trust inference system. Herein, in-
teractions (Υ ) are aggregated by scope into trust relationships (Γ ), which in turn are
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Individual Trust Result (E(ω))
Figure 5.12: Trust inference system.
converted into subjective logic trust opinions (ω) and trust networks (⊤). Thus, this
stage corresponds to the construction of trust and opinion networks, in particular the
extended individual trust/opinion networks, which constitute the fulcrum of the per-
sonalized trust inference system proposed in this chapter and the next (Chapter 6).Note
that subjective logic is here used to derive trust opinions (ω) from trust relationships,
so that the resulting opinion network is basically a trust network enhanced with the
representation of opinions.
5.7.3 Third Stage: Trust Assessment
The last stage is where trust inference and reasoning take place, and will be detailed
in chapter 6.For this purpose, we apply subjective logic (SL) operators to paths linking
trustor and trustee in the individual trust network of the trustor, even when there was
not any interaction between them in the past. As described in chapter 6, these subjec-
tive logic operators are the discount (⊗) and consensus (⊕) operators. As a result, the
trustor does obtain a trust opinion on the trustee, which is expressed as a probability
expectation value.
The assessment across each personalized trust network (i.e., the trust network of each
avatar) will be addressed using three different methods in order to obtain a representa-
tive trust path or paths linking trustor and trustee. In the first method, we will consider
Jøsang TNA-SL [JHP06] and Optimal TNA-SL [JB08b, Bhu11]. In the second method, we
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employ SL directly to the ⊤ without any simplification as in West [WKLS09]. Finally,
the third method will use breath-first search and depth-first search (BFS/DFS) in the
assessment of (⊤) to obtain the representative paths linking trustor and trustee, and
further processed with subjective logic.
5.8 Discussion
The bottom-up methodology used in this chapter and the following (Chapter 6) aims
to demonstrate the applicability and usability of trust mechanisms in virtual worlds.
In the current chapter, the focus is on collecting and aggregating data generated by
avatar-avatar interactions in the virtual world (first stage of the trust inference system),
from which we construct trust relationships and trust networks (second stage of the
trust inference system). In the next chapter (Chapter 6), we will discuss how trust is
calculated from those trust networks (third stage of the trust inference system).
At this point, we are in position of responding to the first two research questions put
forward in the first section of the current chapter:
Q1 — What kind of in-world data are available and how can they be collected?
Taking into consideration that OpenSimulator is open-source, we have direct access to
system-generated events. Therefore, we had only to devise a way of intercepting and
filtering its actions/events related to avatar-avatar interactions. See Section 5.3 for
further details.
Q2 — Can we turn in-world data gathered in the environment into a persistent compu-
tational trust representation?
In Section 5.3, it was shown how collected data in the form of avatar-avatar interactions
could be stored in OpenSimulator database. In Section 5.4, we demonstrated how to
derive trust relationships from avatar-avatar interactions. Recall that trust relationships
express positive and negative interactions between avatars. A graph of avatars (nodes)
and their trust relationships (edges) form what we call a trust network.
We have also shown in Section 5.5 how to derive trust opinions from trust relationships
using the barycentric coordinate system of subjective logic. These opinions will be
used in the following chapter (Chapter 6) to compute the trustability of a given avatar
from a personal point of view (cf. Section 5.7). This computation will be performed
using subjective logic operators. Thus, the third (Q3) and fourth (Q4) questions will be
addressed in due time in the next chapter (Chapter 6).
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5.9 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a bottom-up methodology to build up a 3-tier per-
sonal trust inference system for virtual worlds, in particular for OpenSimulator. The
collecting and aggregating of data generated by actions and events associated to avatar-
avatar interactions are performed in the first tier. The second tier includes a procedure
to derive trust relationships from avatar-avatar interactions in order to make it possible
to determine trust opinions and build up trust networks. The third tier incorporates an
inference mechanism based on graph search algorithms and subjective logic operators
to compute the trustworthiness of a given avatar-impersonating user. Thus, the main
contribution of the chapteris the formalization of trust as a usable concept for virtual
worlds, which translates itself into a personal trust system that each in-world user may
enjoy during his/her interactions with others.
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Chapter 6
Trust Inference
Representing, manipulating, and inferring trust from the user point of view certainly is
a grand challenge in virtual worlds, including online games. When someone meets an
unknown individual, the question is “Can I trust him/her or not?”. This requires the user
to have access to a representation of trust about others, as well as a set of operators to
undertake inference about the trustability of other users/players. In this chapter, we
employ a trust representation generated from in-world data in order to feed individual
trust decisions. To achieve that purpose, we assume that such a representation of trust
already exists; in fact, it was proposed in another paper of ours cf. [CGF16a], an de-
scribed previously in chapter 5. Thus, the focus here is on the trust mechanisms required
to infer trustability of other users/players. More specifically, we use an individual trust
representation deployed as a trust network as base to the inference mechanism that
employs two subjective logic operators (consensus and discount) to automatically de-
rive trust decisions. The proposed trust inference system has been validated through
OpenSimulator scenarios, which has led to a 5% increase on trustability of avatars in
relation to the reference scenario (without trust).
6.1 Introduction
Human relationships rely on trust. The idea of trust computing is to emulate such trust
relationships on computer. The question is then that ”believe or not believe” on some-
one depends on user’s experience, and how the user perceives others and the context.
Personal experience is the result of a knowledge gathering process about others, their
behavior similarities and differences, and so forth, as a result of the prior interactions
with others and surrounding world. When we say that humans are social beings, we are
also saying that they are interactive entities who change and refine themselves over
time and with experience, i.e., they learn in response to their senses.
Thus, the grand challenge advanced by the authors in the previous chapter cf. [CGF16a]
was how to gather data from avatar-avatar interactions and transform them into direct
trust data. The previous chapter succeeded in gathering and representing such direct
trust data. Now, what remains to know is how to infer indirect trust data from direct
trust data embedded in a network of avatars. As Jøsang argued in [Jøs13], we need
to assess if anyone else is trustworthy enough to interact with. This is particularly
important when someone intends to interact with an unknown someone else. In short,
chapter 5 was about the data gathering from avatar-avatar interactions and their trust
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representations, while this chapter is about trust inference and reasoning, i.e., this
chapter details how to reason about those trust data and decide accordingly.
6.1.1 Motivation
Trust is profusely used in everyday life decision making process. In games and virtual
worlds, we need to find a way of mimicking trust between avatars as humans do in their
daily lives. In order to achieve that, we need to consolidate the three stages of the
trust pipeline: collecting, representing, and reasoning on avatar-avatar interactions.
The first two were dealt with in the previous chapter, while the third will be approached
throughout the current chapter.
Obviously, this requires the framework of a trust model in games and virtual worlds, as
we find in specific fields such as social networks [SNP13], work-flows [VM12], MANETs
[CSC11, GM12] and online auctions [WJDW10]. In fact, VW/MMOGs have some similar-
ities with other areas in which trust models were already employed. For example, the
socialization process promoted by social networks [SNP13] is similar in virtual worlds
[DIG13] and online games. But, as far as we know, trust models have never been used
in the context of games and virtual worlds. In a way, this is the raison d’étre of these
two chapters, the current and its predecessor (Chapter 5).
6.1.2 Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter are the following:
• We propose a personal trust model that allows to assist any avatar-impersonated
user in its decision-making about others within the virtual world, as humans do in
their daily lives. This is in contrast with current approaches based on centralized
reputation systems that makes statistical data partially available to users, though
the most common process of passing information from user to user in virtual worlds
and games is word of mouth.
• We propose a trust inference engine sustained on path-finding algorithms and sub-
jective logic (SL) operators. In fact, we use BFS (breadth-first search) and DFS
(depth-first search) pathfinders to extend the TNA-SL (trust network analysis with
subjective logic) previously used in other contexts, other than games and virtual
worlds.
6.1.3 Organization of the Chapter
The remainder of this chapteris organized as follows. Sec. 6.2 provides a brief overview
of trust representation developed in the previous chapter, as illustrated in in Fig. 6.1.
Sec. 6.3 shows how to assembly avatar trees to path the way between a trustor and a
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trustee, from which we are able to find BFS (breath-first search) and DFS (depth-first
search) paths between two avatars. This is particularly important when the trustor had
no idea about the trustee, simply because they have never met before. Sec. 6.4 shows
us how to apply subjective logic operators to the BFS and DFS paths, as a way of a trustor
evaluating the trustability of the trustee. Sec. 6.5 describes a number of experiments
in order to validate the benefits of using our BFSDFS-SL trust engine in virtual worlds
and games. Sec. 6.6 elaborates on the research questions put forward in chapter 5,
highlighting the advantages of using trust modeling in virtual worlds as humans do in
their real lifes. Sec. 6.7 concludes the chapterwith some hints for future work.
6.2 Personal Trust System: an Overview
An mentioned above, our individual trust system is based on a pipeline of three stages:
collecting, representing (or storing), and assessing. This three-stage system is shown in
Fig. 3. The first two stages (collecting and representing) were described in the previ-
ous chapter [CGF16a], while the third stage (assessing) is detailed in the present chap-
ter.Before proceeding any further, let us then briefly approach each of them separately.








ndstage (build trust representation)
Store













Individual Trust Result (E(ω))
Figure 6.1: Pipeline of our personal trust system.
125
Enhancing Trustability in MMOGs Environments
Table 6.1: Data formats.
Type Representation
User parameterizations P = (i, s, g, t, r, d, a)
Event εAB = (uA, nA, uB , nB , b,m,G,R, t)
Action a = (i, A, t, c, p)
Interaction Υ = (i, s, g, t, r, d, o)
Trust Relationships Γ = (i, s, g, t, r, d, a, p, n)
Γ = (i, a, p, n)
Trust Opinions ω = (i, s, b, d, u, a)
ω = (b, d, u, a)
Trust Networks ⊤ = (Γ,A)
⊤i = (Γ,A)
⊤e = (Γ,A)
Trust result value E(ω)
6.2.1 Collecting (1st stage)
Considering that we intend to have an individual trust system to help each avatar (user)
in its trust decision-making about others, we start collecting data with reference to its
own parameters (cf. user parameterizations in Table 6.1).
Collecting consists in gathering event/action data generated from in-world user activi-
ties, which will be used to characterize, to represent, and to store avatar-avatar inter-
actions. That is, events and actions (in the formats shown in Table 6.1) are converted
into representations of avatar-avatar interactions (see also Table 6.1), in a format ad-
equate for permanent storage; for example, OpenSimulator uses a MySql database for
permanent data storage.
6.2.2 Representing (2nd stage)
The second stage represents the process by which the stored avatar-avatar interac-
tions (Υ ) are used to derive trust relationship representations (Γ ), which in turn are
later converted into subjective logic trust opinions (ω) and trust networks (⊤), as illus-
trated in Fig. 6.1.
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6.2.2.1 Trust relationships
The avatar-avatar interactions are at the heart of our personal trust system. From the
point of view of each avatar, such interactions are classified as either ‘successful’ (1)
or ‘unsuccessful’ (0), which are then aggregated by scope in order to produce trust
relationships. Recall that an avatar-avatar interaction ΥAB between two avatars A and
B originates two trust relationships, ΓAB and Γ
B
A ; in Γ
A
B , A is the trustor and B is
the trustee, but they swap their roles in ΓBA . A trust relationship is unidirectional
and not reflexive, so that a trustor cannot be a trustee, other than in another trust
relationship; that is, it is not feasible to have ΓA nor ΓB. In order to elucidate this
point, let us consider we have the transitive path A→B→C→A of trust relationships,
where A appears as a trustor in ΓAB and a trustee in Γ
C
A , but not in the same trust
relationship.
In a more formal setting, a trust relationship between a truster A and a trustee B is
represented by the tuple ΓAB = (i, s, g, t, r, d, a, p, n), where i is its integer identifier, s
the scope of the activity, g the goal to be achieved, t the time of the assessment, r the
risk taken by the trustor, a the base rate taken from trustor (user) parameterizations,
d the decay factor also taken from trustor (user) parameterizations, and p and n is the
number of positive and negative outcomes, i.e., o = 1 and o = 0, respectively. In
practice, we use the simplified form ΓAB = (i, a, p, n) for trust relationships.
6.2.2.2 Trust networks
By aggregating all the individual trust relationships of a trustor avatar, we obtain a
height-1 tree called individual trust tree. In turn, recursively appending the individual
trust trees of the trustee avatars to the individual trust tree of a trustor avatar, we end
up obtaining what we call the personal trust tree of a given (trustor) avatar.
In a more general setting, a trust network ⊤ = (Γ,A) is a digraph representation of
all trust relationships Γ = {Γ1, ..., Γm} established between avatars A = {A1, ..., An}.
Therefore, both individual trust tree and its expanded version, called personal trust
tree, of an avatar (as a trustor) are subsets of the trust network of the entire game
world.
6.2.2.3 Trust opinions
Trust relationships are used not only to build up trust networks, but also to derive trust
opinions (ω) using subjective logic. In practice, each trust relationship of a trust network
is enhanced with a subjective logic opinion. This is a requirement for those interested
in carrying out reasoning and inference across the trust network, as explained below.
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6.2.3 Assessing (3rd stage)
The final stage of the trust pipeline in Fig. 6.1 ends up at calculating the trust value
associated to the trustee, as required by the trustor. The idea is to support the trustor
on its judgment about the trustee. To a large extent, this constitutes the raison d’étre
of this thesis as detailed in this chapter and in chapter 5 (cf. [CGF16a]). For that
purpose, we have to devise a way to reason on the trust network in order to find a trust
path (or paths) between trustor and trustee.
In this chapter,we employ three different methods to obtain a representative trust path
or paths linking trustor with trustee, namely:
• Jøsang method. This method is due Jøsang [JHP06], and is known as TNA-SL. This
method had a follow-up named optimal TNA-SL [JB08b, Bhu11].
• West method. This a variant of the Jøsang method, with the particularity of not
owning any simplification [WKLS09].
• BFS/DFS method. This method uses graph search techniques to find a set of repre-
sentative paths between two nodes of the trust network, the start node (trustor)
and the goal node (trustee). As far as we know, these graph search techniques
have never been used in the context of trust computing in games.
These methods correspond to the trust network analysis (TNA) module depicted in
Fig. 6.1. Having found paths linking trustor and trustee, we apply subjective logic op-
erators (⊗ and ⊕) to such paths, as indicated in Fig. 6.1 and described in Algorithm 3.
These operators are those originally introduced by Jøsang in [JHP06]. From the appli-
cation of those operators to trust paths results a trust opinion (ω) that a trustor has
developed on the trustee, which is then used to obtain a quantifiable trust assessment
as a probability expectation value (E(ω)), represented in the final block of Fig. 6.1.
6.3 Finding Trust Paths
Before calculating a quantifiable trust value of the trustee by the trustor, we need
to find at least one path connecting them in the graph underlying the trust network.
Recall that, in the literature, we find mainly two techniques to determine those paths,
namely: trust network analysis (TNA) due to Jøsang [JHP06, JB08b] and Bhuiyan [Bhu11]
and the modified TNA proposed by West et al. [WKLS09].
TNA has proved to be applied to several types of networks, namely: social networks
[ZXL+12], multi-agent systems (MAS) [WHS11], P2P [WAC+09], and reputation systems
[PSA12]. But, it finds all paths between the trustor and the trustee, so that it tends to
cover the entire search space. This means that TNA is very time consuming, but worse
it is the fact that we very likely get paths with cycles or paths with edges repeated
multiple times. In order to get canonical paths, i.e., paths without cycles and edge
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Algorithm 3: Modeling algorithm.
Data:
uA: in-world user id for truster (sender)
uB: in-world user id for trustee (receiver)
s: scope of the activity
Result:
E(ωAB): quantifiable trust assessment of uB by uA
/* First Stage */
1 begin
/* loads uA parameterizations */
2 Load P (uA) = (i, s, g, t, r, d, a) from database;
/* collect/store (A)/(ε) into (Υ ) */
3 while (A)/(ε) occur in-world do
/* algorithm described in [CGF16a] */
4 Execute CollectAlgorithm ;
5 return ΥAB ;
/* Second Stage */
6 begin
/* define trust relationships (Γ ) */
7 for all Υ (i, s) do
/* algorithm described in [CGF16a] */
8 Execute GatherStoreAlgorithm;
9 return ΓAB ;
/* determine trust opinions (ω) */
10 read Γ (i);
11 repeat
12 read Γ (i);
13 Convert (Γ ) into (ω);
14 i–;
15 until Γ (i) = 0;
/* determine trust network (⊤) */
16 Build (⊤) from (Γ );
/* Third Stage */
17 begin
/* trust network analysis on (⊤) */
18 Execute Algorithm 2;
19 return ⊤AB; /* subjective logic application */
20 Apply SL operators to (⊤AB);
/* convert ⊤AB into ωAB */
21 Determine ωAB;
/* determine a trust value E(ωAB) */
22 Uses ωAB to determine E(ω
A
B);
/* present results to user */
23 return E(ωAB);
129
Enhancing Trustability in MMOGs Environments
repetitions, we have to simplify the trust network. Therefore, simplification aims at
eliminating eventual cycles and edge repetitions along each path between trustor and
trustee. This simplification generates a directed series-parallel graph (DSPG) between
the trustor and the trustee. However, because of the computational complexity and
time processing required to achieve the optimal DSPG [JHP06], only trust paths with
a level of confidence over a given threshold are filtered out. The downside of this
approach is that it may exclude relevant paths that could provide a more accurate final
outcome.
The problem of finding all the DSPG paths was considered impractical and computa-
tionally unfeasible for fully connected networks representing therefore an exponential
number of possible paths to consider; hence West et al. [WAC+09, WKLS09] proposed a
different strategy for the TNA-SL model, called modified TNA-SL. This modified method
does not require the graph analysis of the trust network, i.e., there is no need to de-
termine all paths between trustor and trustee. Instead, one uses a n × n connectivity
matrix for n users to derive a preliminary opinion matrix, which is iteratively updated by
applying the discount (⊗) and consensus (⊕) subjective operators, getting so an opinion
matrix with the most certainty of the trust relationships.
Algorithm 4: BFS/DFS trust network assessment .
Data:
uA: in-world user id for truster (sender)
ux: in-world user id for trustee (receiver)
s: scope of the activity
⊤: scenario trust network
Result:
⊤Ax : Trust network paths linking A with x
1 begin
2 Execute procedure BFS(⊤,A);
3 Execute procedure DFS(⊤,A);
4 Aggregates BFS/DFSAx results as ⊤Abfsdfs = ⊤Abfs +⊤Adfs;
/* Result BFSDSF paths from A to x */
5 begin
6 Parse ⊤Abfsdfs to find paths from A to x;
7 ⊤Ax = BFSDSFpaths found;
Our method was inspired in the trust model introduced by Golbeck [Gol05], which was
designed for social networks. Golbeck’s trust model uses a modified breadth first search
(BFS) to find a path between trustor and trustee, so that it is efficient and fast to reach
all users within the shortest path distance from the trustor (i.e., source user). More
specifically, Golbeck [Gol05] employed a BFS-based minimal path solution in order to
minimize the number of transitive hops interactions in the trust network. Therefore,
the graph search of Golbeck’s trust model does not produce an overall trust assessment,
simply because the search ends up being limited to a localized region of the search
space, following the observed feature that shorter paths and higher trust values lead to
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better accuracy in trust assessment [Gol05].
In contrast, we propose here a new method based on breath first search (BFS) and
depth first search (DFS), as described in Algorithm 4. The use of these two path-finding
algorithms to find two alternative paths between trustor and trustee was motivated by
the following observations:
• Bounded search space. Unlike Jøsang’s trust model [JHP06], we do not consider all
the possible paths between trustor and trustee; instead, we use two path finders,
BFS and DFS, that operate on a part of the search space. This agrees with the fact
that, in virtual worlds and online games (VW/MMOGs), each user interacts with
those within its AoI (area of interest), or at most within the instantiated region,
so that the number of users to take into account in finding paths between trustor
and trustee is limited, yet the total number of users present in the virtual world
may be thousands or millions. Note that, similar to Jøsang’s trust model [JHP06],
the trust solution proposed by West et al. [WAC+09] is also global, yet it is much
more efficient in time performance.
• Trust Assessment Accuracy. This depends on the length of the paths found. The
trust value degrades with the distance (i.e., number of intermediate graph nodes
or users) from the trustor towards the trustee, so that shorter paths are in principle
more accurate than longer paths, what is in conformity with what happens in the
real life when individuals express opinions about others in a chained manner.
It is true that the BFS pathfinder used by Golbeck does not allow for cycles and repeated
edges in the found path, but it has the drawback of using a single path between trustor
and trustee. Instead, we use two-path approach that combines BSF and DFS pathfinding.
The leading idea is to have an intermediate solution between the Jøsang’s solution
[JHP06] —that tends to cover the entire search space— and the single path solution
proposed by Golbeck [Gol05]. As explained further ahead, this two-path solution ends
up being a more balanced solution in the computation of the trust value when trustor
and trustee never met before.
6.3.1 Finding Paths using BFS
As seen in the previous chapter [CGF16a], a plain trust network ⊤ basically is a network
(or graph) of avatars and their direct interactions This is illustrated in Fig. 6.2, where
we have a graph of 7 nodes (avatars) and 18 directed edges (trust relationships). Recall
that the trust relationships as unidirectional.
The trust network shown in Fig. 6.2 is the result of combining the individual trust
networks (Ti) of those seven avatars as follows: TA = {B,F}, TB = {A,C,D, F},
TC = {A,B,E}, TD = {B,C, F}, TE = {C}, TF = {A,B} and TG = {A,B,C}. Recall
that an individual trust network is a representation of the direct interactions that of an
avatar have already established with others so far, which are shown in Fig. 6.3 for our
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Figure 6.2: A trust network ⊤ from avatar interactions in OpenSimulator.
convenience.
A













Figure 6.3: Individual trust networks (Ti) of 7 avatars.
In order to allow an avatar to formulate an opinion about another avatar without any
previous direct interaction, we have been led to the concept of extended individual
trust network Ti, which is built up by assembling a tree of individual trust networks Ti.
Therefore, the concept of extended individual trust network is the key mechanism be-
hind our inference engine, as detailed from here on. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.4, which
shows the extended individual trust network of the avatar A. For example, despite the
inexistence of any previous interaction between A and C, A is able to to formulate an








Figure 6.4: Extended individual trust network TA for A.
As shown in Fig. 6.4, assembling individual trust networks into an extended trust net-
work TA of the avatar A is a procedure of attaching individual trust trees as subtrees
of TA recursively; more specifically, A had interacted with B and F , so we attach the
trees of B and F to the nodes B and F of A, and repeat the procedure for each of their
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nodes. The stopping condition for attaching a tree is when it already exists in the tree.
As illustrated in Fig. 6.4, the assembling of individual trust networks into TA follows a
Breadth First Search (BFS) process that results in the following edges:
1. A→ B (obtained from TA)
2. A→ F (obtained from TA)
3. B → C (obtained from TB)
4. B → D (obtained from TB)
5. C → E (obtained from TC)
These edges are the constituents of all paths from A to any other node in the graph.
These paths are given by the paths of TA (cf. Fig. 6.4), after excluding the terminal
nodes of the tree, and are as listed in Fig. 6.5. The digraph representation of the BSF
paths obtained in Fig. 6.5 is shown in Fig. 6.6. This digraph is a subgraph of the original
plain trust network in Fig. 6.2.
BFS applied to (A)
A to B (B): A->B
A to C (C): A->B->C
A to D (C): A->B->D
A to E (D): A->B->C->E
A to F (B): A->F
A to G (-): not connected







Figure 6.6: Digraph of BFS paths from trustor A.
For inference reasoning purposes, we encode this extended individual trust network ⊤Ae
in the matrix form as follows:
⊤Ae =


















This process can be employed as a personal trust assessment mechanism that any user/a-
vatar can use to assess others.
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6.3.2 Finding Paths using DFS
Finding paths starting at the trustor using DFS is similar to BFS. The difference lies in
that the direct trust tree of each user is attached to the extended trust tree of the
trustor in a different manner. BFS grows the extended trust tree first in width and
in depth afterwards, while DFS does the opposite, i.e., DFS prioritizes the depth in
relation to width. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.7, where the expansion of the tree of A
goes firstly down by the way of F ; after completing the sub-tree of F , one comes back
to B linked to A, but the tree expansion stops because B had already been dealt with
in the sub-tree of F . The digraph representation of the DSF paths obtained in Fig. 6.8
is shown in Fig. 6.9. Obviously, this digraph is also a subgraph of the original plain trust







Figure 6.7: Extended individual trust network TA for A.
DFS applied to (A)
A to B (B): A->F->B
A to C (C): A->F->B->D->C
A to D (D): A->F->B->D
A to E (E): A->F->B->D->C->E
A to F (F): A->F
A to G (G): not connected







Figure 6.9: DFS paths from trustor A.
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Figure 6.10: Aggregated results of the BFS/DFS paths linking trustor and trustee.
6.4 Subjective Logic - based Trust Operators
Subjective logic provides means to produce a quantifiable trust assessment as a prob-
ability expectation, as suitable for analysis of situations with significant uncertainty
[Jø97, Jøs13], and is the basis behind the TNA-SL model [JHP06, JB08b, LLJ+11, JHJ10].
Our interest in the subjective logic stems from the fact that it is able to emulate and
evaluate trust as humans do in real world scenarios [CKN+15, TLHT09, ZDB11, GM12,
PAS13]. This section describes how trust is calculated from BFS and DFS paths between
trustor and trustee.
6.4.1 Trust Opinions
As explained in the previous chapter [CGF16a], a trust opinion entails a trust value that
a trustor A has on another in-world user B within a given activity at a given time. More
formally, a trust opinion of A on B is represented by the following 4-tuple:
ωAB = (b, d, u, a) (6.2)
with (b, d, u, a) ∈ [0, 1] and b + d + u = 1, where b represents the amount of belief A
as on B, d stands for the disbelief (i.e., the opposite of b) that A assigns to B, u is
the value that amounts the uncertainty of the opinion, and a is the base-rate or the
preset value in the model parameterization settings, or in the user individual profile,
that establishes the influence that uncertainty has in the trust predicted value, also
called trust opinion probability expectated value, E of ωAB, which is as follows:
E(ωAB) = b+ au (6.3)
Recall that this trust value applies to direct trust relationships, being the 4-tuples
(b, d, u, a) calculated from the positive (p) and negative (n) outcomes of the past in-
teractions between A and B. If there were not any interactions in the past between A
and B, we have to calculate the trust value by applying subjective logic operators (i.e.,
discount and consensus) along paths connecting A and B in the search graph underlying
the trust network.
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6.4.2 Discount Operator
The discount operator (⊗) is used to compute trust along a chain of trust relationship
edges in a transitive path [JHP06, JIB07, Bhu11]. Its specific features contribute to
increase uncertainty as confidence decreases along the chain [JB08b].
In order to realize how this operator works after all, let us consider an activity involving
three users A, B and C, where we already have two direct trust relationships, namely
A is linked to B and B with C, i.e., we assume that we already have two trust opinions,
ωAB and ω
B
C . Let also assume that there was not any interaction between A and C in the
past. In order to allow A building an opinion on C via B, A has to resort to the discount
operator (⊗) as follows:
ωA:BC = ω
A
B ⊗ ωBC (6.4)
























The discount operator is graphically displayed in Fig. 6.11, where the transitive path be-
tween A and C through B is replaced by a new edge representing the discount opinion,







Figure 6.11: Transitive trust derivation with operator discount (⊗).
6.4.3 Consensus Operator
BFS and DSF generate two canonical paths, i.e., paths without cycles and repeated
edges. However, these paths may share intermediate nodes. These intermediate nodes
work as confluence nodes of two distinct paths. The consensus operator (⊕) enables
us to fuse two opinions into a single one as a result of the confluence of two edges of
distinct paths into a shared node, as shown in Fig. 6.12.
The consensus operator works as an trust update operation. In fact, it performs a sim-
ilar operation to a bayesian network update [JB08b]. Applying the consensus operator
results in a reduction of uncertainty. When uncertainty is absent (u = 0), an opinion
(ω) can be seen as a weighted average of probabilities [JHP06]. To illustrate how the
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consensus operator works, let us consider that the users A and B have an opinion on C;
these opinions are represented by ωAC and ω
B
C . The consensus operator ⊕ fuses these
two opinions about C as follows:
ωA⋄BC = ω
A
C ⊕ ωBC (6.6)



















































C ̸= uACuBC . Thus, this operator creates an opinion that represents the aggre-






Figure 6.12: Trust aggregation with operator consensus (⊕).
Before proceeding any further, let us recall that the subjective logic operators are ap-
plied to the trust network paths linking trustor and trustee, in order to obtain a unique
trust opinion representing the trustor opinion on the trustee.
6.4.4 Trust Inference Scenario
Now, we are in the position of carrying out trust inference on a trust network. Let us
the network depicted in Fig. 6.2, whose scenario represents a snapshot of an in-world
region at a specific time, where we have seven avatars moving around.
6.4.4.1 Trust pipeline: 1st stage
Let assume that there were 89 previous avatar-avatar interactions (Υ ), all performed
within the same activity, with each avatar-avatar interaction scored with one out of two
different outcomes values, either positive (p = 1) or negative (n = 0). These avatar-
avatar interactions are then aggregated as 18 trust relationships Γ = (i, p, n, a), with i
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0 0 0 0

(6.8)
Note that we considered the predefined base rate a = 0.5. The trust network matrix
given by Eq. 6.8 is the output of first stage of the trust pipeline. It represents the direct
individual trust representation between trustors and trustees; the value 0 denotes the
absence of avatar-avatar interactions.
6.4.4.2 Trust pipeline: 2nd stage
As explained in chapter 6 [CGF16a], the second stage of the trust pipeline converts trust
relationships ΓAB = (i, p, n, a) into trust opinions ω
A






a = base rate
(6.9)
so that, from the matrix in Eq. (6.8) we obtain the following opinion matrix:
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ω =

users A B C D E F G
A 0 ωAB 0 0 0 ω
A
F 0









B 0 0 ω
C
E 0 0
D 0 ωDB ω
D
C 0 0 ω
D
F 0
E 0 0 ωEC 0 0 0 0
F ωFA ω
F










ωAB = (0.8, 0.067, 0.133, 0.5)
ωAF = (0.583, 0.25, 0.167, 0.5)
ωBA = (0.6, 0.2, 0.2, 0.5)
ωBC = (0.143, 0.571, 0.286, 0.5)
ωBD = (0.0, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)
ωBF = (0.8125, 0.0625, 0.125, 0.5)
ωCA = (0.7142, 0.0, 0.2857, 0.5)
ωCB = (0.3333, 0.0, 0.6667, 0.5)
ωCE = (0.5, 0.1667, 0.333, 0.5)
ωDB = (0.3333, 0.0, 0.6667, 0.5)
ωDC = (0.333, 0.0, 0.667, 0.5)
ωDF = (0.4285, 0.2857, 0.2857, 0.5)
ωEC = (0.5714, 0.1428, 0.2857, 0.5)
ωFA = (0.3333, 0.0, 0.6667, 0.5)
ωFB = (0.0, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)
ωGA = (0.6, 0.0, 0.4, 0.5)
ωGB = (0.8, 0.0, 0.2, 0.5)
ωGC = (0.3333, 0.0, 0.6667, 0.5)
(6.11)
6.4.4.3 Trust pipeline: 3rd stage
Let us now assume that the trustor A is about interacting with E, but they never met
before. In order to A having a priori opinion about E, we first find BFS and DFS paths
between them, as explained in Section 6.3. As shown in Figs. 6.6 and 6.9, these BFS
and DFS paths are A → B → C → E and A → F → B → D → C → E, respectively.
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The union of these BFS and DFS graphs results in the digraph shown in Fig. 6.10 and
also in Fig. 6.13(a) in a simplified manner. So, now we are in the position of applying
the subjective logic operators discount (⊗) and consensus (⊕) in order to aggregate and
fuse the opinions associated to the edges of the digraph depicted in Fig. 6.13 into a
single trust opinion ωAE, which represents the trust opinion of A on E.
A F B D C E
(a)
A F B D C E
(b)
A F B D C E
(c)
A F B D C E
(d)
A F B D C E
(e)
Figure 6.13: Digraph representing the trust network ⊤AE.
The application of the subjective logic discount operator to the transitive pathsA→F→B
and B→D→C results in a simplification of the initial digraph, as shown in Fig. 6.13(b).
Basically, the trust opinions that A has on F and F on B, as well as the ones that B
has on D and D on C are aggregated as ωA:FB = ω
A
F ⊗ ωFB and ωB:DC = ωBD ⊗ ωDC . So,
taking into account the values of the direct opinions in (6.9), we obtain the following:
ωA:FB = (0, 0.292, 0.708, 0.5) (6.12)
ωB:DC = (0, 0, 1, 0.5) (6.13)
Then, as illustrated in Fig. 6.13(c), the subjective logic consensus operator ⊕ is used to
merge the trust opinion ωAB represented by path A→B with the transitive trust opinion




B ⊕ ωAB yields
ω
(A:F )⋄A
B = (0.758, 0.115, 0.127, 0.5). (6.14)
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Analogously, the trust opinion ωBC represented by path B→C merges with the transitive




C ⊕ ωBC yields
ω
(B:D)⋄B
C = (0.143, 0.571, 0.286, 0.5). (6.15)
Once again, by combining ω(A:F )⋄AB (cf. Eq. (6.14)) and ω
(B:D)⋄B
C (cf. Eq. (6.15)) in a





C = (0.108, 0.433, 0.459, 0.5) (6.16)
Finally, as illustrated in Fig. 6.13(e), we are able to express the subjective trust opinion





C ) ⊗ ω
C
E
=(0.054, 0.018, 0.928, 0.5)
(6.17)
Summing up, although initially avatar A did not possess any information on E, by using
our BFSDFS-SL model to obtain a DAG linking A to E, we can provide a mean to as-
sess the trustability of other avatars even without prior direct knowledge about them.
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the transitivity inherent to the discount
operator tends to degrade an opinion as a path increases.
On the other hand, the consensus operator decreases uncertainty by averaging belief
and disbelief in a fair and equal way. The quantifiable value representing the degree of
trustability of avatar E from the assessment performed by A is obtained from Eq. (6.3),
and is as follows:
E(ωAB) = 0.054 + 0.5× 0.928 = 0.581 (6.18)
Note that this trust value may change over time because of the dynamics of the avatar-
avatar interactions taking place in the game virtual world.
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6.5 Simulation Experiments and Discussion
6.5.1 Simulation Scenarios and Experiments Settings
In MMOGs or virtual worlds like OpenSimulator/SecondLife, the virtual world is parti-
tioned in multiple regions (usually 256mx256m or 512mx512m regions). Essentially, we
are interested in a simulation scenario (i.e., the trust network of avatars) that involves
only a virtual region (i.e., a server), where several avatars interact with each other,
and continuously assess the trust that nourish by others over time. With this scenario
we intend to demonstrate the advantage of using trust-generated data to assist in-world
users or avatars to take decisions as a result of their interactions with others. There-
fore, key features to trust management in other areas like the node dynamics, com-
munication overload, data integrity and security, which are addressed in P2P networks
[GMMPGS09b, TLHT09], are not directly addressed here in our simulation.
6.5.1.1 Settings
The experiments were performed on a HP ProLiant DL160 G6 server, a quad-core In-
tel(R) Xeon(R) E5504 2.00GHz processor with 4 GB of RAM and a 160 GB disk drive. The
operating system used was a Ubuntu 12.04.4 LTS with 64-bit kernel version 3.5.0-44-
generic. All the results of the simulation were produced by a C-based applications and
compiled by gcc version 4.6.3.
6.5.1.2 Behavior-based classification of users
To be able to reason about the advantages of trust usage in the simulation, we consid-
ered different types of user behaviors:
• Honest — This is the default behavior of in-world users who share items and inter-
act honestly with others.
• Pure malicious — This represents users that lie to others in their interactions and
on the items they possess.
• Malicious — This behavior represents users that although being trustful in their
interactions lie about the items they possess.
• Sybil — This behavior has to do with forging different identities. By leaving and
reentering the virtual world with new identity each time, he/she misbehaves to
maintain a positive trust value. Because in the simulation settings, experienced
users are preferred (e.g. users with more interactions) this type of behavior rep-
resents a challenge to detect.
The behavioral characteristics of each user that we have used in our simulation tests
were those described by West et al. [WAC+09] and Pranata et al. [PAS13], and are as
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indicated in Table 6.2 with reference to honesty. For example, honest users are 100%
honest in their interactions with others, but not completely honest (>90% of honesty) in
respect to their shared items of their inventories; in contrast, despite malicious users
are also 100% honest in their interactions, they lie quite a lot in respect to their items
(<10% of honesty). It is worthy noting that the behavior of each user remains unchanged
during the simulation. Each avatar is either honest (or good) or misbehaved (or bad) as
shown in Fig. 6.14 as green dots and red dots, respectively.
Table 6.2: Honesty-based behavior models.
Honest Pure Malicious Malicious Sybil
Interactions 100% 0% 100% n.a.







Figure 6.14: Snapshot of a OpenSim region with 500 avatars with a rate of 10% misbehaved (bad users in
red).
6.5.1.3 BFSDFS-SL trust engine
Our simulation experiments described further below were carried out on our BFSDFS-SL
trust engine. The BFSDFS-SL trust engine was designed as an extension to QTM (quanti-
tative trust management), which is the quantitative trust model simulator developed at
Pennsylvania University [Wes09]. QTM initially aimed to trust in P2P scenarios [Wes09],
but it was also used in other areas like reputation systems [PAS13, YZCZ11, LTW10].
Although there are other trust modeling testbeds solutions [JHSMT13], we choose QTM
because of its extended functionalities, in particular its user behavior modeling func-
tionalities.
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The BFSDFS-SL trust engine comprises two stages: dataset generator and construction
of the trust network. The input data consist of three parameters: number of user-
impersonating avatars, percentage of each type of user behavior (i.e., honest, mali-
cious, pure malicious, and sybil), and number of items to trade.
From the input data, the dataset generator produces a dataset into an ASCII file with
the following data:
• A set of user-behavior pairs that describes how each user supposedly behaves. The
association of behaviours to users is randomly generated using a Zipf distribution
[Zip49].
• A set of user-item pairs that describes the inventory of each user. The distribution
of items by avatars was modeled by a Zipf distribution[Zip49, WAC+09, KSGM03,
PSA12], and represented with a value 0.9 as an attempt to reflect real life data
patterns [PSA12]. The number of available item types to be distributed among
users were limited to 25 to induce scarcity and in this way to increase the number
of require interactions.
• A set of user-query pairs that describes the queries that each user put forward by
each user to others users in the same region. The queries associated to each user
are randomly generated taking into consideration its own items. Basically, a user
may put forward a query to others in its region like “who has the item #5?” since
the item #5 does not belong to its inventory. In order to obtain specific items,
each user must interact with others in an attempt of obtaining items from them.
After generating the dataset into an ASCII file, we are in position of constructing the
trust network incrementally from the avatar-avatar interactions, which in meanwhile
have been generated from the aforementioned queries of the dataset. The number of
interactions was limited to the range [1000,10000]. The edges connecting avatar nodes
of the network denote direct trust relationships, many of them generated from indirect
trust relationships through our BFSDFS-SL trust model.
6.5.1.4 Metrics
In the experiments described further below, we used two metrics to characterize and
evaluate the simulation results: the performancemetric (W ) due toWest et al. [WAC+09]
and the time metric (t). The metric W denotes the performance of honest users as the
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where v stands for the number of valid items that have been traded between users,
while i is the number of interactions that have taken place in a given region of the
virtual world.
The time t plays an important role in the simulation because the avatar-avatar interac-
tions supposedly occur in real-time. In particular, we are interested in evaluating the
upper bound of the number of users that ensure a real-time performance. Recall that
MMOGs and FPSs are particularly vulnerable to lag issues (e.g., a latency time above
200 ms would make a FPS game unplayable), what may negatively affect their trust
usability.
6.5.1.5 Experiments
In order to validate our BFSDFS-SL trust model, we performed the following six experi-
ments:
• Exp. 1 — Here, we used scenario without trust, against a set of different misbe-
havior users. Thus, it is the reference scenario against with we will evaluate our
model proposal.
• Exp. 2 — This uses a scenario with trust. We use the same misbehavior users as
in Exp. 1. Exp. 2 represents an attempt to validate the usage of trust in virtual
worlds and games.
• Exp. 3 — This experiment carries out a comparison of different misbehaviors. Each
misbehavior is compared with two settings: with and without trust. For that
purpose, we used results from Exps. 1 and 2.
• Exp. 4 — This experiment addresses the impact of an increasingly crowded re-
gion (with users) and an increasingly number of interactions has on the simulation
results.
• Exp. 5 — In this experiment, we have a more realistic scenario with a population
that is a mix of users of the four profiles (i.e., honest, pure malicious, malicious,
and sybil).
• Exp. 6 — Finally, this experiment addresses the time issue. One intends to eval-
uate the impact of the trust model on the processing time of the virtual world
performance.
6.5.2 Experiment 1: Absence of Trust Modeling
6.5.2.1 Description
In this experiment, we first intend to assess the impact of misbehaved users in a virtual
world without trust, which will work as the ground truth for the next two experiments.
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For this purpose, we use a population of users of all types, including those behaving
maliciously.
6.5.2.2 Settings
The graph in Fig. 6.15 was produced from a setting without trust mechanisms for three
datasets generated for the different behaviors considered in accordance with the initial
settings and parameterizations for 100 users, 25 items and 1000 interactions. The y-axis
represents the metric defined by Eq. (6.19), i.e., the success rate of honest users. The
x-axis features the percentage of each type of misbehaved users in the total amount of
users considered in the parameterization. For example, in Fig. 6.15, a value of 0.8 of
sybils stands for 80% of sybil users (i.e., just 20 honest users present in a total number
of 100). For this percentage of sybil users, we have an honest for four sybils.






















Figure 6.15: Impact on the honest user performance from rising the number of misbehaved users to
saturation for three different behaviors in an absence of trust.
6.5.2.3 Discussion
Interesting conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the results in Fig. 6.15. All
misbehaviors are consistent with a Gaussian-like regression curve. The success rate
given by Eq. (6.19) decreases with the number of misbehaved users. Regarding the
results of the three different misbehaved user profiles, we see that there are no signif-
icant differences between them. Also, a population with less than 20% of misbehaved
users still has a success rate higher than 80%, while, in the opposite situation, for a pop-
ulation with 60% of misbehaved users or higher, 60% the success rate of honest users
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decays to less than 30%.
6.5.3 Experiment 2: Existence of Trust Modeling
6.5.3.1 Description
With this simulation we intend to analyze how our trust model embedded in a virtual
world copes with different categories of misbehaved users separately, and at the same
time to observe how they compare to each other. We also intend to compare the results
obtained in this experiment with those produced by Exp. 1 in order to validate whether
our BFSDFS-SL-based trust model is adequate for virtual worlds or not.
6.5.3.2 Settings
This experiment uses the same datasets of Exp. 1, i.e., files generated from the pa-
rameterizations concerning 100 users, 25 items, and 1000 interactions, with each file
representing a specific integer percentage of misbehaved in-world users relative to the
population of users, as expressed by the x-axis of Fig. 6.16. Again, the y-axis represents
the success rate of honest in-word users, as expressed by the metric given by Eq. (6.19).






















Figure 6.16: Effect on the performance of honest users from the rising number of misbehaved users until
saturation for the three behaviors.
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6.5.3.3 Discussion
The results depicted in Fig. 6.16 clearly show that using trust mechanisms is beneficial
in terms of valid interactions from the honest user point of view. In fact, in a population
having 20% to 80% of misbehaved users, honest users got more 5% to 10% of valid interac-
tions in comparison with the results obtained in Exp. 1, i.e., the mean rate of successful
interactions increases when one uses trust embedded in virtual worlds. Although the
three user behaviors present similar results, the malicious and pure malicious behaviors
show slightly better results than sybil in the range [30%,50%] of misbehaved users. For
populations with less than 20% or greater than 80% of misbehaved users the differences
are even smaller in relation to the scenario without trust of Exp. 1.
6.5.4 Experiment 3: Trust Modeling per User Category
6.5.4.1 Description
Now, we aim at checking the validity of the our trust model for each category of mis-
behaved users within a virtual world. For this purpose, we considered each type of
misbehaved users separately, without and with trust, as shown in Figs. 6.17-6.19.
6.5.4.2 Settings
The input data and datasets (i.e., files with distinct percentages of misbehaved users)
used in this experiment were the same as those used in the first two experiments.
Figs. 6.17-6.19 show the impact of using trust mechanisms (curves in blue) in respect
to a setting without trust (curves in red); once again, we used the West metric given by
Eq. (6.19).
6.5.4.3 Discussion
Fig. 6.17 shows that there is a clear advantage in using trust mechanisms when the per-
centage of sybil users in the population is in the range [40%,70%]. Using trust seems to be
even more advantageous for malicious (Fig. 6.18) and purely malicious (Fig. 6.19) users,
being this more noticeable for a population with 30% or more of pure malicious users.
Note that trust mechanisms have no significant impact for populations with more than
90% of misbehaved users, but this situation is not plausible because honest users would
stop interacting with others, and probably would abandon the virtual world rapidly
because of the increasing lack of trust. Anyway, it seems that trust mechanisms are
slightly more advantageous in a population with pure malicious users than with other
misbehaved users because the corresponding red and blue curves are more far away
from each other (cf. Fig. 6.19).
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Exp. 3 Sybil behavior impact on performance
with trust
without trust
Figure 6.17: Effect on the performance of honest users from a rising number of sybil users in two
scenarios, with and without trust.
6.5.5 Experiment 4: Trust Modeling with Data of Higher Orders of Magnitude
for a Population with 4% of Malicious Users
6.5.5.1 Description
To address the impact of overcrowding the virtual space we performed some experi-
ments with a varying number of users (from 50 to 500).
This experiment aims at evaluating the trust model in scenarios overcrowding the vir-
tual region (or world). For that purpose, we have considered an increasing amount of
the data (i.e., avatars and avatar-avatar interactions) associated to a region, for a pop-
ulation with a constant percentage of 4% of malicious users. In particular, we have a
ten-fold increase in the number of users and the number of interactions; more specifi-
cally, the number of users increases from 50 to 500, whereas the amount of interactions
increases from 1000 (or 1x) to 10000 (or 10x), as shown in Fig. 6.20.
In other words, we intend to assess the impact that the number of users and interactions
have on our trust model. Nevertheless, in practice, we reckon that the amount of
possible users interacting through their avatars is limited for two reasons. First, any
region of the virtual world has a limited area and, consequently, a limited capacity in
terms of physical space occupancy of their avatars. Second, even in a crowded region,
a user is only capable of directly interacting with those located in his/her vicinity.
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Exp. 3 Malicious behavior impact on performance
with trust
without trust
Figure 6.18: Effect on the performance of honest users from a rising number of malicious users in two
scenarios, with and without trust.


















Exp. 3 Purely malicious impact on performance
with trust
without trust
Figure 6.19: Effect on the performance of honest users from a rising number of purely malicious users in
two scenarios, with and without trust.
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6.5.5.2 Settings
In this experiment, we used a 512x512 region, with the number of users to increase
from 50 to 500, what means that such region progressively gets more crowded; as a
consequence, the corresponding server ends up getting overstretched, in particular in
the case of OpenSimulator.
Taking into consideration that the number of interactions would increase from 1000 to
10000 (i.e., 1000 interactions per each 50 users), we end up having an average rate of
20 interactions per user over time. It was also assumed that the population inside the
region had 4% of malicious users, but no other misbehaved users. This percentage of
4% of malicious users (i.e., 4 out of 100) is an attempt of representing the reality. The
choice of malicious users is justified by the more consistent trust results obtained in
the previous experiments.

































Figure 6.20: Effect on the performance of honest users from a rising number of users and interactions
while keeping a 4% misbehaved presence.
6.5.5.3 Discussion
The graph pictured in Fig. 6.20 was produced from 100 datasets (u, i) (i.e., 100 files),
where the number of users u ∈ [50, 500] varies with increments of 50, and the number
of interactions i ∈ [1000, 10000] varies with increments of 1000. The results in Fig. 6.20
show that with 4% of malicious users, the West rate of success of honest users (cf. metric
given by Eq. (6.19)) in their interactions with the entire population in the region is not
directly affected by the volume of data considered. In fact, the results obtained are
consistently above a success rate of 94%.
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It is observed a higher fluctuation among results concerning the initial 5 scenarios (until
5000 interactions), but from there on there is no noticeable fluctuations in the obtained
results. In short, the success rate ranges between 92% and 99% for a constant rate of
4% malicious users, no matter the size of the population in the region and the number
of avatar-avatar interactions.
6.5.6 Experiment 5: Trust Modeling with Data of Higher Orders of Magnitude
for a Population with Mixed Misbehaved Users
6.5.6.1 Description
This experiment is a more realistic variant of Exp. 4 because the population includes
misbehaved users of different categories. In fact, in a virtual world, the probability
of different users with different behaviors coexist is high. Therefore, the current ex-
periment considers a population having a mix of misbehaved users, namely: malicious
users, pure malicious users, and sybil users.
6.5.6.2 Settings
As in Exp. 4, we also used a 512x512 region populated with an increasing number of
users in the range [50, 500], and an increasing number of interactions in the range
[1000, 10000]. It was still assumed that the population inside the region had 4% of
malicious users, 4% of pure malicious users, and 2% of sybil users.

































Figure 6.21: Impact of the volume variation in the performance of honest users keeping 10% of mixed
misbehaved users.
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6.5.6.3 Discussion
The results shown in Fig. 6.21 corroborate our expectations. They are similar to, but
slightly worse than, the ones produced by Exp. 4. The upper bound of success rate in
Exp. 5 (approx. 98%) is slightly lower than in Exp. 4 (approx. 99%), while the corre-
sponding lower bound in Exp. 5 (approx. 85%) is clearly lower than the corresponding
lower bound in Exp. 4 (approx. 92%). This is valid for populations with up to 500 users,
but for populations with a higher number of users the lower bound tends to converge to
the upper bound of success rate. This suggests that, in spite of a user directly interacts
with a reduced number of other users in its AOI (area of interest), it is recommended
that a user takes advantage of the entire population of its world game region to take
decisions about the interactions established with others.
6.5.7 Experiment 6: Impact of Trust Computing Time
6.5.7.1 Description
In this experiment we address the impact of processing time on the usability of the
trust model. More specifically, we address the implications of the delay incurred in
evaluating the trust model on computer, i.e., the time necessary to get an opinion (or
recommendation) from the trust network, in order to then support the trustor in its
decision-making about the trustee.
It is clear that the admissible lag depends on the type of virtual world in question. For
example, in a player-to-player fight taking place in WoW, a lag of 0.2 secs may be the
admissible maximum, but a lag of 3 secs in SecondLife for trading activities seems to
be reasonable for many. Thus, in Exp. 6, we use a time metric to assess the viability of
the BFSDFS-SL trust model to cope with avatar-avatar interactions in real-time (i.e., in
conformity with the pace of the virtual world).
6.5.7.2 Settings
In Exp. 6, we used the same setting as the one utilized in Exp. 4. That is, we used 10
populations in the range [50,500] that differ in 50 users from one to another, as well
as a number of interactions between 1000 and 10000. As in Exp. 4, the percentage
of malicious users was 4% for any population, though no other misbehaved have been
considered in the simulation. As for the previous experiments, we used BFSDFS-SL trust
model to evaluate trust in the interactions among users.
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Exp. 6 Processing time variability
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Figure 6.22: Effect of the trust computing time under different volume of interactions and users with a
%4 constant rate of misbehaved users.
6.5.7.3 Discussion
A brief glance at Fig. 6.22 shows that, for a population with less than 100 users, it
is feasible to embed trust in the decision-making of in-world users when they interact
with each other, since trust system latency is less than a 1 second, that is, the time
period used as reference for interactions without lagging, also called time window of
usability.
For bigger populations, it is impracticable to use the BFSDFS-SL trust model, unless one
uses parallel computing facilities and tools to speed up trust computations, or eventu-
ally other trust models [CG14], like EigenTrust [KSGM03], Travos [TPJL06] or [LDRL09].
Nevertheless, there seems more reasonable to only consider the avatars within the
small area of each user AoI for interactions with boundaries determined by the \shout
command used in virtual worlds.
6.6 Discussion
Let us now revisit the main research question put forward in the previous chapter[CGF16a]:
Q — Assuming that interaction data is available, how can in-world users (i.e., avatars)
benefit from the data generated in the virtual world to sustain their trust decisions?
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In order to respond to this grand question, we agreed that we had first to respond to
the following five subsidiary questions:
Q1 — What kind of in-world data are available and how can they be collected?
Q2 — Can we turn in-world data gathered in the environment into a persistent compu-
tational trust representation?
Q3 — How can we derive trust to evaluate the trustability of an avatar even when no
previous direct interaction with it took place in the past?
This question can be further detailed in two follow-up questions:
Q3.1 — How to derive a set of paths linking trustor and trustee from the existing trust
network representation?
Q3.2 — How to determine a quantifiable trust value for a path linking trustor and
trustee?
Q4 — Can we demonstrate the validity of our proposal?
Recall that in chapter 5 [CGF16a], we only addressed the main research question par-
tially, because only the first two subsidiary research questions were responded properly.
Those first two research questions have to do with collecting data tied to avatar-avatar
interactions, and how they can be converted into a graph-based trust representation.
The methodology employed to address the first research question (Q1) was based on
avatar-avatar interaction data collected from OpenSimulator actions/events. In re-
gard to the second research question (Q2), we showed how to store collected data into
OpenSimulator database, and afterwards processed and converted into a trust network
representation, as necessary to be latter dealt with by our BFSDFS-SL model. In fact, it
was demonstrated that avatar-avatar interaction data can be then converted into rele-
vant trust information in the form of unidirectional, direct trust relationships between
trustor and trustee. Recall that the conversion of trust relationships into trust opinions
is accomplished in the triangle domain of subjective logic, and in conformity with the
Eq. (6.9).
The purpose of the present chapter is to show how to reason on personal trust trees in
order to allow a trustor come up with trust result about a given trustee in an automated
manner. Such trust inference engine is based on subjective logic operators. To achieve
that goal, we adopted specific methodologies to respond to the third, fourth and fifth
research questions.
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In respect to the third research question (Q3), we used BFS/DFS pathfinding together
with subjective logic operators (i.e., discount and consensus operators) to derive in-
direct trust opinions from direct trust opinions, being thus it possible to combine in-
dividual trust networks into a personal trust tree, from which an user-impersonating
avatar is able to formulate an opinion about another avatar even when they have not
met or interacted before. Summing up, we used a BFSDFS-SL model at the core of our
inference trust engine.
In order to address the fifth research question (Q4), we produced various scenarios
within OpenSimulator with unequally-sized populations of avatars, distinct avatar be-
haviors (i.e., honest, malicious, pure malicious, and sybil), a varying number of inter-
actions between avatars, as well as the impact of trust processing in the overall system
performance. The results have shown that the trust model has a positive impact in the
increasing of trustability among avatar-impersonated users within the virtual world.
Note that the data privacy is a priori ensured by each user settings. That is, informa-
tion concerning email, real name, address, and so forth is not shared in any way amongst
users in our system. The only shared information is the trust network, but even so that
depends on the user settings.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter we have shown that it is feasible to embed a trust model based on sub-
jective logic in virtual worlds, as commonly humans do in their lives. For that purpose,
we have used Opensim as a proof of concept and validation platform to confirm that di-
rect trust relationships stored as trust networks can be used to help a trustor to build a
trust assessment value about a trustee, in particular when they have never met before.
To achieve this objective, we had to win three challenges. Firstly, we had to manage
a way of gathering avatar-avatar interaction data, and find a proper representation for
them. Secondly, we had then to find a way to convert interactions into direct trust
opinions, what was done using subjective logic. Thirdly, we had to use pathfinding
techniques as a vehicle to trust inference, as needed when trustor has to make a trust
decision about a trustee, no matter they have met before or not.
In the near future, we intend to improve the data gathering process in respect to avatar-
avatar interactions, as well as relatively to interactions between other kind of entities
(e.g., avatar-bank interactions, assuming that we have banks in the virtual world).
Additionally, we intend to develop alternative pathfinding algorithms as a support for a
better trust inference. We have also the idea that investigating further the user profiles
(behaviors) may contribute to improve our BFSDFS-SL trust engine. Moreover, we intend
to test the trust system with human users in order to make sure about its efficiency.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This thesis sustains on the research work carried out in trust models for virtual worlds
and massively multiplayer online games (VW/MMOGs). Briefly speaking, we can say that
its main contribution lies in the design and development of a trust model for immersive
environments, where avatars interact with each other in a similar way as humans in real
life, using potentially their five senses: sight, hearing, touching, smell, and taste.
7.1 Context of the Research Work
It is important to recall that the research work underlying this thesis started after get-
ting the understanding that VW/MMOGS lacked trust mechanisms in order to help user-
s/players to make trust decisions about others. In fact, we noted that we can organize
trust in layers and in conformity with the history of trust systems, namely infrastruc-
ture, services, and ultimately community. In modern terms, infrastructure trust has
much to do with reliability of and trust in network nodes, while service trust is inti-
mately related with online services as it is the case of eBay e-commerce system. On
the other hand, community trust concerns social trust we may find in social networks
and e-communities, including VW/MMOGs.
However, VW/MMOGs differ from other social networks, in that they are immersive
worlds where avatars impersonating users/players tend to mimic humans in real life.
That is, virtual trust in immersive worlds attempts to reproduce how humans trust in
other humans. The challenge was then how to model trust (i.e., trust representation
and its operators) for immersive virtual worlds, when there is no known computable
trust model for humans in real life. Recall that such human trust model, in principle,
has to take into consideration the five human senses, each one of which triggers very
personal emotions that affect decision-making.
Obviously, we opted by a simplified trust model that mimics how humans behave during
social interactions. In fact, we opted by considering two out of five senses (sight and
hearing) in the avatar-avatar interactions, though the touch is always present in the
interaction of each avatar with the environment; for example, when an avatar opens a
door or picks up an object, the collision detection-based touch enters in action, i.e.,
we can say that there is an avatar-environment interaction. It is clear that touching
may be considered in avatar-avatar interactions, but we decided not to use it in this
research stage.
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7.2 Research Questions
In order to validate the thesis statement expressed in Chapter 1, let us recall the main
and subsidiary research questions put forward in Chapters 5 and 6.
Q— Assuming that interaction data is available, how can in-world users (i.e., avatars)
benefit from the data generated in the virtual environment to sustain their trust
decisions?
In order to respond to this main question, we use a bottom-up methodology that en-
ables the collecting, aggregation and representation of trust-related information, from
which a small set of operators produce a trust recommendation about any in-world user.
Therefore, the stages of this bottom-up methodology lead us to subsidiary questions re-
lated to data collection, data aggregation, trust representation, and trust assessment,
which are as follows:
Q1 — What kind of in-world data are available and how can they be collected?
Obviously, such data depend on the VW/MMOG at hand. Recall that OpenSimulator
[Lop07] is open-source, so that we access to system-generated events directly. So,
unlike to proprietary VW/MMOGs like WoW (World of Warcraft), we can easily filter out
those events related with avatar-avatar interactions. As explained further ahead in
Section 5.3, these interactions are those in which we are interested in, because they
will allow us to establish trust relationships between avatars.
Q2 — Can we turn the in-world data gathered in the environment into a persistent
computational trust representation?
We can respond positively to this question because we were able to build individual trust
networks from avatar-avatar relationships (Section 5.4). These individual networks can
be then combined together in order to build trusted opinions (Section 5.5) and trust
networks (Section 5.6), which are later used to evaluate the trustworthiness of avatars
from a personal point of view (Section 5.7).
Q3 — How can we derive trust to evaluate the trustability of an avatar even when
no previous direct interaction with it took place in the past?
To respond to Q3, we employed the concept of extended individual trust network,
which, as explained in Section 5.6, allows us to assemble successive individual trust
networks as subtrees of a tree of trust in order to establish a trust path to the trustee
avatar, no matter whether it is unknown or not for the trustor avatar. After finding
such trust path using graph search methods, we use subjective logic operators to come
up with a final trust value about the trustee.
Q4 — Can we demonstrate the validity of our proposal?
Q4 is addressed in Chapter 6. For that purpose, we built up various scenarios within
OpenSimulator with a varying number of users and behaviors (i.e. honest, malicious,
pure malicious, and sybil users), a varying number of interactions between users, as well
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as the impact of trust processing in the overall system performance. These experiments
show that embedding a trust system into a VW/MMOG brings us gains in trust evaluation
accuracy, helping avatars/players to make better decisions in relation to others.
Summing up, and recalling the thesis statement:
Assuming that in-world data generated from avatar-avatar interactions can
be employed to derive a trust representation for each individual user, will
it be feasible to have an in-world trust assessment mechanism suitable to
support and enhance users’ trust decisions?
we can say the research work described in thesis responds positively to and validates
the thesis statement above, in respect to the aforementioned research questions.
7.3 Contributions
The main achievements that have resulted from this research work are the following:
• a trust framework that consists of three layers, data sources, trust engine, and
avatar-avatar interactions;
• a trust model based on the activity theory;
• a trust representation built upon a bottom-up methodology for collecting and ag-
gregating data generated by avatar-avatar interactions;
• a real-time trust inference based on subjective logic operators and graph search
algorithms.
The latter three contributions (i.e., interaction representation, trust representation,
and trust inference) correspond to the three tiers of the trust engine.
7.4 Research Limitations and Future Work
In the research work carried out during the doctoral program, we have identified a
number of research limitations that open a window for future work:
• Data gathering. Although other types of information sources could be used, we
only collected/gathered data from in-world avatar-avatar interactions. There-
fore, the gathering process does not take into consideration other types of inter-
actions or additional information sources (e.g., reputation systems).
• Trust representation. The trust representation was built upon collected data, i.e.,
avatar-avatar interactions via chat and messaging, though other communication
media (e.g., voice and facial expressions and micro expressions of avatars) might
be used.
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• Inference solution. We used BFS/DFS graph search methods to construct the trust
trees, largely because of real-time requirements in interactive MMOGs. We have
not tried other solutions as the search was limited to the game region where the
trustor stood, although we could consider other solutions (e.g., Dijkstra’s, A*, and
Floyd-Warshall search) for solving the shortest path problem between the trustor
and trustee.
• Preset behaviors. We only considered preset behaviors to emulate/simulate hu-
man behaviors. Nevertheless, the experiments would benefit from a deployment
consisting of human data generated from avatar-avatar interactions.
It is clear that these limitations will be instrumental for further research, in particular
those concerning facial expressions, which are related to sight sensing.
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